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ABSTRACT
The harmonization of money laundering and terrorism financing regulation is a key feature of the
contemporary global economy. Since 9/11 particularly, the remarkable growth of this field of
regulation has been characterized by both scale and intensity. However, this drive towards
regulatory convergence is puzzling: the efficacy of the regulation remains unproven while the
content of the regulation poses significant challenges to both criminal justice systems and human
rights frameworks. The corollary to these observations: who does the regulation benefit?
With the understanding that all regulation is an expression of some interest/s, this study analyses
the trajectory of this global regulation and its products. My aim is to understand who gains what
from regulation and how they influence this regulatory evolution. Focusing on Pakistan, my
research will examine how anti money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism financing (CTF)
regulation and its increasing demands for information affects established power hierarchies in
states, between states and among states. At the international and transnational levels, I’m
interested in how a universal financial regulation discourse threatens basic rights and freedoms
and how this exercise of power affects civil, political and economic rights in a country, its
foreign policy as well as geopolitics. At the national level, I’m curious about how such
regulatory power with its distinctive objectives interacts or conflicts with or even amplifies the
control of established power centres in a polity. The analysis of power relations in the case of
Pakistan will be particularly instructive for several reasons. First, the size of its formal economy
is rivalled (if not surpassed) by the informal or black economy and the money laundering
industry is all the more powerful for processing illicit funds from crime; corruption; and tradeand taxation-related malpractices. Second, Pakistan’s military establishment has long supported
militancy as a foreign policy tool, both materially and financially, and to date orients its foreign
policy accordingly. Finally, the military establishment also relies on intrusive surveillance tools
to control civil society.
The opacity of the discourse regarding international financial governance makes a closer scrutiny
of its aims a critical imperative. By exploring the links between regulation, power, knowledge
and surveillance, I hope to understand the aims of this power and offer a critique of financial
regulation as a technique of power and the politics of making and administering AML/ CTF
regulation, both across the globe and within states.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Since its emergence in 1988, anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing (AMLCTF) regulation has not only been globalised at a rapid pace, it has done so unaltered by the
political or economic exigencies of implementing jurisdictions. This study looks to understand
why. The project is analytical as it seeks to identify and understand the motivations of the drivers
of AML-CTF regulation, both globally and in Pakistan, in the period between 1988 and present
day. The study, however, is also theoretical as it examines power – within, between and among
states, institutions and classes – as a possible explanation for the existence and the spread of
AML-CTF regulation. Based on qualitative research, this study will take a grounded theory
approach to the issue of power relations embedded within the framework of global AML-CTF
regulations.
1.1 Why AML-CTF regulation?
The question regarding the spread of AML-CTF regulation1 is especially pertinent in
contemporary times for three reasons. First, few would doubt and the Panama and Paradise
Papers proved that money laundering is still a thriving industry; investigative reporting in several
developed countries (particularly Canada, the US and UK) showed how local economies were
imbricated in the laundering enterprise2. Clearly, AML-CTF regulations are not impeding
1

As used here, regulation refers to norms, standards, principles, guidelines and rules (including laws). By AML-CTF
regulation are meant, primarily, the 40 voluntary recommendations devised and promoted by the Financial Action
Taskforce on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. (See Chapter 3 for details.)
2
See, for example, Robert Cribb and Marco Chown Oved, “Snow washing: Canada is the world’s newest tax
haven”, Toronto Star (January 25, 2017); online http://projects.thestar.com/panama-papers/canada-is-theworlds-newest-tax-haven/; Nicholas Shaxson “The finance curse: how the outsized power of the City of
London makes Britain poorer”, Guardian (October 5, 2018); online

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/05/the-finance-curse-how-the-outsized-power-of-thecity-of-london-makes-britain-poorer?CMP=share_btn_tw; Lee Sheppard, “Our hypocrisy on tax havens”,
Forbes (July 22, 2010); online https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/22/tax-finance-havens-economyopinions-columnists-lee-sheppard.html#5a550c5b5f49; John A Cassara, “Delaware, den of thieves?”, New
York Times (November 1, 2013); online https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/opinion/delaware-den-ofthieves.html?searchResultPosition=1; John Christensen, When will the British government impose public
registries on its tax havens?, (Tax Justice Network, March 4, 2019); online

https://www.taxjustice.net/2019/03/04/when-will-the-british-government-impose-public-registries-onits-tax-havens/?fbclid=IwAR1ZpBGwMVL9UFNlOOSMGirs1pbyErQPQuzO2hpbm9vm9j9d4_7gN0eFTEE &
Leslie Wayne , “How Delaware thrives as a corporate tax haven”. New York Times (June 30, 2012); online
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laundering as much as the authors of such regulation state in their public policy goals, not even
in the earliest, most enthusiastic adopters of the regulation, let alone in the recent (and often,
reluctant) converts. Meanwhile, as the frequency of terrorism cases reported in the mainstream
media in the last 10 years indicates, AML-CTF regulation is not preventing terrorism to any
expected degree either. Given that even global regulators – primarily the Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (FATF) – are unable to show that the
regulation is having the desired effect, the furious pace of the globalisation of this regulation
makes little sense.
Second, a concerted policy regarding regulatory convergence or harmonisation – that is,
compatible regulation across differently-situated jurisdictions – is puzzling on its own. The
critical economic literature about the IMF and the World Bank through the late 1990s and the
noughties categorically discredited regulatory harmonisation as a goal: different jurisdictions, it
was argued, needed different policies and regulations3. The pushback from the global South was
equally sharp and there is now a well-developed body of literature regarding the failure of the
Washington Consensus for postcolonial states4. Even if one accepts the economic-financial
distinction carved out in the literature5, there is little to justify why financial regulation is a better
candidate for regulatory harmonisation than economic regulation.

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-taxhaven.html?searchResultPosition=1.
3

While the literature is enormous, for overviews, see generally, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalisation and its discontents
(New York, W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 2002) and Samir Amin, Capitalism in the age of globalisation: the
management of contemporary society (London, Zed Books, 2014).
4
See, for example, Antony Anghie, “Time present and time past: globalisation, International Financial Institutions
and the Third World” (2000) 32 NYUJ Intl Law & Pol 243, Sundhya Pahuja, “Global formations: IMF conditionality
and the South as legal subject” in Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt, eds, Critical beings: law, nation and the global
subject (Hantspp, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004) at 161-179; Sundhya Pahuja, “Technologies of Empire: IMF
conditionality and the reinscription of the North/South Divide” (2000) 13 Leiden J Intl L 749; Leslie Sklair,
Globalisation: capitalism and its alternatives (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001); & Dani Rodrik, The
globalisation paradox: why global markets, states and democracy can’t coexist (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2011).
5
Conceptually, economic regulation is generally understood as the norms, standards, principles and rules
(including laws) that govern the macroeconomy, particularly the demand for goods and services, employment,
inflation and economic growth. In 1974, Posner called economic regulation “the pattern of government
intervention in the market” that referred to taxes and subsidies of all sorts as well as to explicit legislative and
administrative controls over rates, entry, and other facets of economic activity (Richard A. Posner, “Theories of
Economic Regulation" (1974) 5:2 Bell J Economics at 335-358). Financial regulation, meanwhile, is seen as the
norms, standards, principles and rules (including laws) applicable to the financial services industry. These include

3

Third, there is the issue of composition. Despite multiple attempts to quantify the size of the
global money laundering ‘problem’, there are still no authoritative estimates regarding the same6.
The problems of quantification have been compounded by the extended definition of illicit
financial flows (IFFs)7: the enhanced parameters of corporate criminal liability and the inclusion
banking and securities regulation obviously but after the 2007 global financial crisis, there have been calls to
extend the perimeter of financial regulation to include Special Purposes Vehicles, hedge funds etc. (Luisa
Zanforlin, Ian Tower, Nier Erlend, Michael Moore, Ana Carvajal & Randall Dodd, “The Perimeter of Financial
Regulation” (2009) International Monetary Fund, Staff Position Note No. 2009/07; online
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/IMF-Staff-Position-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Perimeter-of-FinancialRegulation-22826 at 4-7)
6
Most estimates – especially those by economists – rest on numerous unverifiable assumptions. Quirk put forward
a “2 to 5 percent of global GDP” estimate while working as an adviser to the IMF’s Monetary and Exchange Affairs
Department (Peter Quirk, “Macroeconomic implications of money laundering” (1996) IMF Working Paper 96/99,
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC; online
http://www.elibrary.imf.org/abstract/IMF001/04385-9781451962123/04385-9781451962123/043859781451962123.xml?redirect=true); was subsequently quoted by then IMF managing director (Michel Camdessus
(Address by the former managing director of the IMF at the Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering, Paris, February 10, 1998); online
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm) and has since been cited in IMF documents. While
John Walker has frequently attempted estimates – for AUSTRAC in Australia; independently and for the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (see John Walker, Estimates of the extent of money laundering in and
throughout Australia. (AUSTRAC, Government of Australia, 2004); online
http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/200304-33.pdf; John Walker and Brigette Unger,
“Measuring global money laundering: ‘The Walker Gravity Model’” (2010) 5:2 Rev L & Economics 821–853; and
UNODC, Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes
(2011); online https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/October/illicit-money_-how-much-is-outthere.html) – he maintains that the only goal is to speculate intelligently. Most authors agree that the problems
associated with precise calculations are insurmountable (Walker 2010; UNODC 2011; Peter Reuter and Edwin
Truman, Chasing dirty money: The fight against money laundering (Washington, DC, Institute for International
Economics, 2004); and Petrus C. van Duyne, M. S. Groenhuijsen and A. A. P. Schudelaro, “Balancing financial
threats and legal interests in money laundering policy” (2005) 43 Crime, L & Soc Change 117).
7
Since the early 1900s, money laundering was understood as a cleaning process whereby ‘dirty’ money acquired
through criminal activities (such as the drugs trade) would be sluiced through store front operations or cash
businesses to obliterate traces of its criminal acquisition and so, render it immune to seizure by law enforcement
agencies. Present definitions, however, refer to these monies as the “proceeds of crime” where crimes include all
transnational crimes and, post 9/11, terrorism financing and the financing of weapons of mass destruction. In the
last ten years, the term ‘laundered funds’ has been replaced by ‘illicit financial flows’ (IFFs), which focus on the
source as well as the intended use of the monies. The new term covers evolving laundering practices such as the
running of charities, kidnapping, extortion, membership fees (especially for militant organisations), personal
income contributions, the sale of religious books, the organisation of lectures as well as the gems and jewellery
black market. More significantly, the term also covers tax abuse and trade-related malpractices. However, there
are calls to expand the definition of laundering even further: Beare et al, for example, argue for the inclusion of
white-collar crime in the folds of organised crime (Margaret Beare, ed, Critical reflections on transnational
organised crime, money laundering, and corruption. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003)); Pogge and
Mehta see tax abuse as the most significant contributor to IFFs (Thomas Pogge & Krishen Mehta, eds, Global tax
fairness (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016)); Ruggiero identifies sources including tax evasion, corruption,
bribes, capital flight and proceeds of hidden economies (Vincenzo Ruggiero, Dirty money: On financial delinquency
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017)). The World Economic Forum 2012 report also identifies tax free zones as
key enablers of money laundering while Passas focuses on imports and exports that can hide illegal or controlled

4

of tax abuse make precise estimates regarding volume hard to come by. Even so, the composition
of IFFs is still noteworthy: money from crime (drugs, racketeering and terrorism8) accounts for
only a third of total IFFs; corruption contributes only three percent while two-thirds of the total
IFFs stem from cross-border tax-related transactions, about half of which consist of transfer
pricing through corporations9. Similarly, others see trade mis-invoicing as accounting for 83.4
percent of measurable IFFs on average10.
To club these three issues into one: why is the globalisation of AML-CTF regulation such a
pressing issue, when neither phenomenon seems to respond to regulation; the goal of regulatory
harmonisation – as evidenced by the critical literature on economic regulation – is conceptually
flawed; and the ‘size’ of the problem is unquantifiable? If the primary ‘wrong-doers’ are mostly
rich states and corporations, why must the rest of the world sign up for this regulation?
The primary aim of this study is to understand who gains what from enhanced AML-CTF
regulation and how they influence the regulatory trajectory, both globally and in a mid-sized
economy such as Pakistan. The key question is: how does AML-CTF regulation affect
established hierarchies of power within the state and without? Where does power accrue (and
drain) in the AML-CTF regulatory convergence enterprise, both at the global level and the

commodities trade and shield illicit financial transactions via mis-declaration of the quality, quantity, value, origin,
destination, and final use of goods. Nikos Passas, (Hearing on “Trading with the enemy: Trade-based money
laundering is the growth industry in terror finance” before the House Financial Services Committee Task Force to
Investigate Terrorism Financing, 2016); online http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00wstate-npassas-20160203.pdf
8
While the phrase “terrorism financing” is commonly used in the literature, the financing of militancy is a more
accurate and value-neutral characterisation. For the purposes of clarity, it is useful to distinguish between the two.
As Ruggiero correctly contends, the characterisation of militants as violent entrepreneurs or terrorists, not as
religious or political actors, is a “disingenuous discourse” designed to propagate the dominant ideology that fails to
link the crime with the criminogenic environment that gives rise to it, thereby shifting the blame from institutions
to individuals and victims. (The other example he gives is of financial institutions that are routinely portrayed as
‘vulnerable’ to drug money and terrorist finance – not as voluntary service providers reaping huge profits from
cocaine cartels, militant organisations and tax evaders.) Ruggiero supra note 7 at 203. While AML-CTF is being
talked about, the word ‘terrorism’ will be used although this should not be assumed as endorsement of the term.
9
UNCTAD, Urgent global action needed to tackle tax avoidance (2014); online

http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=838&Sitemap_x0020_Taxonomy=CSO
[UNCTAD 2014a]; and UNCTAD, Trade and development report 2014; online
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf at 173 [UNCTAD 2014b]
10

Global Financial Integrity. 2015. Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2004–2013; online
http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final-1.pdf at vii, 5
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domestic one? And finally, as the title of the study suggests, do the regulators transgress their
stated aims and objectives in the design, enforcement and implementation of the regulation?
Hypothesis
This project is intended as a power-based study of the global AML-CTF regime, particularly as it
filters down to Pakistan. My working hypothesis is that AML-CTF regulation is the site of power
struggles between various global and domestic actors as each attempts to consolidate their
power. Unlike a more normative project that would review the performance of the regime in light
of its resolution of a particular problem or stated policy objective, this study looks to understand
the existence of the regime – including its problems – in terms of the power competition between
various domestic and global interests.
In a global context, regulatory power is exercised by powerful regulatory institutions where the
will of powerful member states prevails over the weaker ones. At a national level, power is
exerted by traditional power centres, sometimes in connivance with global powers and
sometimes in opposition to them. Simultaneously, these local powers also collude with and
oppose rival power centres within a polity. The working assumption is that AML-CTF regulation
is both an instrument in the economic warfare arsenal deployed by ruling elites (economic,
military etc) within powerful states against weaker states and the means for the acquisition of
more power by the various actors involved in the enterprise. First, as in economic warfare, the
language of technicalities is deployed in AML-CTF regulation with a view to blinding one to the
normative content of regulation. Second, the power to define ‘mere’ technicalities is political,
economic and biopower. Finally, the aim of this power is more power: economic, political and
biopower.
As understood here, ‘power’ refers to both statist as well as universalizing conceptions11. In the
first, it refers to the exercise of absolute, unqualified power within a state by its representatives,
whether democratic or otherwise. In the second, it refers to the exercise of power over a state
(and by necessary implication, its citizens) by those external to a state (other states/ institutions/

11

Picciotto, Sol, “International law: the legitimation of power in world affairs” in P. Ireland & P. Laleng, eds, The
Critical Lawyers' Handbook 2 (London, Pluto Press, 1997)
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non-state actors). Further, power is also considered in both its ideational sense (that is, how it is
represented in the realm of ideas – the relational, processual and strategic aspects of power) as
well as its material sense (that is, how power is materially organised and institutionalised). My
study will thus tease out the tensions among the power centres within states, between states and
among states to arrive at a fuller understanding of the imperatives of the power located within the
AML-CTF architecture. However, to guard against “the fallacy of affirming the consequent”, I
shall also be evaluating plausible rival hypotheses12 available in theoretical literature.
Alternative hypotheses
The primary justification offered by regulators for the AML-CTF harmonization project is that it
addresses the twin evils of money laundering and terrorism financing, which are a threat to the
health of the global financial system. Besides this, AML-CTF regulation is also pitched as a
panacea to criminal activities such as drugs trafficking, organised crime and insider trading. To
this mutually beneficial end, it is contended, all jurisdictions voluntarily sign up to implement
AML-CTF regulation. As such, the regulators’ purported claims can be seen to be resting on
three pillars: efficacy; universal benefit and voluntary submission to jurisdiction. However, both
contemporary literature as well as fieldwork discredit such an account.
1.2 Why Pakistan?
Several reasons inform the decision to study Pakistan within the context of the global AML-CTF
regime. First, Pakistan typifies the dilemma of a global South country: a mid-sized economy
within the lower-income band that is significant enough to merit regulation but not enough to
influence regulatory outcomes. Second, few other jurisdictions have had such obvious problems
with both money laundering and terrorism financing. But the most pressing reason has to do with
its military.
A key feature of the polity is its historic civilian-military imbalance and the fact that the military
establishment, as a political and economic actor, exercises a preponderant influence over the
state and its domestic and foreign policy. The Deep State – also known as the establishment in
Pakistan – is seen as the cooperative federation of powerful unelected pillars of the state
12

David de Vaus, Research Design in Social Research (London, Sage Publications, 2001) at 13.
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apparatus, particularly the military, intelligence agencies and parts of the bureaucracy.
Collectively, they see themselves as guardians of the country’s physical territory but also, as
significantly, of what they call its ideological frontiers. These frontiers are determined by the
Deep State’s version of Pakistan's founding as an ideological Islamic state and the
characterization of neighboring India as the eternal enemy. The most powerful component of the
Deep State is the main intelligence agency – the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The case of
Pakistan is particularly instructive for such a study since organised crime theory – as the
foundation for AML-CTF regulation – focuses on the state as victim and not as an actor13. While
the confusion between the roles throws up important questions, this issue acquires an additional
layer of complexity in Pakistan: who is the state and can it be independent of the Deep State14?
Pakistan’s foreign policy choices illustrate this dilemma. From the late 1970s, Pakistan’s pro-US
and, as a corollary to that, pro-Afghan Taliban tilt, embedded money laundering and what is now
normatively understood as terrorism financing within the state apparatus15. The ISI was among
the main actors responsible for propagating and facilitating both processes16. While the ISI’s
involvement has been downplayed for strategic reasons in the decades since, a complete
withdrawal of ‘state support’ for terrorism financing can neither be presumed nor proven.
Further, Pakistan’s pro-Saudi Arabia stance from the late 1970s through the 1990s encouraged
the setting up conduits for terrorism financing within madrassahs, charities and mosques across

13

Susan Karstedt, “Organising Crime: The State as Agent” in Letizia Paoli, ed, The Oxford Handbook on Organised
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Pakistan, which are still in active use17. Both foreign policy choices have had far-reaching
consequences: the empowerment of the military at the expense of civilian and democratic
institutions and the creation of powerful militant groups and factions.
Ostensibly, aggressive implementation of AML-CTF regulation ought to be the panacea to both
problems identified above. Realpolitik, however, suggests otherwise. First, the military
establishment has historically courted the religious right in Pakistan, both for political legitimacy
and for ideological support in military misadventures in Kashmir and Afghanistan. As such, the
establishment does not have the option of either dialling down its relationship with Saudi Arabia
or even cracking down on the financing that right-wing parties in Pakistan rely on.
Second, reports from other jurisdictions suggest troubled domestic experiences with global
AML-CTF regulation18 as well as the view in the academic literature that AML-CTF regulation
doesn’t work in containing either. Indeed, Hasan 2013, Shah and Hasan 2014 and Rehman 2015
outline fund mobilisation strategies deployed by militants in Pakistan that sidestep the formal
financial system for the most part. As such, a detailed examination of Pakistan’s case seems
particularly apt. In a cash-driven economy where the undocumented sector rivals the size of the
formal economy19, the chances of AML-CTF success thus seem questionable20.
Last, but not the least is the fact that AML-CTF regulation enhances the surveillance powers
available to states, powers that particularly interest the Deep State. Not only does Pakistan have a
poor track record on the enforcement of human rights, particularly the security of person and
right to privacy21, the state’s powers are prone to abuse by state actors, particularly military
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agencies, against its citizens22. The AML-CTF regime strips away or derogates from many
constitutional and procedural safeguards available under existing laws; as such, the potential for
abuse by the military establishment is amplified and some of these fears are already being
realised. While the global trend towards the judicialization of politics has paved the way for the
rise of the judiciary as a strong power centre in the last decade or so, infighting between the
military establishment and the judiciary is likely to distract the latter from its task of protecting
citizens.
1.3 Research design
Conceptualisation and operationalisation
I will argue that the uniformity of regulation and the lack of sustained, critical dissent in this vital
area of global governance suggests a power that is ideological. I will suggest this power is all the
more potent because it generates (and operates on) the belief that the existing social, political and
economic status quo is natural, inevitable, perpetual and universally beneficial. Further, I will
argue that the specificity of the standards themselves suggests a disciplinary power reminiscent
of Foucault’s “micro-physics of power”23. My study thus aims to deconstruct the evolution and
processes of the AML-CTF discourse with a view to interrogating its dominance.
In the context of AML-CTF regulation, I will argue that power refers to, first, the ability to
control the discourse surrounding regulation. This includes the definition of key concepts and the
creation of normative and legitimation frameworks24. Second, in this dissertation, power refers to
the ability to create and enforce regulations – what Hindess understands as capacity. Power also
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carries embedded in it notions of legitimacy as well as the authority to organise accountability
mechanisms as well as punitive or disciplinary measures – power as right25.
In this dissertation, power is the independent variable and sovereignty is the dependent variable
(the more power, the more sovereign a state/ institution/ individual), while AML/CTF regulation
can be seen as one among several intervening variables. The juxtapositioning of the imperatives
of power with the processes of its construction, I will explain, renders key insights into its aims.
Power and its sources (economic, military, political, ideological and judicial) are key concepts
for the purposes of this study, which looks to document their interaction on the plane of AMLCTF regulation through an extensive review of the literature and, more particularly, through a
case study of Pakistan. Power is used here in consonance with the insights provided by Mann,
which refers to the ability to secure results through political manoeuvring effected by leveraging
various sources of power. This power is held by actors (both individuals and states), institutions
as well as networks. In the first instance, power refers to the ability of citizens to impact the laws
they are governed by: for example, the ability of citizens within the pale of domestic politics to
influence the character of AML-CTF regulation as it applies to them. In the second instance,
power refers to a state’s ability to make and administer the laws operative within its territorial
jurisdiction as well as its ability to leverage its power on a global level to effect (as well as
affect) global laws and regulations that it can benefit from. Finally, power also refers to the
ability of institutions or networks to secure favourable outcomes in derogation of those sought by
others.
Although AML-CTF regulation is pitched as voluntary, I will argue that its enforcement runs
counter to such a characterisation. The ‘outsourcing’ of AML-CTF regulation to organisations
such as FATF can, as such, be seen as an erosion of the monopoly of the state over making and
administering law. Accordingly, among the indicators to be studied are how AML- CTF
regulations impact North-South relations in a postcolonial context. Since power is reflexive at its
core, the study shall examine the effect of these imported laws on the development of political
institutions, democratic structures and processes in the South, using Pakistan as a case study.
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This shall be done by examining the impact of the implementation of the AML-CTF regulations
on the parliament’s relationships with its core constituencies, the people as well as national
regulators (central banks etc). Significantly, this examination shall also extend to how AML-CTF
regulation impacts relationships within a polity (between the legislature, the judiciary and the
powerful military establishment in Pakistan). The analysis of how the various forms of power –
political, military etc – work in tandem and in isolation will provide answers to the question of
how AML-CTF regulations affect established hierarchies of power.
Methodology, data collection and sampling strategy
Given the complexity of the research questions and the need to develop a nuanced understanding
of the phenomena under study, a qualitative research method was selected. The primary
instrument of research were interviews, in order to “access the perspective of the person being
interviewed … to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe26”. This was
particularly necessary since power, as a concept, does not readily lend itself to observation and
even when operationalised, requires further interpretation by its objects and subjects. The
dependence on interviews was rendered all the more complete as there is little available literature
that examine AML-CTF regulation through the prism of power.
Literature review
To develop a fuller understanding of power as well as the processes of its operationalisation, I
drew on popular accounts from the fields of law, political science and sociology. While the
selection of theorists may appear – at first blush – to be both Eurocentric as well as gendered,
this was necessitated by the parameters of the study. First, in the chapter on power that forms the
theoretical framework for this study (Chapter 2), the objective was to develop a generalised
theory of power by mining the literature for commonalities. Since only the most influential,
general accounts of power were selected, this resulted in the necessary omission of, for example,
theorists from the global South as well as feminist voices. Second, while there was an attempt to
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include women besides Arendt and Sassen, unfortunately, many did not make the cut due to the
stringency of the parameters outlined above.
Given the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the efficacy of AML-CTF in
reducing/eliminating money laundering and terrorism financing, I relied on official data and/or
published accounts issued by states and regulatory institutions.
By official data are meant quantitative assessments and economic/ financial data regarding
efficacy issued by the IMF/ WB/ FATF as well as governments. For example, the IMF, WB and
FATF cite a single guesstimate (of dubious provenance) regarding global money laundering; the
Pakistani central bank does not even attempt an estimate for money laundered in Pakistan. The
Panama and the Paradise papers disclosures are spectacular precisely because they provide a
more substantial sense of the numbers involved than was previously possible. (However, since
these numbers are drawn from the documents leaked from one law firm, they have no bearing on
global estimates.) Accordingly, I tested efficacy by juxtaposing regulatory agency ‘non-claims’
(i.e. their lack of quantitative data demonstrating efficacy) with evidence of occurrence in the
news media (i.e. unabated money laundering/ terrorism financing as evidenced by Panama/
Paradise-type revelations or terrorism financing operations).
Interviews
A total of 32 interviewees were selected through purposive sampling, networked introductions
and the ‘snowball’ method. This was because an understanding of the field required specialist
knowledge.
Most of the interviews ranged between 60 and 90 minutes each and were conducted in person in
Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore over the summer of 2018. The interviewees were people
responsible for the regulation, enforcement and implementation of AML-CTF regulation in
Pakistan and included former and serving policymakers and technocrats within the government;
law enforcement agencies (LEAs); financial sector regulators; investigators and prosecutors
within national agencies; industry participants, especially bankers; lawyers; economists;
academics; parliamentarians; rights activists; aid workers as well as journalists in Pakistan.
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The interviews helped assess the potential impact of financial regulation on domestic
constitutionalism, political institutions as well as democratic processes and procedures in
Pakistan. The activists helped answer what these regulations will mean in a country with a
patchy human rights record and a long history of excesses and surveillance by both political
governments and the Deep State. Finally, the interviews with journalists covering militancy
helped acquire a deeper understanding of how terrorism funding operates on the ground and,
thereby, how the state (or, more accurately, the Deep State) is complicit in the securing the
success or the failure of AML-CTF regulation.
Open-ended, semi-structured interviews were chosen as the most appropriate means of data
collection. Since questions of power are rarely examined in conjunction with specifically money
laundering and terrorism financing regulations, this format allowed for more considered and
reflective responses. Further, since some interviewees were reluctant to challenge – or even
voice misgivings – regarding regulations without empirical evidence to support their claims, the
open/semi-structured format allowed me to respond to and individualise questions to get an indepth response while staying within the broad parameters of the subject area27.
To encourage greater disclosure and to ensure the safety of the interviewees where the
information provided was either of a sensitive nature or where interviewees were prohibited from
talking about the nature of their assignments, each interviewee was given the option of remaining
anonymous for part/s or the entirety of their interview.
Finally, the interviews were not recorded and only notes were taken during the same. This was
because recorded interviews generally encourage guardedness. Further, in the case of public
officials, the absence of recorded interviews allows them to maintain plausible deniability.
Finally, taking notes also makes for more active involvement on part of the interviewer28, which
was a key requirement.
Documentary Analysis
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Since this project also focuses on the possible objectives of money laundering and terrorism
financing regulation, research included discourse analysis of money laundering and terrorism
financing regulation as contained in policy documents issued by global regulatory agencies such
as FATF, the IMF, World Bank, the United National Security Council and the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
To focus the scope of the enquiry, the study focused the period between 1988 and present day.
Second, the documents were chosen on the basis of their relevance to global AML-CTF
harmonization projects. Therein, particular focus was laid on material changes in policies/
operations of the IMF/ World Bank etc (for example, documented instances of when AML-CTFspecific regulations were made part of country conditionality on IMF/ WB loans) and in the
standards and codes they endorse/ promote (for example, the inclusion of the regulations in the
IMF’s surveillance work). Further, material changes in the workings of the global financial
market – as reflected by practices of commercial banks; debt clubs; private financial institutions/
individuals and even states – were also examined. The chronological assessment of these
changes show the gradual reification of AML/ CTF regulatory discourse.
The research also included analysis of statutes dealing with money laundering and terrorism
financing in Pakistan, including the amended version of the Anti-Terrorism Act and the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2010 as well as relevant portions of statutes such as the Pakistan Penal
Code; the Income Tax Ordinance; the Customs Act as well as the Control of Narcotics
Substances Act. Policy documents and guidelines issued by the National Counter Terrorism
Authority, which is the lead agency in dealing with terrorism financing in Pakistan; the State
Bank of Pakistan, which is the banking sector regulator, as well as the securities regulator
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan were also examined, in addition to the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. A close reading of these documents enabled a
deeper dive for regulatory objectives.
Further, a study of the methodology of regulation contained in such laws and policies as well as
the financial architecture described provided significant insights into the rationale and the
possible objectives of the regulation. ‘Methodology of regulation’ here refers to the embedding
of FATF regulations across the Pakistani legal universe – in a variety of criminal and civil
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statutes, policy documents and guidelines, bilateral and multilateral agreements etc. This
‘regulatory web’, I believe, allows for more stringent enforcement of the FATF 40
recommendations than a single statute would have done. An examination of the precise location
of a regulation (for example, whether it is part of the anti-terrorism law or general criminal law)
offers greater insights into the intention of the framers as well as its potential for abuse.
Such a reading also allowed me to see first, the substantive changes in the laws over the period
under study and to connect such changes to geopolitical events. Further, it also provided insights
into how the law regarding money laundering and terrorism affects or purports to affect
individuals and institutions (financial as well as, for example, charities). To test the validity of
my findings, I further relied on contemporary scholarship for expert assessments regarding
efficacy. This triangulation help increase the internal validity of the data or what Rubin and
Rubin call “consistency-coherence29”. (That is, any possible inconsistencies in data can be
explained or unpacked, as the case may be.)
Researcher positionality
Having worked as a journalist in Pakistan for 18 years has provided me with significant exposure
to and insight into Pakistan’s history, politics and business. As such, many of the people I
interviewed were drawn from my professional network. Further, since my father was a judge at
the Supreme Court of Pakistan and my brother practices law at the Supreme Court, I also had the
advantage of being able to capitalise on their professional networks. This allowed me to build on
existing relationships of trust and, through the means of networked introductions, further extend
that circle. As a former business editor, not only am I deeply familiar with business practices as
well as the workings of the financial sector in Pakistan, I have studied many of the applicable
laws and regulations, particularly during the course of my Master’s research in financial sector
regulation. This familiarity with both ‘technical’, financial sector-specific knowledge and the law
worked to my advantage in conversations with most interviewees. Finally, due to my journalistic
background, I also have a significant understanding of Pakistan’s militant networks, their
operationalisation and the issues within. This includes an understanding of the relationship with
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the state as well as a working knowledge of their financial operations (fund mobilisation etc) on
the ground. Since several former colleagues cover militancy in Pakistan for mainstream Pakistani
and foreign publications, I also had access to people who were better informed and provided me
with supplementary information. Since the majority of interviewees hailed from urban
professional backgrounds, I did not face any problems associated with perceptions regarding my
gender, class or professional background. In most situations, I was able to trade in on my
credibility as a former journalist to gain both access as well as trust. (But see the section on
Limitations)
Limitations of the study
The most challenging aspect of this project was the lack of empirical data regarding both the
‘size’ of the problem as well as the efficacy of AML-CTF regulation. Official data regarding
money laundering and terrorism financing (both globally as well as in Pakistan) provided only
guesstimates of dubious provenance. While there has been every attempt to triangulate the
figures cited by some interviewees, the data ought to be used with caution.
The second potential limitation is that in Pakistan’s context, it is hard to locate ‘the state’ within
a praetorian state with a subservient legislature and timidly-assertive judiciary. Given the role of
the military establishment in promoting ‘state-sponsored’ militancy, Pakistan’s historic civilianmilitary imbalance as well as military excesses against citizens, the study risks assuming
causality where there may only be correlation (direct or indirect) or even a spurious
relationship30. While there has been every attempt to guard against this possibility by canvassing
the widest range of opinions in both academic scholarship as well as among interviewees, an
element of risk remains.
Finally, an additional challenge was that my analysis would be compromised or rendered less
objective due to my positionality or being deeply embedded in the context. To guard against this
possibility, the research design was built to include an alternative hypothesis, a large cross-
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section of opinion as well as a stringent data analysis methodology. Wherever possibly, I also
cross-checked data against independent sources.
1.4 Project overview
My project begins with a general discussion of power in extant scholarship and, as I have read it,
the implications for AML-CTF regulation. As a central concept of the study, the issue of power
is taken up from four angles: what is power and who does it speak for; how is power produced,
ordered and deployed; what does the interaction of various powers produce and are these results
predictable; and finally, what are the aims of power.
The third chapter focuses on power relations embedded in the global AML-CTF architecture by
mapping its historical evolution as well as the role of key actors, institutions and events, between
1988 (the first conception of AML regulation by the Basel Committee) and now, especially after
9/11. The wider context is about the geopolitics of making and administering AML-CTF
regulation but equally about how the dynamic interaction of powers big and small produces
unpredictable regulatory outcomes. The chapter then proceeds to a discussion of contemporary
critiques of AML-CTF regulation as well as their deficiencies.
The fourth and fifth chapters draw off my fieldwork in Pakistan. The fourth slices Pakistan’s
AML-CTF regime two ways: first, in the context of how its foreign policy, especially in relation
to the US and Saudi Arabia, influences both the enforcement and the implementation of
regulation in Pakistan; second, in the context of how the domestic sources of power – military,
economic, political, ideological and judicial – both affect and are affected by the implementation
of global regulation. That is, how global AML-CTF regulation amplify and/or erode domestic
sources of power.
The fifth chapter sets out the costs of implementation of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan, given
particularly the structure of its economy and its polity. I look at the possible consequences of the
democratic deficit in AML-CTF regulation on the North-South power dynamic as well as the
possible consequences for democratic processes in Pakistan. These obviously include the right to
be governed by a government of one’s choice and to hold it accountable for transgressing the
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defined limits of such delegated power. However, far more pertinent is how the regulations will
affect the balance of powers in contemporary Pakistan.
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CHAPTER 2: Re-reading power inside the AML-CTF regime*
The question of power is key to this project. Like transnational economic law31, anti-money
laundering and counter terrorism financing (AML-CTF) regulation too does not respond to
analyses of power that are state-centric and the Foucauldian focus on the relational, processual
and strategic aspects of power is a better analytical fit for a domination that arises from “a
constellation of interests32”. Significantly, this constellation refers to both the array of global and
local ‘drivers’ of AML-CTF regulation as well as the variety of ideational and material goals
pursued by these drivers.
The drive towards (and away from) AML-CTF regulation can be resolved into its constitutive
elements that determine and influence the trajectory of regulation as well as its implementation
(see Chapter 3 for details). Globally, these elements comprise states who benefit from money
laundering vis-à-vis other states that do not; developed states vis-à-vis developing ones;
individual states vis-à-vis transnational regulators; and transnational networks and pressure
groups vis-à-vis governments. Domestically, these elements comprise the military vis-à-vis the
judiciary; state bureaucracies (central banks etc) vis-à-vis economic actors; law enforcement
agencies vis-à-vis the people, including domestic politicians; the state vis-à-vis criminal
organisations; and even regulators vis-à-vis industry. At the global level, power manifests itself
as pressure from various actors/ institutions/ networks (for example, the US/ the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (FATF)/ G7). Within domestic
jurisdictions, the drive for and against AML-CTF regulation can be distilled to the various
sources of economic, political, ideological, judicial and military power within a polity: for
example, an on-shore haven may have an economic interest in encouraging the inflow of
laundered monies from other jurisdictions but a political interest in arresting the flow of
terrorism financing.
This array of ‘drivers’ – as well as the opposition between them – confirms the Hobbesian
degrees-of-power analysis, where everyone has some power. Crucially, the ‘drivers’ are not just
ruling elites: the relational aspect of power ensures that non-elite groups also have a voice in the
* Particular thanks to Frank Pearce for his insightful critiques of earlier drafts of this chapter.
31
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20

regulation. For example, militant groups in Pakistan (through their influence on military and
judicial power) and global movements such as the Tax Justice Network or Global Financial
Integrity (as a consequence of their efficacy as pressure groups) also wield a power that does not
comport with their size.
The point that deserves greater recognition, however, is that power is both the capacity to act and
to resist. In the context of AML-CTF regulation, the resistances that Foucault and Lukes speak
of are visible in, for example, the “hidden transcripts” that are disguised expressions of
ideological insubordination – for example, the subversion of the implementation of AML-CTF
regulation by the Deep State in Pakistan.
Finally, power within the AML-CTF universe is both ideational and material: the former, in how
it is pitched, for example, as a battle against organised crime; the latter in how it operates to the
material advantage of laundering havens in developed countries or of ‘exporters’ of compliance
products in such countries.
‘Global’ regulation can thus be seen as the product of the interaction of these big and small,
domestic and global powers that clash, converge, consolidate, oppose, resist and nullify each
other through strategic alliances and ruptures. To understand the effects of power within the
AML-CTF universe requires an appreciation of the power structures and networks undergirding
the global regime. To this end, the present chapter explores, first, the question of power itself;
second, how it is produced, ordered and deployed. The final section discusses what happens
when differently sized and oriented powers compete and whether these outcomes are predictable.
2.1 Power, defined
Given that power means different things to different people in different contexts, it is necessary
to structure the specific contours of any debate regarding its meaning. This section refers to
definitions available in the existing literature on power in the disciplines of sociology, politics,
law and philosophy. Accordingly, each definition carries the imprint of the evolution of its
discipline over time as well as convergences and intersections across disciplines.
The concept of power has received sustained scholarly attention in European thought since (and
even before) Hobbes’ Leviathan in 1651 but its inherent porousness and fungibility render it
resistant to an easy universalisation. There is no singular, universal understanding of what power
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is, where it is found, what it does and how it works. There are overlaps and commonalities
between various theories but these crop up in unexpected spaces: for example, most see
invisibility or the complicity of the subjugated as essential to the exercise of power, not visible
displays of power or coercion. Differences in conceptions of power, meanwhile, are invariably
rooted in context: power in sexual relations is fundamentally different from the exercise of
sovereignty. Power thus expands and contracts according to the lens of the theorist examining it
and the situation it is applied to. Even the theories that allow for a more general applicability of
the concept of power – especially as it relates to AML-CTF regulation – are almost invariably
mired in restrictive contexts or riven by certain fundamental inadequacies. For example, while
Foucault’s explications regarding power and resistance are analytically useful in understanding
the operation of AML-CTF regulation, he rarely delves into the precise workings of the
economy. Accordingly, for a project that focuses on financial regulation, Foucault’s theories
necessitate adaptation or tempering with insights from theorists with a stronger economistic
focus such as Marx, Gramsci, Weber and Poulantzas.
The classical Hobbesian definition sees power as man’s present means to acquire some future
apparent good33. This power may be original (or natural) in that it flows from the eminence of
mental or physical faculties, or it may be instrumental (or acquired), that is power – acquired
through the eminence of faculties or by fortune – which is the means and instrument to acquire
more 34. The strength of Hobbes’ analysis lies in the insights he derives from a series of everyday
examples of power. He shows, for example, material wealth, knowledge and eloquence as types
of power, which possess an essential, inherent transmutability: each can potentially be converted
into benefits for the user35. The point about transmutability is significant – Bourdieu later makes
a similar point regarding the inter-convertibility of economic, social and linguistic capital
(discussed later) – since it shows power as the means to an end and not as an end itself.
The other important point Hobbes makes is regarding ‘honour’, that is, recognition or
acknowledgement of power36. While the concept was later investigated as ‘validity’, ‘legitimacy’
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and ‘recognition’ by many theorists ranging from Weber to Bourdieu, Hobbes originally saw
honour as the worth of a person as determined by the value others placed on their power or the
use thereof – a succinct explanation of the relational aspect of power. Critically, Hobbes is alive
to the essential subjectivity of such assessments: he notes that evaluation is dependent on the
needs or judgement of the evaluator and is conditioned by their peculiar context37. The value of
this insight is indicated by the fact that more than three centuries later, contemporary scholarship
is still preoccupied with the subjectivity of norms and discursively constructed legitimacy.
Bourdieu also makes a similar point regarding the acknowledgement of power. The language of
authority, he notes, governs in collaboration with those it governs and with the aid of the social
mechanisms capable of producing this complicity. For a language to be accorded the importance
it claims, it needs to be recognised as such38. This is because power and authority come to
language from the outside: from the social position of the speaker and his participation in the
authority of the institution authorising his utterance (as reflected by his access to the legitimate
instruments of expression) but also – in the Hobbesian sense of subjectivity – from the
legitimacy of the situation and the legitimacy of the receivers of the said utterance39. Legitimate
receivers (or the market for a discourse), argues Bourdieu, shape both the symbolic value of and,
by means of their unique interpretation, the real meaning of the discourse40.
The insight is key to understanding the pre-eminence of FATF as the global authority on both
money laundering and terrorism financing. If the organisation is assessed – like other global
economic regulators – against criteria such as democratised rule formation or the breadth of its
political engagement (as reflected by its membership), FATF’s legitimacy as a regulator is
questionable. But, as Chapter 3 shows, the non-representative nature of FATF and its nondemocratic processes prove no real impediment. This is because its language of authority, to
quote Bourdieu, comes from the outside: FATF is pre-eminent because its power is recognised
by other actors (states such as the US; institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and networks such as the G7). These actors lend their power and authority to FATF by
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accepting – and thereby endorsing – its jurisdiction over the issues of money laundering and
terrorism financing. Further, this market for the FATF discourse on money laundering or
terrorism financing – the “legitimate receivers” – shapes both the symbolic value of and, by
means of its unique interpretation, the real meaning of the discourse41. For example, how the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – as one such ‘receiver’ – interprets the regulations as
applicable to the financial services industry ends up being the most authoritative explication of
the global AML-CTF standards regarding banks42. Similarly, the IMF’s endorsement and
promotion of FATF standards enhances both the symbolic value ascribed to AML-CTF
compliance as a normative good but also its material value as a guarantee for better terms on a
loan or the route to a better assessment of a country’s financial sector in an IMF-World Bankauthored Financial Sector Assessment Programme43.
For Hobbes, however, material gain or the threat of violence are the only guarantee of
compliance. People honour the commands of a sovereign, he says, when they value him/her for
the help s/he can provide or the harm s/he may inflict44: “the terrour of some Power45”. The
argument holds up well in the AML-CTF context: FATF’s ability to grey- or blacklist countries
based on their lack of compliance would probably not have inspired such fear among ‘errant’
jurisdictions if the listing did not affect access to financial capital and services. A FATF ‘callfor-action’ is a call for all its members and partners to cooperate in effecting a financial
chokehold on a jurisdiction by eliminating transactions with the said jurisdiction or enhancing
scrutiny of the existing ones. The FATF call translates into the jurisdiction’s inability to – for
example – seek IMF monies; avail of correspondent services from global banks; raise monies
from international capital markets46.
The most sophisticated excursion of Hobbes’ thought, however, lies in his description of the
interaction of powers (what Gramsci and Foucault subsequently develop as, respectively,
alliances and network of power relations; discussed below). “[T]he power of one man resisteth
41
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and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the
power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such
their opposition is called contention.47” For Hobbes, power is not the zero-sum game some
Marxists (including Marx himself) allude to; the exercise of power cannot be reduced to a binary
of the powerful against the powerless in an orderly, circumscribed field. Instead, Hobbes favours
a degrees-of-power analysis, suggesting a field with competing forces of varying magnitude:
interacting, consolidating, opposing and nullifying each other. Simply, no one is completely
deprived of power in Hobbes’ world; some have more, others less. The exercise of power in the
context of AML-CTF regulation can then be seen as the clashing and/or convergence of big and
smaller powers – ruling elites and non-elite groups – both at the global and the local level.
Although Hobbes does not state so explicitly, the resistance and hindrance he speaks of emerge
as inherent to the exercise of power and not as a consciously organised, revolutionary opposition.
Foucault articulates it thus: “where there is power, there is resistance”, in fact, “a plurality of
resistances”, since there is “no single locus of great Refusal”. But Foucault cautions against
viewing these points of resistance as “only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the
basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat”.
Instead, he sees resistance as inscribed in power as an “irreducible opposite” and scattered over
the power network: capable of creating new alliances, cleavages, regroupings and even
revolutions48.
Poulantzas takes strong exception to this resistances argument, contending that the existence of
power precludes the presence or even the emergence of resistance49. But this reading ignores the
relational, reciprocal aspect of power Poulantzas dilates on himself: where power is a field of
struggle between competing interests, the exercise of power by one runs directly counter to the
exercise of power (or, effectively, resistance) by another50. The very application of power itself
suggests the prior presence of a smaller force or resistance.
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Lukes appears to corroborate such a reading as well as Foucault’s original assertion when he
challenges the notion of power being analogous to domination. Quoting extensively from James
Scott’s Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Lukes contends that the
‘victims’ of domination are actually tactical and strategic survivors who dissemble in order to
survive. Since they have everything to lose by openly resisting the dominant forces, their
resistance is concealed in “hidden transcripts” of their lives away from public scrutiny and in
open yet disguised expressions of ideological insubordination. With Scott, Lukes also believes
that these resistances are eclipsed out of “official” or public transcripts – which are created and
infused with the power of the dominant forces – and replaced with narratives that seem to verify
the purported hegemony of dominant values51.
That said, as Agamben correctly identifies, the originality of Foucault’s contribution towards an
understanding of power lies in that he veers away from the traditional juridico-institutional
models of power: definitions of sovereignty and the theory of state52. Instead of locating power
within state sovereignty, law or domination, Foucault focuses on the operation of power in ways
that are, concurrently, relational, processual and strategic. Power, to him, is: “the multiplicity of
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their
organisation; [] the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens or reverses them; [] the support which these force relations find in one another, thus
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate
them from one another; and [] the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or
institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in
the various social hegemonies53”. (This can be seen, for example, in the Pakistani military
establishment’s unarticulated opposition to the implementation of AML-CTF regulation. While
the “official transcripts” or the Pakistani state’s communications with FATF suggest a complete
capitulation, the “hidden transcripts” or the actual conduct of the state show an opposition that is
both active and undefeated. Moreover, the military establishment also deploys AML-CTF
regulation to help achieve its own ends by, for example, using the regulation to discredit its
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political foes, thereby creating new fissures and alliances within the polity (see Chapter 4 for a
detailed discussion).)
More specifically, Foucault refers to power as a certain type of relation between individuals
where one can, more or less entirely, determine another’s conduct54. However, he is quick to
include the caveat that such a determination of conduct is never exhaustive (in the sense of total
control) or coercive (that is, the subject is never coerced into compliance)55. (While Foucault
does not dilate on precisely why a power-driven determination of conduct is non-exhaustive, the
presumption seems a concession to the vagaries of human behaviour.) There are two significant
diremptions worth exploring here: the break with Marx’s base-superstructure argument and the
emphasis on the absence of coercion in the exercise of power. Foucault’s failure to adequately
theorise economic relations within power is a conceptual weakness in his overall framework but
the problematisation of coercion and consent is a far-reaching key feature of his thought.
As Hindess contends, modern Western political thought features two competing conceptions of
power. The first is the idea of power as a generalised capacity to act (he calls this power-ascapacity); the second is power as a capacity to act but accompanied by the right to act, which is
predicated on the consent of the subjugated (power-as-right)56. To contextualise Foucault’s
contribution, it is worthwhile to look at other influential explications of the power-coercion
nexus. Hobbes, for example, seems to adhere to the power-as-capacity thesis and propounds the
principle of coactus tamem voluit (although coerced, it was his will)57. Hobbes maintains that the
simultaneous existence of liberty and fear are possible because even a man driven to an action by
fear is at liberty to omit to do so58. That this ‘liberty’ does not correspond to general standards of
free will and doesn’t represent ‘real’ choice does not interest Hobbes. Weber, meanwhile, insists
that an act – physical or psychological – qualifies as coercion proper only if it is backed by an
order and is applied by “a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose”59.
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The significance of this definition acquires greater clarity when juxtaposed with what Weber
defines as domination, that is, the possibility of imposing one’s will on another. While he does
not define ‘power’ directly, he categorises domination as a special case of power60. This
domination arises from either “a constellation of interests”, especially a position of monopoly, or
from authority (that is, the power to command which imposes a corresponding duty to obey)61.
But while domination appears strikingly similar to an authoritarian power of command in that the
will of the person exercising power influences the conduct of the ‘ruled’ through empathy,
inspiration, persuasion or some combination of the three62, its distinguishing features are its
validity (that is, its appearance as exemplary or obligatory) and, as a consequence, its legitimacy.
For Weber, obedience/ conformity with the will of the ruler qualifies as domination only when
the command is accepted as a valid norm: “as if the ruled had made the content of the command
the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake [emphasis added]63”.
This point bears repetition: the command is obeyed not because it is one or because the subject is
coerced but because the validity of the norm is accepted. Power can thus be seen as operative in
not the issuance of a command per se but in the actions, ideas or representations that validate the
norm and encourage obedience – power-as-right. While Weber remains acutely aware of the
possibility of this domination translating to a strict or oppressive discipline or even a “despotic
hegemony” with coercive apparatuses, he still points out that it is a consequence of a contract
made between formally equal parties through voluntary acceptance of the terms64.
With his “normalising judgement” concept, Foucault takes up and expands on the political act
involved in the creation and propagation of this aspect of the Weberian norm. Power, insists
Foucault, does not act upon a person; it is a mode of action that acts upon the action of a
person65. The subject is thus necessarily complicit – actively or passively – in his own
subjugation by the norms he accepts and orients his behaviour towards; by the disciplines and
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power relations he internalises66; but, above all, by his acceptance of the ‘truth’ of his identity as
articulated and imposed on him by power67. The complicity of the subject is thus critical to the
working of power. Unlike coercion, power can only be exercised over free subjects since power
and freedom are a permanent provocation to each other68. Since power exists only in its exercise,
it is not a renunciation of freedom, a transfer of rights or a delegation of power to one or a few.
Accordingly, the exercise of power cannot be predicated on consent; ‘consent’ can only form the
basis of a power relation but a power relation is not the manifestation of a consensus69. This line
of reasoning comes through more clearly when he describes the technique of individualising
correction in prisons. The function of ‘discourse’, argues Foucault, is to allow for a “universal
recoding” that enables both the convict and all other potential offenders to see that the
punishment is not only ‘natural’ but in their own interest70.
Bourdieu further develops this notion of power-as-right or the complicity essential to the
exercise of power as “symbolic power”. All symbolic domination, he contends, presupposes a
complicity on part of the ruled that is neither passive submission to external constraint nor the
exercise of free will. Instead, it is the systematised inculcation of dispositions in line with the
rules of a particular market71, be it the official sector or international capital markets. The
efficacy of this symbolic power, as Thompson reads Bourdieu, thus depends on the inculcation
of certain forms of cognition or belief so that even those who gain the least from the exercise
participate in their subjection for the most part since they have been deprived, as Bourdieu puts
it, of a sense of deprivation72. By acknowledging the legitimacy of power or of the hierarchical
relations of power they are embedded in, the subjugated fail to recognise hierarchy as an

66

D&P supra note 23 at 202-3. Here, Foucault is talking about Bentham’s Panopticon and how the prospect of
permanent visibility leads to an internalization of discipline by prisoners and their self-surveillance.
67
“The Subject and Power” in Power supra note 54 at 331
68
So, for example, slavery is not a power relation for Foucault. “The Subject and Power” in Power supra note 54 at
340-2
69
“The Subject and Power” in Power supra note 54 at 340
70
D&P supra note 23 at 108-9
71
Symbolic supra note 38 at 50-1. 54, 82-3. Bourdieu is talking specifically about the domination exercised by an
“official language”, whereby speakers subconsciously adjust their manner of speaking – without any consciously
experienced constraint – to correspond to the rules of the official language in order to capitalize on their linguistic
capital. He uses the speech patterns of those deprived of economic and cultural capital to show how their
attempts to emulate upper-class speech (or conversely, even deliberately flout such rules) is born of their
internalising a system of evaluation stacked against them: what expresses itself as linguistic habitus is for Bourdieu
really class habitus.
72
Symbolic supra note 38 at 123-4

29

arbitrary social construct designed to serve the interests of some groups more than others73.
(Interestingly, while many of the Pakistani interlocutors correctly read US pressure behind
FATF’s greylisting of Pakistan74, too many fail to recognise the extent of money laundering in
many developed countries or even the irony of Saudi Arabia – as a self-confessed financier of
terrorism – being a FATF member (see Chapters 3 and 4 for detailed expositions).)
Both Foucault and Bourdieu are on the same conceptual plane. The function of discourses in the
Foucauldian sense is to “impose frameworks which structure what can be experienced or the
meaning that experience can encompass, and thereby influence what can be said, thought and
done75.” And, as a corollary, what cannot be. The implicit ‘consent’ of the convict to his
correction secured by recoding can thus be seen as qualitatively different from the Gramscian
notion of consent as a foundation for power or hegemony76. In Foucault’s example, power is
exercised through the administrative apparatus to alter the mindset of the convict by the means of
“representations” that communicate to him his interests, advantages and disadvantages as well as
his pleasures and displeasures77. (This shows up, strikingly, in calls by several Pakistanis to
implement AML-CTF regulations “for our own sake”, “in our own interest78”. That is, without
having meaningfully interrogated the quality or the efficacy of the regulation, several are
convinced of the inherent salubriousness of the regulation.)
Unlike Gramsci’s subordinate class which has its own set of internal demands, Foucault’s
convict receives a conception of who they are from the outside. Much like Pavlov’s dog, the
convict learns to associate the idea of crime with the idea of punishment and view it as “a
retribution that the guilty man makes to each of his fellow citizens, for the crime that has
73
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wronged them all79”. (One such example are the FATF-mandated action plans that every ‘errant’
jurisdiction agrees to file after invasive country reviews by monitors such as the FATF-style
regional bodies (FSRBs)) The convict’s ‘consent’ to the punishment or, more precisely, their
belief in punishment as a duty they owe, is the result of the manipulation of their mind and not
any manifestation of their will. This malleability of consent is the reason Foucault refuses to see
an exercise of power in a renunciation of freedom, a transfer of rights or a delegation of power.
Using his studies on prisons, hospitals and human sexuality80, Foucault shows how consent is
actively manufactured and conduct determined by using disciplinary tactics and “technologies of
power”.
In the AML-CTF context, this consent or complicity of the subjugated is reflected in the fact that
most jurisdictions submit ‘voluntarily’ to FATF jurisdiction in that they choose to comply –
power-as-right. The validity of the norm – to desire to crack down on money laundering or
terrorism financing – is accepted; the subject becomes complicit in their own subjugation by the
norms they have accepted and oriented their behaviour towards81. This orientation reflects in
either the internalisation of certain disciplines/ power relations/ rules of a particular market82 (for
example, the submission to AML-CTF rules for either their own sake or for the sake of the
capital markets) or the acceptance of the truth of the subject’s identity as articulated and imposed
upon it by power83 (for example, by ‘delinquent’ jurisdictions ‘accepting’ the greylisting or
blacklisting classification that FATF imposes on them instead of challenging or ignoring it). In
line with Foucault’s reading of the function of discourses in manufacturing consent84, the power
of the AML-CTF discourse seems to obviate resistance or defiance since countries see the
regulation as in their own interest: every greylisted country and even Iran – despite its
blacklisting – is struggling to achieve AML-CTF compliance85. Critically, however, acceptance
of the norm should not be conflated with normative endorsement. That is, not all the jurisdictions

79

D&P supra note 23 at 109-110
Variously, D&P supra note 23, HoS supra note 48, Madness and Civilisation.
81
Weber supra note 32 at 328; Discourses supra note 25 at 1; Power supra note 54 at 331; D&P supra note 23 at
202-3
82
Symbolic supra note 38 at 50-1, 54, 82-3
83
Power supra note 54 at 331
84
D&P supra note 23 at 108-9
85
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/publicstatement-june-2019.html
80

31

that comply believe AML-CTF regulations are a normative good; many comply for more
pragmatic reasons such as ease of trade and/ or financial transactions with other jurisdictions86.
Barring Hobbes, all the major theorists seem to veer towards an understanding of power-as-right.
However, despite this and other specific differences in the positions assumed by Hobbes, Weber,
Gramsci and Foucault, there is a striking similarity common to all: violence. It is loud and
explicit in its exercise in Hobbes and Foucault (coercion, fear, imposition, discipline); quieter
and more tractable in Weber and Gramsci (empathy, persuasion, co-option, concession). One
inference would be that there is no getting around the structural violence involved in orienting an
action, even when mediated by consent.
However, there is a gentler, third way too: Bourdieu’s habitus. Objects of knowledge, he says,
are constructed by a system of structured, structuring dispositions – the habitus – which is
constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions. The world and its
exigencies – how things are to be said or done – impose themselves in thought and deed “without
ever unfolding as a spectacle87”. That is, individuals are ‘conditioned’ on a subconscious level to
act and react according to certain principles that are never articulated as formal ‘rules’. As
Thompson explains in the introduction to Language and Symbolic Power, habitus is a set of
dispositions that inclines agents to act/ react in certain ways and generates (in interaction with
the context of the individual) practices, perceptions and attitudes that are regular without being
consciously coordinated or governed by any rule. Inculcated by mundane processes of training
and learning and reflective of the social conditions it was acquired in, the greatest utility of a
habitus lies in the fact that, first, it becomes ingrained in a body such that it endures for the life of
the individual in a pre-conscious way so that it doesn’t readily change with conscious reflection
and modification, and second, that the conduct produced is capable of being transposed to fields
other than the one of their acquisition88.
The potential advantages of the use of habitus as a technique of power seem incomparable. First,
‘training and learning processes’ seemingly bleed power of visible violence as well as its
normative core, thereby pre-empting and forestalling any resistance. Second, the durability of the
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habitus as well as its own resistance to modification makes it a more secure guarantor of the
desired behaviour. Finally, its mobility to other contexts is a convincing argument in favour of its
cost-effectiveness as a technique of power. That said, even habitus is not immune to the charge
of violence in just the fact of its inculcation.
The AML-CTF regime offers several examples of such structured, structuring dispositions
designed to inculcate certain attitudes. Through seemingly mundane processes of training and
learning – for example, the filing of Suspicious Transaction Reports; a country’s regular
submission to FATF, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) scrutiny; the
filing of copious compliance reports – the habitus is engrained such that it endures. Critically,
habitus here is not the filing of reports per se; it is habituated compliance with certain principles
that are never articulated as formal ‘rules’: submission to scrutiny, accountability and a general
willingness to change everything deemed offensive or objectionable by the regulators (for
example, domestic legislation; the monitoring of financial or economic systems; regulations and
rules). To rephrase, the filing of Suspicious Transaction Reports by a banker is significant
because it represents a series of duties: to report, to submit to scrutiny and to be held accountable
for failure to comply. Moreover, the conduct is easily transposed to other fields: for example,
habituated compliance with FATF-mandated banking regulations was easily extended to more
invasive surveillance by including realtors, lawyers, jewellers and casinos in the reporting effort
against launderers/ terrorism financiers.
Such a reading of power, of course, conflicts with traditional state-centric analysis, which relies
on the concept of the delegation of sovereignty, whether by God or the people. Hobbes, for
example, sees the state’s power (whether acquired through natural force or war or through a
covenant of political representation89) as the fusing of the power of many into one person, natural
or civil, who can use their collective power as s/he wills90. Since FATF boasts only 39 members
despite claiming global authority, the idea of delegated sovereignty does not really apply here.
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The above survey is not exhaustive by any means but one omission stands out nonetheless:
Marx. As one of the earliest and most influential theorists of power, Marx exemplifies power’s
ability to expand and contract in accordance with the lens of the theorist and illustrates the
consequent profits and pitfalls at either extreme. With historical materialism91, Marx positioned
the economy as central to every human enterprise and located class struggles at the heart of all
conflict in society. An extraordinarily powerful analytic tool, it expanded the epistemic frontiers
of the knowable world; once seen, the dominant role of the economy in influencing social,
political and intellectual life processes could not be unseen. For Marx, however, this insight led
to the conclusion that political power was “the organised power of one class for oppressing
another92”; the bourgeoisie, agents of power; and the state, its instrument for class domination.
Compounded by his polemical style, this econo-centric focus to the derogation of all other
frameworks proved detrimental to the vigour of Marx’s original insight and rendered his theory
more susceptible to attack by several generations of scholars.
Weber and Gramsci, for example, make powerful cases for understanding power as, and in, a
dialectical relationship with politics, culture and religion. Significantly, neither contests the
significance or even the primacy of the economy in power relations; they just dispute its
exclusivity as the source of all power. Hindess and Hirst, comparatively, take a more aggressive
line and challenge the very concept of mode of production as a social totality, “a form capable of
historical existence as a society93”. In an influential critique of both Marx and the AlthusserBalibar duo (authors of the equally influential Reading Capital), Hindess and Hirst advocate a
broader conception of class relations than as economic class relations alone. Further, as Bourdieu
argues, treating the political field as an epiphenomenon of economic and social forces ignores
the symbolic effectiveness of representation and the proper political power of the government.
To Bourdieu, the political field is the site of competition for the right to speak in the name of all.
“The world is multi-dimensional,” he argues, “and allows for the valuation of different kinds of
capital94.” Economic capital is obviously valuable but so are cultural, linguistic and symbolic
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(that is, accumulated prestige or honour) capital, especially since the forms of capital are
convertible among themselves95.
As Poulantzas rightly observes, the economic process is class struggle and thus, manifests
relations of power, not just economic power96. But contrary to Marx’s assertion that politics and
ideology are built upon the foundation of the economy, Poulantzas holds that political and
ideological relations are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production.
This, he says, is why they play an essential role in the reproduction of the latter; this is also why
the process of production and exploitation involves the reproduction of the relations of politicoideological domination and subordination97. Balibar, in comparison, phrases this slightly
differently: reproduction replaces and transforms things but it retains social relations indefinitely.
Thus Balibar believes production is not the production of things but of social relations98. The
difference is twofold: first, while Poulantzas finds ideological and political relations within the
relations of production, Balibar locates them within the process of reproduction. Second, Balibar
thinks the aim of production is to produce social relations whereas Poulantzas assumes a more
instrumentalist approach and sees social relations as the founding activity for the process of
production. However, both shun a completely materialist view and agree that social relations are
inextricably tied to both production and reproduction.
Poulantzas’ virtue lies in that he is able to synthesise the materialist with the political. Unlike the
powerful-powerless, oppressor-oppressed binaries Marx trades in for the most part, power to
Poulantzas is no zero-sum game with a definite, measurable amount of power. Instead, he sees it
as the capacity of one or several classes to realise their specific interests in derogation of the
capacity and interests of the other classes. Poulantzas’ conception of power is thus best
understood as a relational field. The power of a class, he argues, is a manifestation of its
objective position in economic, political and ideological relations, where the place of each class
is designated and limited by the place of the other classes. The political power of a class to
realise its political interests thus depends on its class position relative to others but also on the
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position and strategy it displays vis-a-vis the others99. Finally, Poulantzas echoes Gramsci when
he argues that even though state power is the power of certain dominant classes in relation to the
dominated classes, the state is only a site and centre of exercise of power and not a player with
power of its own100.
The materialist strain – as expounded by Marx and Poulantzas, particularly – is also visible in
AML-CTF regulation. That is, there is a palpable difference between how the AML-CTF regime
is represented in the realm of ideas and how it is materially organised. On the plane of ideas, the
regime is pitched as both apolitical and salubrious for the overall health of society, democracy
and even the global economy. Materially, however, the regime operates to the distinct advantage
of some groups: laundering havens in developed countries101; their governments’ desire for
confiscated assets102 or tax evasion dollars103; as well as the exporters of AML-CTF compliance
products from such countries104. The capacity of these groups or ruling elites to realise their
interests in derogation of those of others is obviously conditioned by their objective position in
economic, political and ideological relations relative to others: as a G7 and FATF member, for
example, the US is a credible force. However, this capacity also depends on the position and
strategy displayed vis-a-vis others: for example, an alliance with other on-shore havens such as
the UK and Canada, allows the US to collectively leverage their positions for the greatest gains.
Above all, the difference between representation and material organisation is visible in the way
the offence of money laundering is treated in AML-CTF regulation: despite its positioning as the
foremost global body to deal with money laundering in general, FATF retains an inordinate
focus on organised crime and refuses to include tax issues105 or trade-related malpractices under
99

Poulantzas supra note 49 at 147
Poulantzas supra note 49 at 148
101
See, for example, Eleni Tsingou, “Global financial governance and the developing anti-money laundering
regime: What lessons for international political economy?” (2010) 47:6 International Politics 617–637; Peter
Alldridge, “Money laundering and globalization” (2008) 35:4 JL & Soc’y; Donato Masciandaro, ed, Global financial
crime: Terrorism, money laundering and offshore centres (London, Routledge, 2004).
102
Michael Kilchling, “Finance-Oriented Strategies of Organised Crime Control” in Letizia Paoli, ed, The Oxford
Handbook on Organised Crime (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
103
Michael Levi, “Money Laundering” in Letizia Paoli, ed, The Oxford Handbook on Organised Crime (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2014).
104
Margaret E. Beare & Michael Woodiwiss, “U.S. Organised Crime Control Policies Exported Abroad” in Letizia
Paoli, ed, The Oxford Handbook on Organised Crime (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014)
105
For example, the FATF website states: “FATF does not address at all issues related to low tax jurisdiction or tax
competition. The FATF mandate focuses only on the fight against laundering of proceeds of crimes and the
financing of terrorism [emphasis added].” https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/generalquestions/#d.en.3119
100

36

its remit106. That FATF – and by necessary implication, the governing body of its members –
refuses to expand its definition of laundering despite calls from academics, tax justice
organisations as well as global networks and institutions (such as the OECD) is bewildering on
its own. However, this decision becomes even more suspect when juxtaposed with the fact that,
first, several influential FATF members are net beneficiaries of the AML-CTF regime, and
second, tax and trade issues account for a much larger proportion of illicit financial flows as
compared to organised crime107. More simply: key FATF member governments as well as global
and domestic capital have a continuing interest in the continuation of money laundering. This
state-corporate nexus is positioned at the heart of global money laundering regulation since state
policy – as the precursor to a member government’s position and politicking at FATF – is
conditioned by both reasons of state (for example, the need for more tax revenues) as well as
capital108. Defining money laundering to exclude tax and trade issues allows for – to quote
Bourdieu – the profit of saying while denying it by the way it is said. That is, the repressed
elements (here, the state-corporate nexus) are concealed by integrating them into a network of
relations (here, FATF) which modify their value without modifying their substance109: the
resulting AML-CTF regulations thus ‘impede’ laundering and terrorism financing without
subverting the objectives of the state-corporate nexus.
As the above shows, there is no last word on power110. Yet many of these disparate definitions
and explications collectively describe the power structures and operations undergirding the
global AML-CTF regime. Knowing what power is, one can then proceed to the question of its
exercise.
2.2 Originary power
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Every definition of power and its mode of exercise are grounded in a particular historical,
economic, sociological and legal context. Any systematic investigation of power thus needs to
begin with an understanding of how power is produced, ordered and deployed. This
historiography is essential to understanding the social formation where power operates and how
the exercise of power affects the world we inhabit. The present section takes up two themes that
will be critical to helping locate power within the global AML-CTF regulatory architecture in
Chapter 3. First, which strategies are used to construct a power framework? Second, which
techniques enable the exercise of power?
2.2.1. Constructive practices
In the context used here, ‘constructive practices’ refer to the broad strategies of effecting,
maintaining and perpetuating domination. These are distinct from the instruments of power
(discussed later) and refer to the practices that rationalise and institutionalise power. Simply put,
constructive practices refer to the ‘big ideas’ that pave the way for the deployment of specific
techniques of power.
For Marx, this big idea is universality or the common interest. In “The German Ideology”, he
argues that each newly dominant class needs to – if only to achieve its interests – conquer
political power in order to represent its interests as “universal interests”111. As Poulantzas
correctly notes, ideology is never neutral and is invariably class ideology. Hence the ruling
ideology is an essential power of the ruling class, even when it is deployed by the state to
legitimise violence and help achieve a consensus among the politically dominated class112.
The representation of universality, Marx finds, allows for ideas that support domination to be
presented as “the only reasonable ones, the only ones universally valid113”. This is critical
because the newly dominant class is embroiled in a class struggle and universality allows it to
present its dominance as the dominance of certain ideas, and not of the class114. This is because,
as Marx contends, historiography accepts each epoch’s “illusions” about itself; doesn’t separate
dominant ideas from these dominant individuals; or recognise dominant ideas as self-expressions
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of a dominant class. Instead, historiography sees these ideas as a “self-determining concept”115.
Since the revolutionising class stands in opposition to another class, he argues, it is invested in
presenting itself – from the very beginning – as not a class but as the representative of the whole
of society. This sleight of hand is what gives the appearance of the entire body of society being
opposed to one dominating class116.
The idea of universality also features extensively in Gramsci, who describes it as the “culturalsocial unity” undergirding hegemony. A common conception of the world, he argues, is what
forges “a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims” into a single aim. This unity
is achieved through relationships of hegemony – on ideological and commonsensical planes –
that are necessarily educative in character117. According to Gramsci, collective political
consciousness – of the sort exemplified by the spread of the AML-CTF regime – proceeds in
three stages: first, at the economic-corporate level, that is, professional solidarity among the
members of a group (for example, the convergence between various pro-AML-CTF lobbies such
as the financial services industry in tax havens and compliance product exporters); second,
consciousness of the economic interests common to all the members of a social group (for
example, the G7 consensus to set up FATF); and finally, hegemony, that is, consciousness of fact
that one’s own corporate interests must transcend the limits of one’s economic class and become
the interests of subordinate groups as well (for example, the arrogation of the mantle of global
regulator by FATF)118.
Interestingly, the germ of the idea of education as the bedrock for power is found in Hobbes too.
Among the duties of public ministers as representatives of the sovereign authority is a duty “to
teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is
just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace among
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themselves, and resist the publique enemy”. The sovereign authority, meanwhile, acquires his
power to teach and instruct people from God119.
The major difference between the three is of intent. Marx advocates from a position that sees
power as essentially repressive and designed to deliver bourgeois aims. Gramsci, meanwhile, is
batting for the revolutionary class that needs to educate and ally with subordinate groups to
strengthen itself. Hobbes, on the other hand, proceeds on the understanding of the normative
good: duty, justice, godliness and peace. While there is a suspicion of power inherent in Marx,
Gramsci is more value-neutral and Hobbes seems convinced of its capacity for good as well.
The AML-CTF regime adroitly commandeers this representation of universality. FATF
inevitably pitches money laundering as a global social and political problem that threatens the
viability of world economies; the global financial system; “the social fabric” as well as “the
democratic institutions of society120” through the untrammelled growth of organised crime.
There are similarly shrill evocations regarding terrorism financing. The dominance of FATF is
thus presented as the dominance of ideas, the ideology regarding money laundering and terrorism
financing, and not as the dominance of ruling elites; the repeated advertence to the global nature
of the problem helps mobilise a political consensus that pre-empts serious challenge since these
ideas are presented as “the only reasonable ones, the only ones universally valid121”.
Implicit in both Marx and Gramsci is the need for power to be legitimated and recognised by the
subordinate group’s assumption of the dominant group’s ideology. Weber takes up the issue in
his discussions on the legitimacy of domination and contends the “empirical structure of
domination” stems from a power’s need to justify itself. He develops Marx’s idea regarding the
illusions of the dominant class into the idea of a myth developed by “every highly privileged
group [...] of its natural, especially its blood, superiority”. But the merit in Weber’s construction
lies in that he sees the construction of the myth as a conscious bid to acquire legitimacy – not an
illusion the dominant class believes about itself – and recognises that the underprivileged groups
buy into the myth122. Such a myth can be seen in FATF’s justification for its assumption of the
role of global problem-solver: among the arguments advanced for the G7’s leadership in the
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devise of financial regulation (including money laundering) was said to be the fact that as homes
to the most developed financial markets, these jurisdictions were the first to experience the
problems and the first to come up with solutions to the same123. Together, the purported
dominance of ‘ideas’ and the legitimating myth end up subsuming the non-democratic, nonrepresentative character of FATF and thereby forestalling political challenges to its dominance.
However, Weber fails to mine adequately the processes of constructing the myth as a selflegitimation device. Instead, he concludes weakly that domination is legitimated by a system of
consciously made rational rules; personal authority based on tradition and personal authority
based on charisma. While he does issue the caveat that these are idealtypes and the real world
features combinations, permutations and modification of the same, the flight of his theory is
irredeemably arrested by his failure to interrogate the construction of the myth.
Fortunately, Bourdieu works further on this concept. The reality of the social world, he argues, is
constructed by the imposition of “a more or less authorised way of seeing the social world124”.
Accordingly, political action aims to produce and impose representations of the social world that
will authorise collective actions to transform the social world in accordance with the interests of
those making the representations125. These representations are based on rites of institution: the
consecration or legitimation of certain arbitrary boundaries that express and impose a particular
identity on an individual126. The recognition of a particular social order as legitimate is thus
achieved by “the misrecognition of the arbitrariness of its foundation”127. Bourdieu fruitfully
applies this in his own work on the myth of competence, whereby dominant groups seek
theoretical justification for their privilege128, and the Weberian germ and the Foucauldian
influence are both clear. Bourdieu’s contention regarding the interests of those making the
representations is borne out by AML-CTF scholars who argue that FATF calls the problem into
being, proceeds to define this “publique enemy” (as Hobbes would call it) for the world and then
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pronounces ‘solutions’ to the problem that privilege some more than others129. Not only do these
representations legitimate arbitrary boundaries (for example, the criteria classifying a country as
“high-risk” or “other monitored jurisdiction”), the misrecognition of this arbitrariness further
legitimates a particular social order130 (for example, the ‘hierarchy’ between compliant and noncompliant states or the decision to focus on money laundering by organised crime and not by
corporations).
That said, Bourdieu fails to match Foucault, both in terms of scale and in terms of creative arc.
For Foucault, the big idea is power-knowledge. While Bourdieu remains locked in his linguistic
deliberations, Foucault’s original is intended for universal applicability. As he describes his
power-knowledge bind: “We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not
simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that
power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and
constitute at the same time power relations131.” Knowledge is seen as being produced within a
field of power relations; this necessarily renders sites of production of knowledge complicit in
power relations132 since by its nature, knowledge is perspectival, partial and oblique133.
The idea finds resonance in the work of some Marxist scholars too. Althusser, for example,
speaks of the need to see knowledge as “a production”; Balibar describes historical knowledge as
the result of a labour of knowledge134. Both the subject (the knower) and the object of study,
argues Althusser, predate knowledge. As such, both already define a certain fundamental field.
The real object, he says, comprises an essential and an inessential part; knowledge is the process
that operates on this real object to eliminate the inessential and leave the subject with the
essential part. Significantly, the role of the process of abstraction (from the realm of objects to
that of ideas) is to purge the inessential real (that is, the extracted part) as well as every trace of
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its operation135. Althusser’s explication of the process of obliteration is also worth noting: the
invisible, he says, becomes so because it is “repressed from the field of the visible”. It goes
unperceived because the function of the field “is not to see them, to forbid any sighting of them”.
As such, he finds a relation of necessity between the visible and the invisible: the invisible does
not exist outside the visible but is “the inner darkness of exclusion, inside the visible itself
[emphasis in original]”136. More simply: decisions regarding what to exclude determine what
will be rendered invisible. As such, the decision to exclude is as significant an exercise of power
as the decision to include since what gets left out defines a field of knowledge as surely as what
is included.
Bourdieu is equally fascinated by the concealment idea. As he uses the notions of myth and
disinterestedness, they become “veils” for concealing particular interests137. Foucault, on the
other hand, sees in power-knowledge a passionate ‘will to knowledge’ that is both a support and
an instrument of power138. He dismisses what he calls the myth regarding the neutrality of
knowledge and insists that political power is always present in knowledge, is woven together
with knowledge139. As Foucault builds on this elsewhere, he argues that knowledge arises from
conflict, combat and the outcome of combat. And between knowledge and things knowledge
must know is thus a relation of violence, domination, power and force140. Foucault’s conception
of power-knowledge can then be seen as an inherent structural violence that goes much beyond
the obfuscatory tactics of a smaller, less aggressive power as conceived by Bourdieu or
Althusser.
This is also why Foucault disagrees with Marxists who, he says, argue that relations of force,
economic conditions and social relations are imposed on knowledge. As Foucault sees them,
political and economic conditions are “not a veil or obstacle for the subject of knowledge but the
means by which subjects of knowledge are formed and hence are truth relations141”. The
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relations of production that characterise capitalism, he says, cannot exist without power relations
and forms of knowledge142.
Power relations in the AML-CTF regime can be seen to produce knowledge through both
discourse creation and data extraction. First, by generating and globalising discourses that define
money laundering and terrorism financing, the AML-CTF regime determines how to think about
the phenomena but also maps the frontiers of this knowledge. Take, for example, the FATF
definition of money laundering as the disguising of the illegal origins of the “proceeds of crime”.
On the face of it, the definition establishes an abiding link between criminal activities and illicit
funds. However, less obviously so, the definition also determines what constitutes ‘crime’ (and
what doesn’t) as well as who is a criminal (and who isn’t). And so, when FATF cites drugs
trafficking, insider trading and “prostitution rings” as examples of criminal activities, it shears
tax- and trade-related crimes from the ambit of laundering criminality143. This act of defining (or
the creation of discourse) is thus an act of political power in that it generates a particular kind of
“perspectival, partial and oblique” knowledge, where the decision to exclude – as Althusser
argues – is as important as the decision to include. Implicit and embedded in the positive
definition of crime as organised crime is a coextensive negative definition of crime that excludes
corporate crime. Critically, by restricting the parameters of the debate to criminals and organised
crime networks as well as terrorist and terrorist networks, the AML-CTF regime implicitly
refuses to recognise and hold accountable corporations and state actors who commit the same
offences. The well-documented cases of money laundering by the US Central Intelligence
Agency and of terrorism financing by Saudi Arabia are but two such examples (See Chapter 3
for a detailed discussion).
Second, power relations in the AML-CTF regime also produce knowledge by extracting
knowledge and data about the jurisdictions subject to the regime. As discussed in Chapter 3,
under the terms specified by FATF, every jurisdiction is expected to set up a Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) that collects and analyses Suspicious Transaction Reports and other
information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and the financing of
terrorism, and for the dissemination of the results of this analysis to the Egmont Group of
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Financial Intelligence Units144. A significant chunk of responsibility for surveillance and
monitoring also falls onto the IMF and the World Bank. Foucault’s contention that knowledge is
acquired through relations of violence, dominance, power and force is a point Black corroborates
when she argues that the “giving of account” is a relationship that stems from a fundamental
power imbalance between two parties, which is further exacerbated by this accountability
dialectic145.
While Foucault does not offer any examples of how capitalism is shored up by the powerknowledge bind, Weber’s contractual ‘unfreedom’ thesis both corroborates and demonstrates this
claim. Challenging the idea of contractual freedom, Weber contends that differential levels of
power between contracting parties allow for an increase in constraint and lesser individual
freedom. This, he says, is because the legal agreements the law chooses to enforce or not are
decisively influenced by diverse interest groups which vary in accordance with differences in
economic structure. In an increasingly expanding market, he reasons, the most important group is
of those who have market interests. The ‘unfree’ contract thus allows property ownership to be
used cleverly and without restraint “as a means for the achievement of power over others”. While
such a contract is perceived as less coercive, it is actually more coercive because it advantages
those who are economically able to make use of the empowerments146.
Significantly, coercive contracts are the norm within the AML-CTF regime. Theoretically,
sovereign states that ‘voluntarily’ sign up for AML-CTF regulation should be able to opt out of
the regime at any time. However, as Weber argues, the law (or regulation, in this case) favours
the group that has “market interests” and thus, more power. Since many of the G7 countries are
home to the largest financial institutions or global centres of finance, they represent the most
important interest group. As backers of the AML-CTF regime, the G7 are naturally invested in
the promotion of AML-CTF compliance; as ‘owners’ of the international capital markets, the G7
also have the capability to exercise their ownership rights to achieve greater power over others.
A FATF determination of low AML-CTF compliance, for example, brings an inordinate amount
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of pressure on the non-compliant state147 since it increases the cost of raising funds from the
international capital markets by increasing the country’s debt risk premia and diminishing its
sovereign credit ratings148. As such, the ‘voluntary’ aspect of the contract is reduced to a fiction.
One final point: secrecy. Seminal to the construction of a power edifice is secrecy. Weber speaks
of it when he says that every continuing domination features secret rule at some point149;
Thompson speaks of it when he says that the invisibility of symbolic power contributes to its
legitimacy150. As Foucault and Lukes repeatedly indicate, power is at its most effective when it is
least visible151. As Foucault speaks of the art of punishing, the most potent power sets up a
‘natural sequence’ so that punishment does not appear as the arbitrary effect of a human power:
“punishment must proceed from the crime; the law must appear to be a necessity of things, and
power must act while concealing itself beneath the gentle force of nature”152.
Like other global ‘standard-setters’, the AML-CTF regime also exemplifies this secrecy
requirement153. FATF, too, was set up by a mandate provided by a total of 16 members drawn
from the G7, the EC and eight other countries. Although its membership has increased to 39, this
number is still low considering the body is supposed to be a global regulator and the members
extend their own mandate for global regulation154. Further, the global South is underrepresented
among the members and the OECD contingent is said to dominate. This membership profile is
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unlikely to change since FATF also keeps a tight control over membership: the key to being
“considered” for a membership in a process spanning three years is the ambiguously-worded
requirement that the applicant be “strategically important155”. Meanwhile, the invisibility
requirement is satisfied by the disaggregated AML-CTF governance structure: with multiple
regulators responsible for the devise, implementation and enforcement of regulation, the
prominence or visibility of each recedes (see Chapter 3 for details).
2.2.2

Instrumental power

In the sense it is used here, ‘instrumental power’ refers to the specific techniques and means
deployed in the exercise of power. However, three significant caveats: first, contrary to utilitarian
connotations of the phrase, instrumental power is not just an assortment of tools or simply the
means to an end. Instead, as Poulantzas says, all power exists in apparatuses, which help
constitute power. Instrumental power is thus a set of discursively constructed practices pregnant
with particular histories of conflict and violence – that is, these practices are functional in that
they contribute to the furtherance of a goal but they are also political in their aims, their
construction and deployment.
This leads to the second caveat: while a bare reading of ‘instrumental power’ would suggest a
dilation of the power-as-capacity thesis only, a deeper mine reveals an intimate relationship with
power-as-right. The ‘big ideas’ or constructive practices discussed above rationalise the exercise
of power; instrumental practices construct and reproduce both institutions of power and relations
of power. Constructive practices justify the exercise of power by X; instrumental practices show
how X exercises this power and how the exercise constructs legitimacy for both the power and
X, as the holder of this power.
Finally, while instrumental power seems similar to Foucault’s disciplinary power, it is intended
for a more general application. Foucault’s concern were the apparatuses of power – prisons,
hospitals etc – and the inculcation of discipline. While disciplinary tactics (discussed as
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‘dressage’ below) are a key instrumental power, the significance of, for example, crises,
scientific rationality and norms as instruments of power cannot be underestimated.
At their most potent, instrumental powers perform four functions: they reveal the workings of
power; construct and reproduce institutions of power; construct and reproduce power relations;
and confer legitimacy on the power and its holder (category A). A notch below are those powers
that are primarily techniques of power but mould power relations and institutions (category B).
At the most granular are those powers that show how power works and say something about
power relations (category C). The common thread between these techniques of power is the
seeming invisibility of power; the absence of overt, explicit violence (although, as discussed
below, symbolic violence does exist); and the notion of neutrality. But the most interesting
aspect of instrumental power is the fact that everyone seems to agree on how power is
operationalised. As a survey of the literature shows, each theorist offers minor modifications but
the core techniques described exhibit remarkable resilience and traction.
2.2.2.1. Category A
Thinking power
As demonstrated above, universality is a key constructive practice for most scholars of power.
But this claim to universality is shored up by the instrumental practice of ‘group think’, where
those subject to power share the beliefs and the worldview of the holders of power. The
pervasiveness of these beliefs or worldview creates or reinforces existing power relations;
enables the creation of institutions that embody this power but also legitimates the exercise of
power as well as the holders of power.
Hobbes understands the need to foster group think: he speaks of the duty of public ministers to
educate the people in their duty to the sovereign; in differentiating between what is just and
unjust; and identifying the public enemy156. While the ‘instructions’ capture the need for
inculcating a homogenous worldview, the fact that the sovereign is in the position to issue such
orders is implicit recognition and legitimation of his divine right to do so157. The ministers are
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thus institutional repositories of sovereign power. Further, the evocation of ‘duty’ (on part of the
ministers as well as the people) reinforces the relations of power between the sovereign on the
one hand and the ministers and the people on the other.
For Marx, a shared worldview emerges from “ruling ideas” or “dominant thoughts”, which
dominate because the class that is the dominant material power of society is also its dominant
intellectual power. Since this class is the producer and regulator of ideas, its ideas prevail over
the ideas of those who lack the means of material production – even though the dominant class
initially persuades itself that these ideas dominate independently of the conditions of their
production and the producers of these thoughts158. These ideas thus carry the imprint of existing
power relations and set up institutions (the law, for example), which perpetuate those power
hierarchies. Thus, to Marx, the eventual shift towards abstract ideas and universality – the claim
that these ideas represent the interests of society as a whole and not just the dominant class –
signals the dominant class’s attempt to obliterate the bourgeois origins of these ideas and to
secure greater legitimacy for the same159.
Like Marx, Gramsci is also an advocate for a “common conception of the world” and insists on
the epistemological significance of hegemony160. He sees “intellectual and moral leadership” as
one of the two manifestations of a social group’s supremacy161. This leadership is exercised by
one or more strata of intellectuals, who give the social group its cohesiveness and an awareness
of their economic, political and social raison d’etre162. Unlike Marx, however, Gramsci does not
reduce the battle over ideas – what he calls ideology and common sense – to a violent, classbased struggle. Instead, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals serve a more beneficial, pastoral
function: they foster a “collective national-popular will” by guiding people ideologically and
preserving their link to the leading group163. Further, Gramsci refuses to set territorial boundaries
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on hegemonic relationships and insists that they are equally applicable in national, international
and global contexts164.
In the AML-CTF universe, at one level, ruling ideas emerge as normative ideals such as the
belief that money laundering inevitably damages the workings of the global economy,
particularly by entrenching organised crime at the heart of the economy and allowing it to
flourish, and that both phenomena destroy the fabric of society. At another level, these ideas
allow the ruling elites to propagate their conception of ‘the public enemy’ (here, organised crime
launderers and ‘terrorists’) and to instil a sense of the duties people owe to ‘the sovereign’165 (for
example, acquiescence to a culture of surveillance and reporting the activities of their fellow
civilians to global and domestic regulators). As such, not only do these ruling ideas create and
reinforce existing power relations (for example, between developed countries, that are part of
influential networks such as the G7, and developing ones), they also enable the creation of
institutions such as FATF or laws such as AML-CTF regulation that embody this power. Further,
these ideas legitimate both the exercise of power as well as the holders of power.
While both Bourdieu and Foucault endorse the essential idea of a shared worldview, their
respective approaches are subtly different from both Marx and Gramsci as well as each other.
Both Bourdieu and Foucault see language as the primary mediator for an empirical, external
reality: language does not just name and label realities, it also constructs them in a discursive
interaction between the speaker, the listener and the context in which they operate166. Foucault
sees discourse as a strategic and polemical game, in which a subject constitutes herself within
history and is constantly established and re-established by history through discourse167. As Hunt
and Wickham read this, discourse refers to the substantial role played by language “in
constituting social subjects, the subjectivities and identities of persons, their relations and the
field in which they exist, but only within a context of institutional practices … [that is,] in a
particular culture at some particular point in time168.”
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Seen so, language or, more specifically, discourses become the building blocks of power. As
Bourdieu puts it, language is the principal support of “the dream of absolute power” because it
produces existence – by producing the collectively recognised and thus, realised representation
of existence169. In the AML-CTF discourse, for example, the label of “non-compliant” is not an
objective statement of fact; it is a political utterance based on a subjective assessment – a scarlet
letter, of sorts. The label is designed to create a social subject (the ‘delinquent’ state) by
imposing a particular identity on a jurisdiction and collective recognition of this identity – by
FATF members and all those subject to the AML-CTF regime – collectively wills it into
existence. This freshly-minted identity then places the jurisdiction within an existing matrix of
power relations – in a subservient, deferential role to FATF and “compliant” jurisdictions.
As illustration of the power of discourse, Bourdieu presents a fascinating exploration of how a
delegate exercises power over the group that ostensibly gave him power. Building on Nietzsche’s
idea of the self-consecration of the priest, Bourdieu says the priest’s discourse creates the
conditions by which he acquires and maintains power. The priest consecrates himself by basing
universal values on himself, appropriating values, requisitioning morality and thus monopolising
the notions of God, Truth, Wisdom, People. In this act that Bourdieu calls ‘usurpatory
ventriloquism’, “the spokesperson gives voice to the group in whose name he speaks, thereby
speaking with all the authority of that elusive, absent phenomenon … [I]t is in abolishing himself
completely in favour of God or the People that the priest turns himself into God or the People. …
[He] speaks in the name of something which he brings into existence by his very discourse170.”
Bourdieu sees this usurpation, this “monopolisation of collective truth”, as what enables the
priest (or politician, for that matter) to exercise power and compels obedience to his command.
Similarly, FATF problematizes money laundering through processes of social construction so as
to win the right make the rules around laundering and to secure the compliance of those who
have not been involved in the rule-setting process171.
For Foucault, however, a discourse is a politically constituted body of knowledge that ends up
structuring the field of what can be thought: it “structure[s] the possibility of what gets included
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or excluded and of what gets done or remains undone172”. Foucault explains this process where
he speaks of the “tyranny of globalising discourses” 173, which simultaneously devalue certain
knowledges and privilege others to produce a particular truth as “a system of ordered procedures
for the production, regulation and distribution, circulation and operation of statements174”. To be
considered valid and legitimate then, a statement needs to remain within the parameters of the
knowledge that is legitimated by the discourse. (As discussed in Chapter 3, FATF remains
completely impervious to calls from academics, thinktanks and legal practitioners to expand its
definition of money laundering; abandon the obsolete placement-layering-reintegration model of
money laundering and revamp its simplistic understanding of terrorism financing.) The terms
may be different but the similarities with Althusser’s conceptions of knowledge; apparatus of
thought and the invisible-inside-the-visible (see above) are striking. However, the triggering
event for both are different. While Althusser pegs his apparatus of thought to a “natural and
social reality175”, for Foucault, ‘truth’ is produced and sustained through power and power
cannot be acquired or exercised except through the production of truth176 (elsewhere he calls this
“a regime of truth”)177. Practically, Foucault’s truth is produced by “apparatuses of knowledge”
similar to the data excavation methods deployed by FATF: methods of observation, techniques
of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control178.
Meanwhile, the difference between Bourdieu and Foucault’s conceptions of discourse is – as
ever – of scale. While Bourdieu’s discourse remains confined to individual speakers, Foucault’s
discourse is capable of being operationalised by groups, classes and institutions as well.
Bourdieu’s discourse compels obedience because it posits itself as truth; Foucault’s discourse
compels obedience because it eliminates other, competing truths by redefining what truth is or
can be. The veracity of the first is still capable of contestation; the second is not. To mask selfinterest, Bourdieu’s speaker conceals himself in relation to and within another (God/ Truth/
People). The speaker speaks in the name of an external Other; he draws authority and power
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from those he speaks of; he abolishes himself to become this Other. The ‘deceit’, as such,
consists in the positing of the speaker’s creation (God/ Truth etc) as an independent, autonomous
entity. Foucault’s discourse, however, is not constructed in direct relation to another entity; it
seeks to construct a knowledge in derogation of other knowledges. This act of creation – and the
shearing of other knowledges – is a manifestation of the speaker’s own authority and power.
However, his self-interest is better concealed by the fact that his ‘creation’ and its opposition are
both seemingly depersonalised, apolitical knowledge/s. The ‘deceit’ perpetuated here is that
knowledge, by its very nature, is neutral and autonomous.
Productive detours aside, the most succinct explication of group think falls to Poulantzas.
Encapsulating the worldview, power relations, institutions and legitimacy debates, he argues that
ideology is not just a system of ideas or representations designed to generate consensus but also
“a series of material practices, embracing the customs and life-style of the agents and settling
like cement in the totality of social (including political and economic) practices [emphasis in
original]179”. While effecting homogeneity of ideas among different classes and factions is
essential, so are the apparatuses that embody ideology and help elaborate, inculcate and
reproduce that ideology180. This, he concludes, is what enables the constitution of relations of
possession and economic property and the social division of labour at the heart of the relations of
production. FATF is one such ideological apparatus.
Bureaucratic power
The true worth of bureaucratic power lies in its seeming depersonalisation and depoliticisation.
The institutionalisation of this power is far clearer than with other instrumental powers – for
example, the institutions that mobilise the power of crises are far less visible than a bureaucratic
apparatus – but the fact of institutionalisation has the advantage of obscuring the political origins
of this power. The primacy of ‘rules’ – for example, the FATF 40 – suggests adherence to
universal and apolitical norms and values, which are rarely so in operation. The violence
embedded in the institution is thus concealed beneath a depersonalised façade.
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Marx seems to advert to this depoliticisation and depersonalisation when he says that
bureaucracy is the formalism of a content that lies outside it181. To him, the hierarchy of
bureaucracy is a “hierarchy of knowledge”. Unlike Foucault, Marx is not interested in the
content or construction of knowledge itself; he is more preoccupied by the impregnable nature of
the bureaucratic order. As he says, the “general spirit of bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery,
preserved inwardly by means of the hierarchy and outwardly as a closed corporation [emphasis
in original]”. This secrecy is reflected by, for example, FATF’s limited membership policy and
closed-door meetings. Marx seems to suggest that the desire for secrecy overwhelms every
political impulse that the bureaucrats may harbour since both “political spirit and disposition” are
seen as betrayals of the mystery. Such a reading is corroborated by his assertion that authority is
the principle of bureaucracy’s knowledge and deification of authority its disposition182. Not only
does this demonstrate a loyalty that outweighs every other, it also reflects the depersonalised, detemporalised nature of it: rather than to a person or an institution at a moment in time, loyalty is
owed only to the current holder of the sceptre.
While Marx focuses on how the hierarchical order protects the mystery from the political in a
process internal to the bureaucracy, Poulantzas takes up the imperviousness of the bureaucracy to
rank outsiders. For Poulantzas, all power exists in apparatuses, both state and otherwise, which
also play a role in the constitution of power183. The secrecy of power and bureaucracy, he
contends, are designed to create recognised networks within the state that will favour
pronouncements from certain quarters184 and exclude popular masses from “centres of decisionmaking”185. He builds on Marx’s closed corporation thesis to argue that the framework of the
apparatuses of the capitalist state – army, courts, administration, police, ideological apparatuses
and state apparatuses – rest on the permanent and specific exclusion of the popular masses. (As a
non-representative body, FATF is not accountable to non-members, even if they are affected by
its regulations; since the regulations are pitched as “technical” and not political, they are rarely
debated by legislative bodies – even when FATF mandates particular changes in laws – and are
mostly implemented by apolitical state institutions such as central banks, other regulators and
181
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law enforcement agencies186.) Poulantzas’ contribution is thus the important insight that political
networks and alliances – as reflected, for example, by the “capitalist state” – are critical to
navigating bureaucracies. The mystery of the bureaucracy is a mystery only to those excluded
from the corridors of power, not allies of the power.
Weber similarly captures the essentiality of bureaucratic power. He sees every domination
(whether a monopoly domination or an authority one187) expressing itself and functioning
through administration188 and every bureaucracy the expression of a rationally consociated
conduct of a dominational structure189. The value of a bureaucracy, to Weber, is that it provides
precision, speed, consistency, availability of records, continuity, possibility of secrecy, unity,
coordination, minimisation of friction, and expense for material and personnel190.
Tracking the evolution of bureaucratic structures from honoratiores to administration by princes
to modern bureaucracies, Weber contends that bureaucracies were born of the technical
requirements of administration. First, the more stable a prince’s power, the more the prince
tended towards unity, order and cohesion of his realm191. To this end, there arose the need to
deploy a small number of rulers and maintain secrecy (in contrast to the ease of communication
between the ruled); easily organise power; and easily preserve secrecy regarding the intentions
and resolutions of the rulers192. (This is seen in FATF’s existing governance structure, for
example.) But the other push towards bureaucratisation, Weber finds, owes to the personal
interests of the prince’s officials regarding career advancement and lateral moves193. As Marx
puts it, the aims of state become the aims of bureaucracy and the aims of bureaucracy become
the aims of state194.
In modern bureaucracies, Weber argues, the law embodies what was once the will of the prince.
“Bureaucracy provides the administration of justice with a foundation for the realisation of a
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conceptually systematised rational body of law on the basis of ‘laws’”, he says. According to
Weber, the more depersonalised a bureaucracy, the better it serves capitalism since it carves out
a space for the emotionally detached, professional expert195.
Thompson has a useful explication regarding Weber’s detachment theory. The development of
objectified institutions in modern society, says Thompson, reduces the importance of symbolic
mechanisms in sustaining dominance through interpersonal relations. As he sees it, individuals
need not dominate because violence is built into the institution itself, which provides a practical
justification of the established order. To put it another way, the ability to surveil a jurisdiction or
to demand changes in its laws, for example, appears less of an intrusive imposition when it
comes from FATF – the ‘global’ regulator, charged with protecting the global financial system
from laundering and terrorism financing – rather than from the US or the G7. Further,
institutionalisation enables those who benefit from the established order to convince themselves
of their inherent worthiness while preventing those who benefit least from understanding the
basis of their deprivation196. Institutional mechanisms fix the value assigned to different
products, allocate them differentially and inculcate a belief in their value197. For example, while
Pakistan has frequently been upbraided by FATF for failure to crack down on cash couriers
(FATF Recommendation 32; see Chapter 4), the US’ inability to enforce beneficial ownership
rules (FATF Recommendation 24 & 25) have not attracted similar attention198. Institutions such
as FATF can thus be seen as both legitimating (in how they defend the status quo) and selflegitimating (in how their objectification creates the presumption of neutrality). As Bourdieu
puts it: these institutions select and educate producers of ideology, codify rules, rationalise
competence required in the political universe while legitimating themselves by assuming the
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appearance of scientificity and “treating political questions as matters for specialists which it is
the specialists’ responsibility to answer in the name of knowledge and not class interests199.”
Yet, as Marx seems to caution, the deification of authority is the problem and not whether the
dominance is sustained vide interpersonal relations or objectified institutions. As he notes,
deification is what turns into a “crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, of trust
in authority, the mechanism of an ossified and formalistic behaviour, of fixed principles,
conceptions and traditions200”. As Marx describes it, the individual in modern society exists in a
twofold organisation: the bureaucratic, which is a manifestation of the state, of executive power,
which does not touch him and his independent actuality; and the social, which is the organisation
of civil society, in which he is a private man outside the state, which does not touch the political.
To exist as a citizen of the state who has both political significance and efficacy, says Marx, the
individual must abandon his civic actuality201. And bureaucracy can only be abolished when
universal interest actually becomes a particular interest, which is only when a particular interest
becomes universal202.
2.2.2.2. Category B
Science as fetish
The scientific rationality thesis of the Enlightenment has been attacked by waves of scholars of
power203. The power of science to authorise and legitimate ideas and practices is undisputed;
these theorists document instead the way science is deployed to bolster the arguments of those
who wield power. (Interestingly, however, the fetishisation of science itself receives little
attention.)
The germ of the idea of science can be found in Marx’s early writings, where he talks of how the
division of labour enslaves man. The specialisation he refers to where “everyone has a definite,
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exclusive sphere of activity which is imposed on him and from which he cannot escape204” is
crafted from a seemingly impartial assessment of individuals in line with certain predetermined
principles and logic. However, the effect of this categorisation is the creation of a ‘logic’ that
enables the construction of definite power relations. The segregations that determine the division
of labour in Marx’s scheme – industrial or commercial versus agricultural labour; industrial
versus commercial; patriarchy versus slavery etc205 – bear a marked resemblance to modes of
scientific classification; in the FATF scheme, such segregation is conducted on the basis of
compliance/ non-compliance. The naming of things in an ordered, rational fashion that is further
capable of being reproduced and reapplied to new things is one of the hallmarks of all scientific
disciplines.
Unlike Marx who sees the scientific method in the processes of commodification of labour alone,
Foucault extends the parameters of the applicability of science. He sees science as one of the
three modes of objectification of humans206 – he talks about how normalizing, corrective
knowledge about the individual enables the “so-called human sciences” and the appearance of
man as an object of science207. Analytically, the comparison with errant jurisdictions holds:
normalising, corrective knowledge about a jurisdiction allows for the construction of said
jurisdiction as an object of science amenable to correction, rehabilitation. Foucault sees
“medicalisation”, “penal arithmetic” and “psychiatrization of criminal danger”208 being used to
legitimise the exercise of power and the reproduction of relations of power in society. Elsewhere,
he speaks of the political, economic and technical “incitement” to talk about sex in terms of
“analysis, stocktaking, classification and specification, quantitative or causal studies209”.
Science, argues Foucault, is what enables the holders of power to ‘quantify’ nebulous concepts
such as the inherent dangerousness of an individual, to empirically ‘measure’ his potentiality and
determine how much protection society needs from them210. This measurement and assessment,
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he maintains, is what enables such subjective decisions to assume the ring of ‘truth’ – a truth
accepted by both society and the individual himself. More critically, this scienticised truth is
what allows power to exercise control over an individual’s future: the subjectivity concerns
man’s potentiality, not his actuality. As such, the punishment morphs from being seen as “legal
vengeance” to “a technical prescription for a possible normalisation211” – a transformation that
obliterates the political imperatives within such judgements and makes punishment appear as a
retribution the offender owes to society212. The insight holds great value in the context of AMLCTF regulation: the risk-based approach (FATF Recommendation 1) that undergirds the regime
is meant to be an assessment of the ‘inherent dangerousness’ of a jurisdiction – a (necessarily)
subjective evaluation of its potentiality but couched in language that suggests a more empirical
consideration – and a determination of how much protection global society needs from such
jurisdictions. Similarly, the Suspicious Transaction Reports are an assessment of an individual’s
potentiality, not their actuality: could they be a terrorist? This scienticised ‘truth’ is then written
into the country evaluations that allow for the ‘technical’ prescriptions for ‘normalisation’: for
example, stricter monitoring of informal value transfer systems (IVTS); better terrorism
financing investigations; greater controls on cash transactions. The political imperative within
the judgement – for example, that a country crack down on IVTS or a cash-intensive culture – is
subsumed by the notion that the jurisdiction owes this retribution to society.
Although Bourdieu does not use the word scienticisation, he takes up similar themes when he
talks of what is regarded as “commonsensical”. According to him, dominant individuals
propagate the status quo by imposing a universal commonsensical discourse which is pitched as
necessary. Much like the operation of science, this common sense undermines politics through a
depoliticised political discourse produced through a neutralisation or negation of the heretical
subversion, through the rhetoric of impartiality and scientificity213. But, Bourdieu cautions, even
neutral science has non-neutral effects214. The commonsensical then becomes the legitimating
device as well as the site for the construction of power relations by those who define the
commonsensical. For, as Bourdieu contends, common sense brings into existence, publicly and
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explicitly, that which hasn’t an objective collective existence and was in a state of individual or
several existence215. The fact of being articulated as ‘common sense’ is what enables it to assume
existence as such.
Key here is what Bourdieu calls the inherent politicity of language. This property gives primacy
to relations over elements, to form over substance; it conceals the repressed elements by
integrating them into a network of relations which modify their value without modifying their
substance. The example Bourdieu uses to demonstrate this is of the use of specialised language
by specialists. This, he says, allows for the profit of saying and the denying of what is said by the
way it is said216. The elevated form of the specialist discourse ensures laypersons stay at a
distance because the text is thus only a) to be read within the limits of the text, and b) by
professional readers217. (Critically, in the AML-CTF context, neither domestic legislatures nor
regulators count as professional enough: the FATF rules do not specifically discount their input
but – as the Pakistan example shows in Chapter 4 – FATF arrogates to itself the right to
determine whether the input is adequate.) The discourse – or science – is both self-referential, in
that it secures its reading within the confines of a prescribed text, as well as self-legitimating, in
that it specifies who is authorised to read it.
Weber, meanwhile, finds a similar trend towards scienticisation in what he calls “modern legal
science”. The construct he describes emerges as a self-contained, self-referential edifice of
rationality: every social action of humans is seen as either application, execution or infringement
of legal propositions and whatever cannot be construed legally in rational terms is legally
irrelevant. Accordingly, every legal decision must apply abstract propositions to concrete facts
using legal logic in a “gapless” system of legal propositions218. Like every scientific discipline,
the frontiers of law are self-determined; to be legally valid, an action must adhere to the internal
logic of the law. Furthermore, the drive towards increasing rationality and specialised legal
knowledge create the need for professional lawyers219 – the only ones deemed capable of
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participating in the conversation, much like Bourdieu’s “professional readers” – thus closing the
circle completely.
Crisis as vehicle
The power of the ‘crisis’ in constructing legitimacy and, thereon, power relations is undeniable.
The crisis is what authorises a break from the status quo and, in doing so, allows for the
previously untenable to be regularised and incorporated into the current reality220. Significantly,
it neutralises possible resistance by evoking visions of community, even if the said community is
a fiction, and simultaneously underscores the need for urgent redressal. Finally, the power to
define what constitutes a crisis invests the holder of this power with both legitimacy and the
power to exclude other, competing definitions of a crisis. Since its inception, AML-CTF
regulation has regularly reverted to crises as legitimation devices: from the war on drugs to the
war on terrorism; from weapons of mass destruction to financial crises. Each of these crises have
enabled significant departures from the status quo: the war on drugs, for example, allowed for
civil forfeiture laws to be fashioned to track criminal proceeds221; the war on terrorism authorised
an unprecedented level of financial sector surveillance and the abandonment of constitutional
and criminal law safeguards222. Finally, the focus on organised crime as the primary source of
money laundering has deflected attention from the role of capital in laundering.
Although Weber is speaking of actual wars, much of what he says about the conditions generated
by war hold equally true for crises in contemporary society. War and its effects on economy and
social order, he writes, “secularises” the thinking about what should be valid as norm because it
becomes clear to everyone that the status quo isn’t sacred. The need for security against internal
and external enemies compels a new rationalisation of law-making and law-finding, which is
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why Weber insists that “war and warlike expansion have at all stages of historical development
often been connected with a systematic fixation of the law both old and new.” Unfortunately,
Weber does not explore the consequences of this power to define enemies (and, by negative
definition, to define allies – the Us-Them binary so favoured by former US president George W.
Bush) and to determine the specific form of rationality the new law is to favour. But he
recognises that war bestows a military character to political associations and greater influence
over disputes and law to the military. The latter, he insists, is particularly important since the
army is likely to be free of traditional constraints223. (This was particularly relevant in the
development of CTF regulation in the wake of 9/11.)
Fortunately, Bourdieu picks up from where Weber leaves off and develops a sophisticated
account of how representation (or the power to identify enemies, in the Weberian example)
affects power relations and legitimacy. He contends that the representation of a world – as
opposed to only factual, objective manifestation – contributes to its reality. To have efficacy as
an instrument of power, crises require the creation of a new commonsense. For Bourdieu,
heretical discourse (or the articulation of the previously unthinkable) produces this new
commonsense by integrating the previously repressed or tacit experiences of the group (the
unthinkable) and investing them with the legitimacy conferred by public expression and
collective recognition. For example, pre-9/11, the notion of prosecutions based on suspicion or
the requirement that an accused prove their innocence were once unthinkable according to
established criminal law principles; similarly, the idea that banks would share information about
their clients or of a law without a statute of limitations were also once heretical. After 9/11,
however, public legitimacy endowed the AML-CTF regime to deploy and exercise all these
powers.
This becomes possible because, as Bourdieu puts it, every language that makes itself heard by an
entire group is an authorised language invested with the group’s authority; it authorises what it
designates at the same time it expresses it. The language thus draws its legitimacy from the
group over which it exercises authority but simultaneously also helps constitute by offering the
group a unitary expression of its experiences224. This political labour of representation (in words,
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theories, ceremonies, demonstrations or any form of symbolisation of division or opposition),
says Bourdieu, allows political agents to construct new identities based on newly discovered
commonalities that were earlier isolated, divided and demobilised225.
The points he makes merit further consideration. Where representation shapes reality, the
subjectivity of the representation assumes greater significance. The demarcation of a crisis – be it
a financial crisis or a spike in white-collar crime – thus contributes to its objective, factual
existence as a crisis. To rephrase: it becomes a crisis also because the new common sense calls it
a crisis. The legitimacy of the group attaches to both the common sense and the crisis it
constitutes and the identity of group is further cemented by its ownership of the new common
sense and the crisis. (For example, as with anti-corruption watchdogs.) Critically, the political
labour of representation by political agents that makes all this possible, passes under the radar.
The significance of the above becomes more pronounced in the context of the global economy.
To rephrase Foucault, the exercise of pastoral power by the modern state is predicated on a new
conception of ‘salvation’226: FATF repeatedly invokes its desire to save the world from the
effects of money laundering and terrorism financing. However, the point that merits recognition
is that the invasive technologies and apparatuses that enable the exercise of this power (by
developing knowledge of individuals) are entirely dependent on the definition of ‘salvation’ in
terms of health, security, etc and who defines it so. That is, FATF’s peculiar definition of
salvation – one predicated on a tenuous linkage between global financial health and organised
crime (see Chapter 3 for details) – is what authorises its deployment of invasive technologies
and apparatuses.
As Gramsci correctly notes, economic crises don’t produce fundamental historic events but
create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought and ways of
problematising the subsequent development of national life227. Similarly, while the issues of
money laundering and terrorism financing have yet to trigger a global financial meltdown, they
have already inculcated what Tsingou refers to as “surveillance creep228”: the idea that
surveillance is the right of regulators and to be surveilled is the duty of citizens. The
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militarisation Bourdieu speaks of consists in assuming authority on the basis of the “war”
situation confronting the organisation, a situation that can be produced by working on the way
the situation is represented so as to produce and reproduce constantly “the fear of being against”.
This, he says is the ultimate basis of all militant or military disciplines: the characterisation of all
opposition as collusion with the enemy. Militarisation, argues Bourdieu, is reinforced by the UsThem binary and the perception of “the besieged ‘us’”, which predisposes people to military
obedience and annuls all practical possibility of being against “by exploiting the euphoria of
adherence or the anguish of exclusion and excommunication”229.
Divisive power
Dividing practices are essential to the project of power. By setting up separations, they impose
identities as well as certain relations of power and even structure the parameters of dissent.
As discussed above, Marx sees division of labour as one of the principal powers at work230. For
him, the imposition and inevitability of “a definite, exclusive sphere of activity … from which he
cannot escape231” is the most potent manifestation of this power. Using the example of guilds, he
shows how the organisation of guilds gave masters a direct influence over the entire life of the
worker and installed the workers in a pre-existing complex of power relations. There was
obviously the power imbalance between the worker and the master, both in terms of knowledge
and know-how but also the tying of the worker to the existing order by his interest in eventually
becoming a master himself. However, Marx also points out other relations of power: the bonds
between workers working for one master; their unification against the workers of other masters;
and their separation from other masters. Caught so in the network of power, Marx says, the only
subordinations these workers managed were within individual guilds232. As discussed above,
FATF’s grey and blacklists similarly install jurisdictions within power networks. Like workers
tied to guilds by their self-interest, jurisdictions also remain tied to the AML-CTF regime
through their efforts to achieve whitelisting.
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Arendt makes a similarly powerful analysis of how dissent is managed through dividing
practices. She quotes Montesquieu as saying that the outstanding characteristic of tyranny was
isolation: of the tyrant from his subjects and the subjects from each other through mutual fear
and suspicion. This made tyranny contradict the essential human condition of plurality, which is
the condition for all forms of political organisation. As Arendt reads this passage, tyranny
prevents the development of power in its entirety; it generates impotence as naturally as other
bodies politic generate power233. The insight regarding suspicion is particularly important in the
context of the AML-CTF regime: not only does FATF alienate and label jurisdictions based on
its subjective assessments regarding the dangerousness, it further divides individuals between
themselves by fostering a culture of surveillance and suspicion and by co-opting professional
bankers, jewellers, casino owners, realtors etc in policing each other. As Chapter 5 discusses, this
culture has a significant impact on how people in societies relate to each other.
Foucault’s contribution is the dissection of this impotence and its causes. He sees norms and
“mechanisms of exclusion … apparatuses of surveillance, the medicalisation of sexuality, of
madness, of delinquency” as techniques of power incorporated into the social whole234. Dividing
practices or segregation – of the sick from the healthy, the sane from the insane, for example –
divide the subject both within himself and from others235. The wholeness or plurality Arendt
espouses as a precondition for politics thus becomes an unattainable goal for this subject. The
twofold division by what Foucault calls “the government of individualising” or “individualising
power” is critical: the individual is categorised and marked by his individuality but he is also
attached to his own identity by the imposition of a law of truth on him that he must recognise and
have others recognise in him. This is how, Foucault concludes, power makes individuals subjects
in two senses: subject to control and tied to their own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.
It’s a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to236. The control exercised over this
individual is thus both external or disciplinary and internal or inculcated (discussed later).
Bourdieu agrees with the power inherent in the institution of an identity, which signifies to an
individual what he is and how he should conduct himself as a consequence. He also concurs with

233

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958/1998) at 202
“Two Lectures” in P/K supra note 173 at 101.
235
Power supra note 54 at 326
236
Power supra note 54 at 330-1
234

65

Foucault that all social destinies and boundaries are fatal because they enclose whom they
characterise and prevent those inside from leaving237. But part of this ‘magic’, for Bourdieu, lies
in that the identity is instituted by saying it in front of everyone: the authoritative manner in
which an individual is informed of what he is and what he must be stems from the authority of
‘everyone’238. As he reasons, every group is the site of a struggle to impose a legitimate principle
of group construction. Accordingly, the principle of classification ought to be one that is capable
of uniting the members but also annulling their previous identities239. (This shows up in, for
example, FATF’s naming-and-shaming of non-compliant jurisdictions.)
While Foucault’s concern are the effects of dividing practices, Bourdieu highlights two critical
aspects about the practices themselves. First, he argues that all rites of institution consecrate or
legitimate an arbitrary boundary by fostering a misrecognition of its arbitrariness; all rites either
encourage a recognition of the boundary as legitimate or the solemn, lawful transgression of a
limit, which constitutes a social and mental order the rites are supposed to safeguard. But the rite
– be it classification as a high-risk jurisdiction or to mark the transition to adulthood – ends up
focusing attention on the passage and not the arbitrariness of the line itself240. The politicity of
the line ends up subsumed by the factual passage over it. For example, as Chapter 4 shows,
Pakistan attracted FATF’s ire in 2007, for doing what it had been doing since the late 1970s.
Second, Bourdieu invites attention to the fact that while a line separates a before and an after, it
also defines an instituted group in relation to a hidden set of people – the visible-invisible
dichotomy espoused by Althusser. The example Bourdieu chooses is regarding male
circumcision. While circumcision apparently distinguishes the boys from the men, the rite also
separates – unnoticed – those who’re subject to it (boys, men) from those who are not (girls,
women). That is, the girls/women are always present though invisible in the rite of circumcision.
By treating the visible and the invisible separately, Bourdieu contends, the rite consecrates and
institutes a simple difference of fact as a legitimate distinction, as an institution. Rites assign
properties of a social nature in such a way that they appear as properties of a natural nature241.

237

Symbolic supra note 38 at 122
Symbolic supra note 38 at 120-1
239
Symbolic supra note 38 at 130
240
Symbolic supra note 38 at 118
241
Symbolic supra note 38 at 118-9
238

66

Similarly, while greylisting ostensibly separates the compliant from the non-compliant, it also
separates those who are subject to it from those who, due to political privilege, are not. For
example, despite having financed terrorism and encouraged money laundering, neither Saudi
Arabia nor the US have been sanctioned for the same.
Agamben builds on Bourdieu’s visible-invisible preoccupation with his inclusion-exclusion
principle by arguing that the exclusion (separation, for Bourdieu) has the effect of including –
and thus perpetuating control over – even that which has been othered242. His example of the
concentration camp illustrates this: the creation of the exception (the temporary suspension of
fundamental rights) places the concentration camp outside the ‘normal order’. However, that
which was the state of exception within the polity (temporary suspension) becomes the rule for
the camp243. Even in its state of exclusion, the camp is subject to the rules of the polity. The
power to define the exception thus expands even when it appears contractionary. And so, despite
its pariah status, every non-compliant jurisdiction remains subject to the rules of the AML-CTF
regime – as evidenced by their effort to achieve compliance.
The advantages of control, of the misrecognition of arbitrariness and of expanded ambit are
significant in and of themselves. However, as Foucault notes, dividing practices also carry
economic advantages or political utility244. This utility shows up in, for example, crime control
policies targeting “man, the soul, the normal or abnormal individual245”. Attacks on the
individuality of man, his “dangerousness” and his potentiality legitimates the exercise of external
discipline through supervision, control and correction. As such, this individualising power
delivers legitimate control over an individual’s future246. The utility of this power can also be
seen in what Foucault calls “institutional networks of sequestration” such as prisons, factories
and schools. Here, individuals are sorted into groups and then controlled by the instituting of
controls over their time and bodies as well as through the creation of a new polymorphous,
polyvalent power that is economic (for example, the power exerted by he who pays wages),
political (for example, the power to set rules or determine the basis for exclusion from groups),
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judicial (the power to punish and reward) and epistemological (the power to extract knowledge
from and about individuals with a view to perfecting control)247. In every case, the exercise of
individualising power is seen as delivering even more power to its holder. Significantly, FATF
exercises all these powers: economic (for example, the ability to limit access to capital markets);
political (the power to set rules as well as the decision regarding when to flout them); judicial
(the power to reward and punish); and epistemological (the power to extract knowledge from and
about jurisdictions, their economies, their citizens, with a view to perfecting control).
2.2.2.3 Category C
Dressage
The term ‘dressage’ here is not used in the Foucauldian sense (discussed later). Instead, it refers
to the equestrian art of training, whereby a trained horse learns to execute precision movements
in response to barely perceptible signals from its rider248. The emphasis is on the intensiveness of
the training and conditioning that first, renders the movements of the horse predictable, and
second, economises the input of the rider. To rephrase, control is complete and perfected only
when the subject internalises discipline such that they require minimal external control.
Interestingly, the question of an internalised discipline preoccupies mostly the latter wave of the
power theorists surveyed here. (Poulantzas, perhaps, is the only exception.) Foucault, Bourdieu
and Lukes variously explore the notion of internalised discipline as dressage, responsibilisation,
internalisation and inculcation. While there is no significant explanation of why this is so, part of
the reason may have to do with temporality: Foucault, for example, contends that disciplinary
power is a modern power that remains outside the construct of a traditionally defined sovereignty
of the state249 whereas state sovereignty was a core concern of the other scholars discussed here.
Interestingly, the core theory of disciplinary power propounded by all three theorists remains
strikingly similar. Foucault, for example, defines dressage as a core docility which joins the
analysable body to manipulable body that can be subjected, used, transformed and improved250.
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(For example, by determining the specific ways an economy ought function by proscribing a
cash-intensive culture; see Chapter 5.) The techniques deployed by disciplinary power are small
powers – “micro-powers” or “infrapowers” – which rely on the production of ‘docile bodies’
through the repetition of detailed tasks as in prisons and hospitals251. The techniques of
surveillance – methods of observation, recording and training – thus engender a new universal
recoding where the individual absorbs and internalises the discipline he is subject to. Critically,
this power seems to obviate the use of force or coercion as an impetus to obedience252.
As Hunt and Wickham read Foucault, disciplinary power exhibits three basic characteristics:
hierarchical observation; the operation of norms and normalising judgement; and a mix of micro
penalties and rewards253. The FATF governance structure manifests all these: the tiered
observation by the FATF-style regional bodies, the Egmont Group, the IMF and the World Bank;
the norms and judgements regarding money laundering and terrorism financing practices; the
naming-and-shaming techniques and the public commendations on achieving progress. As
Foucault explains in The History of Sexuality, these techniques arise out of existing hierarchies
of power: the state has an interest in knowing about the sexual lives of its citizens and how sex is
used so that the state can control it to secure a sexuality that is economically useful and
politically conservative (visible as steady population growth and labour capacity and the
perpetuation of social relations). The norms prescribed by the experts then help define
‘deviance’, thereby expelling from the discourse all sexual practices deemed useless by the
state254. Even difference – aberrant sexualities, as it were – is to be rendered useful by giving it
an analytical, visible reality that can be used for classification and intelligibility255. Finally, as
Hunt and Wickham contend, the advantage of the micropenalties that Foucault puts at the heart
of all disciplinary mechanisms is that they take possession of ever-widening fields of behaviour.
That is, whereas penalties track offenses, micropenalties can be used to arrest minor deviations
and individualise punishment256.
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Bourdieu, meanwhile, speaks of this internalised discipline as a consequence of the consecration
of difference (discussed above). The person consecrated is transformed, he says, because of the
simultaneous transformation of the perception he has of himself and behaviour he feels obliged
to adopt in order to conform to that representation257. The “universally adopted strategy” of
preventing a person from leaving the box of his social destiny, says Bourdieu, is the
naturalisation of difference by turning it into second nature by inculcation in the form of
habitus258. The key advantage of inculcation is that it seeks to naturalise the differences that
constitute an arbitrary limit in the form of “a sense of limits” so that people are deprived of a
sense of deprivation259. That is to say, the external limits imposed on an individual are so
internalised that he begins valuing them for their own and forgets to resist them as an external
imposition.
Lukes has a similar read: he argues that A exercises power over B not just by getting him to do
what he does not want to do by also “by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants 260”.
Lukes takes issue with the pluralists who contend that actual conflict is necessary to power and
argues instead that the most invidious and effective form of power is where the conflict is
prevented from rising in the first place; where grievances are pre-empted from being articulated
because the people accept their role in the order of things or because they cannot imagine an
alternative or because they see it as natural or as beneficial and divinely ordained261. The
Pakistani interlocutors who profess to want whitelisting need to seen as such: even if their aim is
to access foreign capital or to prevent terrorism within the country, the self-identification with
FATF and its aims is deeply problematic since the FATF rubric comes embedded with its own
politics and power relations.
The most strident critique of such an internalised discipline comes from Poulantzas. He insists
that Foucault underestimates both the role of law in the exercise of power as well as the role of
the state with its repressive apparatuses (army, police, judicial system etc)262. The repressionideology couplet or the techniques of power, he says, focus attention on how consent is secured –
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through “law-love” or “prohibition-desire”263 – while the role of violence in grounding power is
undermined. This focus, Poulantzas claims, eclipses the “positive material reasons [emphasis in
original]” for securing consent, such as the concessions made to the masses by the existing
power (the Gramscian influence is clear though Poulantzas does not acknowledge this). Here, in
a persuasively argued passage, he goes for Foucault’s jugular: if disciplines of normalisation
were enough to account for submission, there would be no space for struggles or the resistances
that Foucault himself recognises as inscribed in power. Violence, like consent, owes its existence
to the universality and primacy of exploitation-based struggles264.
As ever, Poulantzas turns to class to justify his thesis. Organised physical violence is critical to
the existence and reproduction of labour, he contends, and all phenomena of power – the
capitalist techniques of power, the disciplinary devices and the ideological-cultural institutions –
presuppose the state’s monopoly over violence. “State-monopolised physical violence
permanently underlies the techniques of power and mechanisms of consent: it is inscribed in the
web of disciplinary and ideological devices; and even when not directly exercised, it shapes the
materiality of the social body upon which domination is brought to bear [emphasis in original]”.
The violence, however, remains concealed by the shift of legitimacy towards legality and by the
rule of law265.
There is a strong case to be made for both sides. But if Foucault and Co’s defect is a failure to
adequately theorise the role of the state, Poulantzas’ is that the state is too much with him. There
is no denying the significance of the state – still – but as the fulcrum or the locus of all power
may be an oversimplification in contemporary times. As Pearce and Tombs note, recent
governmentality literature has upended the belief that the state is at the epicentre of social
ordering; instead, such accounts privilege the governance of self, the actions of others and
relations within populations as their object266. To be fair to Poulantzas, such regulatory
technologies were nascent or non-existent at the time of his writing and the emergence of global
regulation and the transnational capitalist class were a way off. The materiality of the state in
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international law has since been productively mined, for example, by scholars such as Chimni
and Hay. Chimni, for example, applies a Marxist lens to international law to argue that first,
international relations depend on how each state has developed its productive forces, the division
of labour and internal dialogues. Second, that foreign policy proceeds from domestic policy and
is located within a socio-economic context based on a dominant mode of production. Third, in
the international arena, states advance the interests of the ruling class and do not represent
‘national interest’. Finally, the international system has an identity distinct of the sum of its
parts267.
However, even such advances remain locked in the materialist framework and fail to take
adequate account of other forms of power such as military (as distinct from the state);
religious/ideological and political. Further, there is little recognition of the fact that the
interaction of powers in a society frequently produces results that cannot be completely predicted
by or even explained in terms of a single, predominant power. As Dupont and Pearce read “The
Confession of the Flesh”, even Foucault recognises that nobody controls the totality of the social.
And yet simultaneously, they argue, he makes a persuasive case about the different strategic
capacities used by different groups to take advantage of the unexpected, surprising effects of the
operation of particular social apparatuses or dispositifs268. But the most significant aspect of the
interaction of powers thesis is – to quote Hindess in another context – it requires the idea of a
power whose effects are produced in ways that cannot readily be traced to the deliberate actions
of any identifiable individual or group269.
2.3 Interaction of powers
Before proceeding to a discussion of how powers interact, it is essential to briefly revisit what
power is. First, power is no zero-sum game with a definite, measurable amount of power; power
is the capacity of one or several actors to realise their specific interests in derogation of the
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capacity and interests of other actors in a relational field270. While the political power of an actor
to realise their interests depends on their position relative to others, it is also conditioned by the
position and strategy they display vis-a-vis others. Second, power originates from both economic
and non-economic capital (political, cultural, social, symbolic etc). Third, power requires both
broad strategies of effecting, maintaining and perpetuating domination (‘constructive practices’)
as well as specific techniques and means of exercising it (‘instrumental power’). The latter are
also significant as they help reproduce the institutions of power.
The specificity of this definition provokes a series of interrelated but distinct questions related to
the interaction of powers, more particularly, the intersection of politics, non-elite groups and
institutions. First, to quote Parsons, the greater power is power over the lesser, not merely more
power than the lesser271. If all actors are powerful to varying degrees, what does their interaction
look like? Who wins and is this always a predictable outcome, a given? Also, what constitutes a
‘win’: is a ‘win’ a watershed moment in a struggle between various groups when a decision
could have gone the other way? If so, how are the individual contributions of each group to the
(eventual) decision to be mapped? Or is a win more of an irresistible watercourse, where the
direction of the current depends on the magnitude of the largest force (or some combination of
the largest forces) applied and cannot be altered? Further, are the ‘specific interests’ of actors
immutable or is there room for purchase or influence, for example, through the Gramscian
concession? How do such concessions affect the purity of the interests and, as a corollary, the
source of power itself? Finally, how does the ‘subjective’ (that is, the power and position of each
actor relative to others) act upon the ‘objective’ (that is, the power and place of each actor in
economic, political and ideological relations)? That is, how does the interaction between the
various social groups – for example, between the capitalist class and the military – condition the
power and place of both?
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Second, if power is predicated on the accumulation of capital (whether economic or noneconomic) and belongs to elite groups or the ruling class, what is the role of non-elite groups? Is
their impotence inevitable? Further, where elite groups (such as capitalists) have constituencies
comprising non-elite groups (such as workers, labour unions etc), what do these relationships
look like and how do they affect the choices and decisions of the elite groups?
Third, while an understanding of how power is produced, ordered and deployed is crucial, the
key question remains: where does power inhere? Is the relational field populated by individuals,
groups, institutions or a mix of all? Further, where individuals and groups hold several
memberships and identities simultaneously (for example, an ‘old money’ capitalist who has ties
with the military or a religious group that has entered mainstream politics), how are the various
contributory sources of their power to be mapped? Finally, are the institutions autonomous or
merely reflective of the interests of actors and groups who run them? If the latter, do the
institutions (and the positions they assume) manifest the plural identities of the groups?
To collapse this set of disjointed questions into one: how do all the moving parts cohere?
This is where Mann comes in. In a daunting four-volume series titled The Sources of Social
Power, Mann traces the exercise of power, its sources and effects “from the beginning272” to
present day. He builds on older models of social stratification (respectively, Marx’s economicideological-political and Weber’s class-status-party) to deliver what he calls his ‘IEMP model’:
ideological, economic, military and political power as distinct and “relatively autonomous”
sources of social power273. The point is to zoom in on what drives the ‘drivers’ instead of
focusing on the faces of the actor/ institution/ network. Each of the four sources, says Mann,
presents an alternative means of social control; at different times in history, each offered an
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enhanced capacity for organization that enabled it to dictate – for a while – the form of societies
at large274.
The list of Mann’s problems with most theories of power are too numerous to be cited here in
full275 but three points are key. First, unlike most of the other theorists of power, he sees the
drivers of history continually changing through history. (For example, the US compulsions in
Afghanistan were different in the late 1970s from what they were in the noughties.) He
repeatedly rejects every theory of primacy/ structural determinism to argue that human societies
comprise “multiple, overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power”276. While each
network controls and reorganizes certain parts of social life, he believes none can fully control or
systematize social life as a whole277. In Mann’s reading of power through time, the question of
‘who wins’ is obviated by social complexity. History, he argues, does not have a “fundamental
unity” conferred by the history of, say, class struggle, modes of production, epistemes or
discursive formations278 and abstracting even “several major structural determinants” tends to
distort social complexity279. As such, he categorically rejects theories of systems and holisms
that attempt to “reify societies”280.
While Mann does admit the governing logic or the ordering force of, for example, capitalism/
patriarchy/ multistate relations, he cautions against viewing any as the sole determinant of social
change281. Since social events and trends have multiple causes (discussed later), he thinks the
notion of primacy is stillborn. Further, he contends that no power source has a given structure
exerting “a steady, permanent influence” on social development282; structures are essentially the
outcome of collective actors and groups forming around the distribution of power resources. That
is, structures and institutions (including law and norms) are set up to distribute power after
people enter into cooperative power relations in pursuit of collective goals283.
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Second, while Mann takes great pains to define each source of power as rigorously as possible,
he is uncompromising in that each source is an idealtype. Although the sources are conceptually
distinct, they are also “functionally promiscuous” in how they interact and operate within power
actors in the ‘real’ world284. (The example he gives is of the state, which is both an economic
actor and a political one.) A full appreciation of society, its structure and history, he argues, is
predicated on an understanding of the interrelationships between the four sources of social
power. These interrelationships, he says, are reflected by both networks of social interaction (that
is, the interaction between individuals and groups) as well as institutions285.
The sources of power, claims Mann, develop in tandem: entwined and influencing each other’s
development rather than undercutting it286. The interaction of these networks and institutions is
critical because it transforms the nature of each power actor/ network/ institution – their “inner
shapes” – as well as their “outward trajectories” in ways that are often unpredictable. (The
internal transformation – or, to put it another way, the mutation of specific interests – is why he
cautions against thinking of power sources as “billiard balls”, which change direction when they
hit another but largely follow their own trajectory287.) This is because power organisations can
never be entirely institutionalized or insulated from influences coming “interstitially” from either
cracks within them or between them288. (For example, see the evolution of the military within
Pakistan in Chapter 4.)
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While the idea of a reflexive, dialectical interaction is as old as Marx himself, Mann’s specific
contribution rests on the blending of multicausality (as opposed to primacy) with
unpredictability289. The combined operation of both, he seems to suggest, nullifies any questions
regarding watersheds or watercourses. The insight is an important one and Mann deftly pulls
examples from history to show the fusing of disparate power sources and objectives: for
example, how ideological and economic power were essential to buttressing military power290 or
how military power and economic power have been mobilized in the service of political
power291. He makes a convincing argument for unpredictability where, for example, he discusses
US foreign policy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. He insists that the US was “sucked
into a militaristic strategy” due to the close ties of American capitalists with local upper-class
conservatives who didn’t want to yield any of their domestic power292 – a moment that captures
simultaneously the interrelationships of economic and political power in both the US and
Southeast Asia respectively; the influence of economic/political power over military power in the
US; and the transnational alliances between economic elites. The AML-CTF regime also merits
examining through a similar lens since it brings together the various sources of power in a polity
and beyond. Significantly, the direction of the regulation cannot be attributed to either a ruling
class or to a hegemon: the US position, for example, is informed by its economic, political and
military interests; the Pakistani position is informed by the political and economic interests of its
military as well as the ideological interests of its populace.
The element of unpredictability also comes through where Mann struggles to evaluate the
relative strengths of the power sources: he concludes that it is “difficult” to weigh the relative
strength of “the two American motives: great power rivalry with communist powers or support
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for capitalists and landlords in the interests of American capitalists”293. The unspoken corollary
to the foregoing is, of course, greater outcome unpredictability.
Unfortunately, Mann falters when it comes to demonstrating reflexive internal transformation.
Despite the stunning promise of the insight – as well as its readily intuitive appeal – he fails to
unpack the processes of its operation or even show how the theory applies to modern politics – at
least not explicitly294. For example, when he discusses the US Supreme Court’s conservative and
pro-capitalist bias, he concedes too readily that he is unable to understand why this is so295. (This
is particularly ironic since the case has come to exemplify how political and economic power are
individually transformed by their encounter and is now part of legal and political science
folklore296.) Happily, Kennedy supplies the deficiency with an explanation that hews closely to
Mann’s original with an additional contribution.
Like Mann, Kennedy, too, is no fan of ordered patterns as a heuristic device and sees actors and
structures as constituted though engagement. But his key advancement over Mann is that he
views actors and structures as the outcomes of previous struggles: “conflict is always already
there, frozen perhaps, but there. The [] positions [of actors and structures] at rest are the outcome
of those prior struggles297.” The quest for ordered patterns, maintains Kennedy, leads to an
overestimation of the significance of agreement, collaboration, consensus or persuasion – what
Mann would call interrelationships. But Kennedy refuses to characterize this interaction of
powers as benignly, as pacifically as Mann does. Like conflict, says Kennedy, this collaboration
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“takes place on a terrain of distributed power and legitimacy. Agreement, like argument, is
undertaken in a vocabulary whose effectiveness arises from its relative hegemony. Every
collaboration rests on a status of forces and every persuasive argument rests on a canon of the
plausible and the persuasive.298” To rephrase: the position of an actor/ structure and their specific
interests are the ossification of earlier conflict and power battles. The positions and interests are
the manifestation of the subjective acting on the objective; these positions and interests evolved
as a consequence of previous encounters. The internal transformation that Mann speaks of is not
a standalone event, episodic or even neoepisodic299; it is continuous, continual change in the
Hegelian sense. The transformation is present in every position of an actor/ structure; the procapitalist tilt of the US Supreme Court is not received but the result of earlier encounters with
economic, ideological and political power. Similarly, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the
ideological orientation of the military and judiciary in Pakistan is a consequence of their earlier
encounters with religious groups.
While Mann’s inability to flesh out this specific case is puzzling – especially since he recognises
a similar process at work when he lays out his thicker account of institutional development
(discussed below) – it does not detract from the overall conceptual merit of his theory. He sees
social change as the outcome of a combination of “creative group action” and “institutional
development”. At major points of change in society, he argues, there is a series of conjunctions
between causal chains – some novel, others interstitial (in that they emerge from gaps within and
between existing power structures) – but also other conjunctions with deep-rooted institutions
that are changing, albeit at a much slower pace300. In the latter case, change is the outcome of the
interaction between older, institutionalized power models and newer power models that emerge
interstitially301. As if these variables weren’t enough, he also adds a third, contributory category:
“mistakes, apparent accidents and unintended consequences302”. The cumulative effect of these
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four – the interactions between power sources, interstitial interlopers, institutional development
and inadvertency (mistakes, etc) – is that the outcome of power struggles are rarely predictable.
It is not enough to say, for example, that the US or G7 desire for greater financial-sector
surveillance will materialize as a consequence of AML-CTF compliance: the military
establishment in Pakistan, for instance, will attempt to derail implementation and the
inadequacies of an underfunded police department will torpedo investigations. Chapter 3 talks in
detail about the various compulsions of each source of power as well as the limitations they
impose on each other.
Corroboration for such a reading of power comes from the area of elite studies. Introducing a
special elite studies issue of the influential journal Theory, Culture and Society, editors Davis
and Williams make a case for elite studies to recognize the fallibility of all kinds of power and
map their intersection instead of aligning with one concept of power. “Many researchers have
signed up to explore the hegemony of a single form of power, only grudgingly accepted its
fallibility and never enquired about its intersections in a world where power’s reach often
exceeds grasp. Those issues about fallibility and intersection cannot be avoided in the
researching of new spaces where various elites (executive and intermediary, sectorally-based and
politically sponsoring or expertly supporting) are tactically combined for offence or defence,
often against competing groups”303.
Elite power, argue the two, has become more complicated since the Millsian notions of ‘money’,
‘power’ and ‘prestige’ rarely all reside in single individuals, be they political office bearers,
politicians or CEOs. “[M]any of the most visible public figures in politics and business now
resemble the type of celebrity that Alberoni (1960) once called the ‘powerless elite’. … The idea
of elite individuals being able to actively impose their will on others, because of their structural
position and superior resources, has been reappraised”. Instead, Davis and Williams cite
Foucault to contend that those at the top of the pyramid are as disciplined as those below: “[a]
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‘micro-physics’ or ‘capillary’ form of power works in all directions, with elite agency thoroughly
diluted (Foucault, 1980: 156): ‘Power is no longer substantially identified with an individual who
possesses or exercises it by right of birth; it becomes a machinery that no one owns’. As
Foucault’s later work made clear, even rulers are ‘governmentalized’”304. This insight is key to
understanding the AML-CTF regime since it captures the fact that isolating a singular class or
even kind of interest among the drivers of the regulation is inordinately difficult, if not
impossible.
The second point is regarding the role of non-elite groups. If power is predicated on the
ownership of capital (economic or otherwise), theoretically, non-elite groups ought to have no
influence or power. Yet Foucault insists that the preoccupation with powerful/ powerless is
largely futile since relations of power-knowledge are dynamic “matrices of transformation”. The
strategy of power, he says, is conditioned by, first, the specificity of possible tactics, and second,
by the tactics conditioned by the strategic envelope that makes them work305. This becomes
clearer when he explains what he calls the “microphysics of power”. This power, he says, is a
strategic position assumed by the dominant class that is sometimes manifested and sometimes
extended by the position of those who are dominated; the microphysics of power is thus a
network of relations constantly in action, not a property or privilege acquired or preserved by the
dominant class. Power does not operate on the powerless but “invests them, is transmitted by
them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them” even as they resist its grip over them306.
As discussed above, Foucault sees the complicity of the subjugated as essential to the exercise of
power. However, this complicity is neither born of impotence nor passive in its operation.
Sassen goes a step further by contending that there is puissance in even powerlessness. The
interaction of powers, she says, gives birth to a new kind of political power for those who were
powerless in conventional terms307. For example, she sees the law as having created the worker
as a disadvantaged subject in relation to the capitalist and marks how law feeds into (and
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conceals308) the power of the latter. As such, the encounter between workers and the owners of
capital, she contends, should have been entirely exploitative. Yet she notes how the workers,
their organisations and political parties used the same law to secure greater rights for
themselves309. The same argument can be extended a notch: since the workers are among the
non-elite constituencies of the capitalist, the exercise of this ‘new’ power by workers would also
influence future decision-making by the capitalist – an example of how a non-elite group, while
being ostensibly powerless, can move the levers of power. This is evidenced in the influence of a
non-elite group such as religious parties on politics in Pakistan: while lacking sizeable power of
their own, these groups leverage their influence on broader society (through their ideological
power as well as their welfare activities) as well as the Deep State’s dependence on them to
direct the trajectory of AML-CTF regulation. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.)
The complexity of powerlessness, writes Sassen, stems from the fact that it is not simply the
“absence of power” – only some constitutions of powerlessness feature impotence and
invisibility. She further demonstrates this using the example of disadvantaged and minority
groups in cities. “The fact that the disadvantaged in global cities can gain ‘presence’ in their
engagement with power but also vis-à-vis each other does not necessarily bring power, but
neither can it be flattened into some sort of generic powerlessness310.” While this presence is in a
broader political context that is not captured by the formal polity, it is still political action and
shows how informal political subjects, despite their exclusion from the formal political
apparatus, can still “make history”311.
Finally comes the question of where power inheres. The literature – as well as common sense –
suggest a mix of individuals, groups and institutions drawing jointly and separately on various
sources of power. Mann’s multicausality and functional promiscuity theses preclude the question
of hierarchy between and within these actors. That is, few phenomena – if any – can be attributed
to a singular, pure source of power prevailing over all others in a field. The problem of
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promiscuity of sources is compounded further by the multiple identities of the actors. For
example, a military owes its predominance to sources of power that are economic (the presence
of ample grasslands, in Mann’s example above), political (for example, inter-state conflict) and
ideological (for example, nationalist), in addition to its own social power. Predominance
achieved, the military develops its own power networks and institutions. These would include,
for example, the military industrial complex (economic power) as well as its role in praetorian
democracies (political power); both condition the strength of the military as an institution. If one
were to attempt to predict the overall direction or strategy of this institution, how would the
contributory influences be mapped relative to one another? The issue is not just of how the
economic interests of the military are balanced and reconciled with its political interests. Far
larger is the question of how this calculation manifests itself in the strategic direction assumed by
the military.
Mann believes the calculation of interests is influenced by all entwined sources of power and
always involves norms – both peaceful and violent – emanating from “complex attachments to
the ‘imagined communities’ of class and nation”312. He illustrates this using the example of the
state. Few states, he argues, are unitary actors and state elites are also plural, not singular. This
diversity produces an incoherence, especially where states comprise a mix of groups and
institutions (military, bureaucrats, political parties313); are riven by multiple departmental
autonomies; under pressure by capitalist and other interest groups; and hostage to specific
foreign policy imperatives314. In this mix, the traditional mechanisms deployed by states to
allocate priorities – via legal codes and constitutions; budgets; party democratic majorities;
monocratic bureaucracy – do not work315. Where power crystallises around different networks
(economic, military etc), a singular systemic state would theoretically have the capitalist class or
the working class care about routine diplomacy; the military care about factory safety legislation.
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Since they do not, argues Mann, “[p]owerful political actors pursue most of the multiple
functions of the state pragmatically, according to particular traditions and present pressures,
reacting pragmatically and hastily to crises concerning them all316.” The state, he concludes, is
not conspiracy but “cock up”317; the modern state has emerged “in forms intended by no one and
has in turn transformed all their identities and interests”318.
The point marks a critical feature of Mann’s thought: the state as both an actor and a place. (This,
of course, contradicts Poulantzas and Gramsci’s insistence that the state is only a site and centre
of exercise of power and not a player with power of its own319.) As a place, the state is open to
penetration by different power networks as well as geopolitical concerns320. Sassen, too, echoes
the idea of state-as-space when she talks of how global processes are embedded in what she calls
“national strategic spaces”: state institutions, territories and infrastructure321. And yet, as an
actor, Mann’s state manifests an autonomy, an identity independent of its multiple networks of
power. State autonomy, he posits, may reside less in elite autonomy than in the autonomous logic
of definite political institutions that rose during previous power struggles and were subsequently
institutionalised and now constrain present struggles.
While Mann is specifically talking about the state here, his conclusions are generalisable for
most institutions. Like states, most institutions are part of multiple networks of power and caught
up in webs of influence that determine their evolution. While the influences of disparate powers
sources are easy enough to see, the interactions and the outcomes cannot be readily reduced to
what Mann mockingly refers to as “ultimate relations322”. This is particularly so since the
interactions have produced, over time, an institutional autonomy that generates outcomes that
resist classification.
2.4 Conclusion
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In physics, vectors are used to describe the motion of a moving object in terms of the forces
acting on the said object. The eventual displacement of the object from A to B is a function of
the magnitude and the direction of the disparate forces operative on it (see diagram 1). When
explaining social phenomena, it is tempting to conceive of the interaction of powers as orderly
sets of quantifiable vectors representing the sources of power. These vectors would amplify and
nullify each other’s operations to produce entirely predictable displacement323; it would be
possible, for example, to gauge the magnitude of economic power relative to ideological power
in a situation and to predict the outcome of a collision between the two. However, as the
foregoing shows, the outcomes of power struggles are rarely entirely predictable; even the
powerless have some power over outcomes and institutions add further complexity to an already
complex interplay. Vector diagrams are thus completely inadequate.
A more accurate diagrammatic analogy is of vector fields. In physics, they are used to model
objects that are changing over time (for example, moving liquids or magnetic force). A vector is
assigned to each point in a subset of space; each vector captures the strength and direction of a
force as it changes from one point to another (see diagram 2). Not only does this capture the
changing direction of the forces, it does so over time.
Diagram 1: Net force
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Diagram 2: Magnetic force of the sun

Displacement, in mathematical terms, refers to both the distance travelled by the object as well as the direction
of its motion.
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Knowing how power works, one can proceed to an examination of the complexities of the global
anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing architecture.
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CHAPTER 3: Drugs, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction: power relations within
the global AML-CTF regulation
The excavation and analysis of power relations in the anti-money laundering and counter
terrorism financing (AML-CTF) regime is critical because financial regulation materially affects
“livelihoods, health and living standards”324. Like economic regulation, financial regulation also
responds to the logic of capitalism and constructs ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; it is – as Gilligan says –
a social and political process, not a value-neutral and automatic system325. However, unlike
economic regulation, most financial regulation remains politically uncontested, primarily
because it operates through seemingly arcane ‘technical’ rules. Yet these rules affect aggregate
demand, output, employment and the spending ability of individuals, firms and governments326.
Banks subject to higher capital adequacy requirements327 have less to lend to individuals,
businesses and the government: fewer goods are produced and consumed, tax revenues stagnate
and public healthcare funding falls. Stringent criteria for Initial Public Offerings starve firms of
capital, which affects the growth of the company as well as the economy. A country featured on
the FATF blacklist struggles to pay trading partners328, import capital goods, create jobs and
provide life-saving medicines to its citizens. As Picciotto argues, financial factors have
“(re)distributional consequences or implications329” far beyond what is envisaged by a
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“technicist view of social management330”. As such, understanding the powers that shape
financial regulation is essential.
Studying anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulation as a type of financial
regulation, this chapter deconstructs the architecture and the operations of the global AML-CTF
regime with the aim of resolving its power into its constituent elements331. A word about this
approach: a more traditional approach to the issue of power would apply a theory (or even
theories) of power to the global financial architecture. However, two issues peculiar to the AMLCTF regime necessitate the current approach. First, unlike most discussions of power in the
context of politics or government, the AML-CTF regime lacks a locus of power or a ‘state’ as a
centripetal force, which precludes a singular theory or explanation of power332. Second, like most
global governance regimes, the global AML-CTF architecture comprises overlapping layers of
governance by multiple sets of actors, institutions and networks, each with their own strategic
interests and sources of power. The simultaneity and complexity of these interactions makes it
difficult to tease out individual interests, to gauge the strength of each actor relative to another
(especially where they forge power alliances with other actors) and to identify the various levers
they deploy to achieve these interests. As such, this chapter looks at how theories of power
manifest themselves in the architecture and operations of the regime; it maps relationships of
power based on the exercise of power.
The chapter comprises five parts. The first sketches out the historical evolution of AML-CTF
regulation, from 1987 till date. The focus is on how key actors (the US, for example) and events
(9/11, for example) shaped the trajectory of this regulation. The second part zooms in on the
players themselves, their sources of power and how the dynamic interaction between them
produces unpredictable regulatory outcomes. More specifically, this section examines how
power and powerlessness constructs legitimacy and accountability mechanisms. The third part
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surveys contemporary critiques of the AML-CTF architecture, focusing on the conceptual and
structural problems as well as the collateral damage inflicted.
The fourth part takes a critical view of the existing critiques by arguing five key points. First,
even the critical takes remain, for the most part, firmly state-centric: regulation is seen as either a
state-sponsored iteration or a balancing of competing state interests. Second, this state-centric
focus renders invisible the interests of capital in the AML-CTF architecture. Third, even the
critics do not answer why weaknesses are built into the regime. This section contends that the
invisibility of capital, coupled with the specific advantages conferred on capital by the AMLCTF regime, suggests that the weaknesses of the regime were planned. Fourth, the multiplicity
of powers has implications for accountability, which precludes a serious interrogation of these
planned weaknesses. Given the foregoing, finally, money laundering and terrorism financing
need to be situated and understood from within the broader political economy, not as a
criminological exercise independent thereof.
The concluding part argues that the AML-CTF regime has consistently delivered both power and
profits to key players in the last 30 years. To determine whether this is merely a happy
coincidence, one needs to systematically interrogate the power-profits nexus.
3.1 Historical evolution333
Appreciating the evolution of global AML-CTF regulation requires some degree of familiarity
with broad trends in the history of financial regulation. This is because AML-CTF regulatory
trends mirror many of those developed during the harmonisation of banking regulation.
Despite the rapid globalisation of banks and financial markets during the 1960s and 1970s, the
push towards the harmonisation of regulatory standards did not occur till 1974334. When the
largest private bank in Western Germany Bankhaus Herstatt went bankrupt from its forex
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dealings in June that year335, it was poised to take five US banks with it336: systemic risk and
contagion had been born. The bank failures were attributed to the lack of an adequate
transnational regulatory structure which would protect against financial risk337; the regulatory
response constructed the issue as a universal problem and began the shift towards scienticisation
by attempting to quantify the amount of risk posed by such banks. In 1975, the G-10 regulators
and central bankers met at Basel, Switzerland, to form the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision – the first ‘global’ standard-setting body338. The inchoate, incipient powerknowledge bind – to know better to control better – was obvious even then: the self-confessed
initial aim of the committee was to “close gaps in the supervisory net” through international
cooperation but the “wider objective” was to “enhance financial stability by improving
supervisory knowhow and the quality of banking supervision worldwide [emphasis added]”. The
resulting Basel Concordat was a set of voluntary, non-binding international standards and rules
of prudential supervision for the regulation of financial institutions, payment systems and foreign
exchange markets designed to apply to just the G-10 countries339.
But this changed in the 1980s. The period marked a series of crises in the US banking industry:
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was forced to resolve some 1,650 federally insured
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banks and the Savings and Loans crisis saw the failure of 1,320 financial institutions340. In 1983,
widespread public agitation led the US Congress to pass a law mandating adequate capitalisation
of all banks341. The Savings and Loans crisis data suggested that “adequate” was eight per cent
of the outstanding loan amount and the Congress rubberstamped the number. However,
American bankers argued that the capital adequacy requirements placed them at a distinct
disadvantage to foreign banks342. Accordingly, at the 1988 Basel Committee meeting, the US
strong-armed the other members and foisted the higher standards onto all members by a revision
of the Concordat343. The rationale was that higher CARs would strengthen stability at a time
crises were increasing344 and eliminate “competitive inequality arising from differences in
national capital requirements345”. Significantly, the standard was ultimately pushed on virtually
all countries with active international banks346.
The developments showcase various aspects of power and how it is operationalised. The
interaction of powers within a polity shows up in the US government’s decision to bail out the
banks as a consequence of the economic power wielded by banks and to tighten banking
regulations as a consequence of the political power wielded by the electorate347. The position of
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the US at the Basel meeting shows how domestic sources of power (here, US bankers) inform a
country’s stand on the global stage. However, more significantly, it shows how the domestic
imperative is transformed into a global imperative: by a specific representation of the social
world that characterises the problem as a universal one; by deploying crises (here, the threat of
financial crises) as a means to neutralise resistance from other jurisdictions; by touting higher
CARs as a prescription for ‘normalisation’; by scienticising risk (here, the stipulated eight
percent CAR as the best ‘protection’ against risk); by the Gramscian concession to the
subjugated (here, by convincing other jurisdictions that the enhanced standard will also help
realise their concerns such as greater financial stability and the elimination of “competitive
inequality”).
The US victory introduced key trends to the regulatory market. First, it showed how global
regulation could be crafted in line with the domestic imperatives of certain countries and how a
small group could legislate for the world. Second, it showed that proposals to raise the bar could
be presented as inherently beneficial and impartial advice – regardless of the motivations of the
mover or the demonstrated efficacy of the proposals. Third, and most significantly, it showed
that the opposition could always be disarmed by citing safety-related issues. Financial regulation,
despite its shroud of seeming neutrality, was morphing into a formidable technique of power348.

them from the consequences of their actions and thereby, encourage riskier behaviour in the pursuit of
greater profits. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp While the critical literature
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Many of these trends re-emerged during the development of anti-money laundering regulation.
In their 2000 magnum opus, Braithwaite and Drahos conclude that money laundering occupies
the top priority in the US scheme of globalised financial regulation349. Money laundering
regulation in the US exemplifies Mann’s interaction of powers thesis in how it captures the
varying motives of a state: military, economic, political and ideological. The regulation was a
convenient catchall for domestic priorities (for example, arresting the drugs trade) as well as
national security and foreign policy imperatives (for example, the defeat of communism, the
propping up of friendly dictators or the unseating of unfriendly ‘strongmen’). The war on drugs
itself, find Braithwaite and Drahos, was a useful weapon against General Noriega and his ilk
while the CIA had “an interest in being a major launderer of dirty money itself, while making it
harder for the competition to do so350”.
While worries about increasing drug consumption – a political imperative – had preoccupied the
US since the 1970s, impeding the drugs trade had proven more difficult. As Naylor builds on
Reuter & Levi’s reading of the history of AML-CTF regulation in the US, law enforcement
agencies (LEAs) chose ‘follow-the-money’ methods of crime control for five reasons. First,
since targeting capos (instead of lower-level drug dealers) made little difference to the trade,
LEAs focused on seizing the money that provided the motive and the means. In 1978, LEAs won
the right to proceed by civil forfeiture against both the ‘proceeds of crime’ as well as funds
supposedly destined for use in narcotics-related offences351. The second reason – an economic
imperative – was the imagined size of the laundering pie: the worldwide drugs trade was
understood as generating earnings worth $500 billion annually and the US portion was pegged at
between $100 billion and $120 billion352. The third reason – another economic imperative – had
to do with fiscal responsibility: US foreign misadventures had generated huge domestic budget
349
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deficits and with drug consumption at its peak, the “presumed untaxed wealth of drug barons”
was identified as a potential source of revenue353. The fourth reason – an ideological imperative
– was a broad shift in thinking about the causes of crime: the ‘old’ view of “economicallymotivated crime” was pregnant with the need for the government to fix the underlying unequal
social and economic opportunity. The ‘new’ idea of ‘bad people’ turning to crime after a
considered cost-benefit analysis obviated the need for reform and turned resolution strategies
into simpler affairs, where crime could be controlled by increasing the cost of crime (by
increasing the risk associated with it) and confiscating its means. Finally, the focus on the money
trail also reflected a fundamental shift in the nature of crimes targeted by the state: from
predatory offences, attention moved to market-based crimes, which involve the production and
distribution of illegal goods. Naylor sees this as a concerted effort to criminalise personal vice
(gambling, sex, recreational drugs) by setting up as an abstract concept such as ‘society’ as the
‘victim’ of such crimes354.
In Cuellar’s reading of US legislative history, the money trail was also meant to help LEAs
detect predicate crimes and to identify money laundering ‘specialists’355. However, as an
example of how conflict and convergence between various sources of power within a polity
generate unpredictable outcomes, Naylor argues that the strength and the ubiquity of the US
dollar undercut the anti-money laundering effort. Legitimate and illegitimate trade around the
world are mostly dollar denominated and US dollar deposits and US securities are globally seen
as insurance against political and financial uncertainty. Since the US government gained in terms
of seigniorage356, it had no incentive to reduce the export of dollars. However, since its large
trade imbalances also necessitated the import of capital – much of it based on tax abuse and
capital flight from other countries – the US could not afford to turn away funny money. Further,
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in the 1980s, American banks were also eager to jump into the private banking business long
monopolised by Swiss and British banks357.
The domestic, anti-drugs pressure led to the institution of the Money Laundering Control Act in
the US in 1986 and the imposition of mandatory Currency Transaction Reports on banks358. But
most other countries were not enthusiastic about anti-money laundering measures359, certainly
not enough to initiate regulation. Yet the US pushed the topic onto the Basel Committee as a
subject worthy of regulation and eventually drafted the Basel Statement of Principles on Money
Laundering (approved by the committee in 1988)360. In 1989, the leaders of the G7 and the
president of the European Commission established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)361.
Boasting a total of 16 members drawn from the G7, the EC and eight other countries, FATF was
to combat the perceived threat posed by money laundering to financial stability362.
That both developments came at the behest of the lobby of American bankers was validated in
the early 1990s, when Senator John Kerry forced Currency Transaction Reporting on all
countries that wanted to access the US-based clearing system363. The stipulation demonstrates
both the influence of economic power on the trajectory of regulation as well as the Hobbesian
help-harm couplet as a guarantee of obedience by others. By leveraging both its hegemony as a
financial nerve centre as well as its power as a leader at the Basel Committee and FATF, the US
thus translated its domestic political and economic imperatives into global standards. This
enabled US banks to overcome the competitive disadvantage they faced in the global market
because of their adherence to domestic AML and CTR requirements364. Significantly, the
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developments also showcase the material – as opposed to the strictly ideational – aspect of
power: while the global regulation may have been represented as a normative good, its
institution also conferred material advantages to its movers.
Critically, Naylor’s five reasons for US enthusiasm for AML-CTF regulation characterised (and
continue to characterise) global AML-CTF regulations as reflected in the FATF-issued 40
recommendations: money laundering was depicted as the means for the growth of crime and civil
forfeiture rules governed their seizure. The imagined amount of laundering was a key trigger and
the idea of the launderer as a ‘free rider’ in the economic sense remained popular. Finally, ‘bad
people’ and the risks they posed to ‘society’ were still dominant in the AML-CTF discourse.
Subsequently, 9/11 proved a watershed in the sense that, first, it mobilised the power of crises as
an instrument of power to help authorise the previously untenable and impart a sense of urgency
to the project of regulation. The crisis shifted the focus of AML-CTF discourse from the control
of organised crime to ‘national security concerns’. Critically, however, it simultaneously
embedded a disciplinary surveillance – with all its implications for the power-knowledge bind –
at the heart of the regulatory project through ‘training and learning’ apparatuses (Bourdieu’s
habitus). These apparatuses were the hardened enforcement and surveillance mechanisms used
by the official sector and the market (discussed below). However, the disciplinary surveillance
also reflected in the new normative framework for intelligence gathering, information sharing
and cooperation between governments. Further, the ‘national security’ discourse also enabled a
relatively frictionless expansion of the private sector in policing functions: other than banks,
independent professionals (lawyers, accountants, stockbrokers etc) were also co-opted.
Second, terrorism financing was suddenly, inexplicably introduced into the mix with eight
terrorism-financing recommendations tacked on to the FATF 40365. This happened, Beare says,
placed them at a competitive disadvantage since other countries did not impose similar requirements on their
businesses.
365
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267 (regarding the imposition of economic sanctions against the
Taliban in in Afghanistan) in October 1999. While the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing
was adopted in December 1999, only four countries had signed up for the same by 9/11. After 9/11, the US passed
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), which allowed for the indefinite detention of immigrants; the search of a
home or business without the owner/occupant's consent or knowledge; the search of telephone, e-mail, and
financial records without a court order; and the expanded access of law enforcement agencies to business records,
including library and financial records. Meanwhile, the Security Council Resolution 1373 called for the
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even though, first, there was no proof that the anti-money laundering regulations were reducing
money laundering and, second, despite the lack of similarity between the phenomena of money
laundering and terrorism financing (discussed below)366. As Eckert explains, relatively small
amounts of money are required to effect acts of terrorism and the aim of militant organisations
isn’t to acquire more money. Further, the origins of money are also different: money laundering
is the process of cleaning dirty money while terrorism financing is mostly clean money being
used for illegal objectives367. Even so, the FATF strategy to target terrorism financing was
principally the same as the one it had used for money laundering – choking the supply of funds
to control crime368.
3.2 Present day
The most interesting feature about the global AML-CTF regime is that it is disaggregated in an
ideational sense at every level of governance – standard-setting; enforcement; and surveillance –
and often, even within individual levels. This section describes the present structure of the AMLCTF regime and how various actors, groups, institutions and networks feed into the global
governance project. Each actor draws on their own sources of economic, political, ideological
and military power and capitalises on or converts that power to influence regulation (for
example, as seen above, banks use their economic clout to politically lobby the state). However,
the interaction of these actors shows how they feed off each other’s power and the consequent
impact on their own.
As with other pluralistic international regimes such as trade, responsibility for the creation of
global rules and standards regarding money laundering and terrorism financing is assigned to
several different organisations, with the approval of the IMF and the World Bank. The
bureaucratisation through law and experts that Weber speaks of is visible here: for example, the
criminalization of active and passive support for militants; the freezing of funds; the sharing of information by
states; and enhanced multilateral cooperation. Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert, “Introduction: the challenge
of terrorist financing” in Thomas Biersteker & Sue Eckert, eds, Countering the Financing of Terrorism (London,
Routledge, 2007) at 2-3. The FATF 40 recommendations were originally rolled out in 1990 and revised in 1996 to
reflect changes in money laundering methodologies. Eight terrorism financing recommendations were tacked on in
2001, which were revised to nine in 2003. The last major revision occurred in 2012, which synthesized the money
laundering and terrorism financing recommendations and reduced the number to the original 40.
366
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Basel Committee handles banking supervision while FATF deals with money laundering and
terrorism financing. Even so, the lines of responsibility are not clear as none of these agencies
are discrete ‘legislative’ units. The Basel Committee, for example, has the banking portfolio but
trade agreements and regional treaty arrangements such as the EU continue to affect financial
regulatory standards369. Similarly, while FATF is charged with the devise of AML-CTF
regulation, the Basel Committee is also actively involved in devising money laundering
regulation and the regulation of systemically important payments lies with the Committee on
Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), earlier known as the Committee on Payments and
Settlements System370.
Meanwhile, since 2009, the task of coordinating among the standard-setting bodies has been set
to the G20-endorsed Financial Stability Board (FSB), earlier the Financial Stability Forum under
the finance ministers and the central bank governors of the G7371. Not only is the FSB tasked
with assessing the vulnerabilities of the global financial system, it is also meant to help with
policy development and implementation372. Significantly, the FATF 40 are among the “key
standards for sound financial systems” the FSB endorses373. Clearly, the importance of effecting
regulatory convergence across jurisdictions is growing with global financial regulation evolving
as “a dense web of influences”374 with multiple regulators for most areas.
As Bourdieu argues, the institutions legitimate themselves by assuming the appearance of
scientificity, thereby obscuring the political origins of these rules. More important by far,
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however, is the cross-referential legitimation of power. This occurs in two ways. First, not only
are the AML-CTF standards used by both the FSB and FATF the same (the FATF 40), the actors
common to both the FSB and FATF are the same375. The deployment of the same standards by
different organisations can thus be seen as attenuation of the original or perpetuation of
groupthink. Second, by endorsing the standards authored by other regulators and embedding
these within their own work, each regulator legitimises the jurisdiction, validity and legitimacy
of the others. For example, drawing on the legitimacy of its parent organisation the Bank for
International Settlements, which boasts 60 members from a mix of developed and developing
countries, the Financial Stability Board provides greater legitimacy to the standards authored by
the relatively exclusive 39-member FATF. Further, this endorsement/ embedding confers
recognition of FATF’s power in a relational sense, thereby creating the perception of neutrality
regarding FATF standards.
Enforcement for these standards lies primarily with the 1995-established Egmont Group of
Financial Intelligence Units, which is meant to facilitate international cooperation and the secure
exchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing376. Each country is expected to set up a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that collects
and analyses suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money laundering,
associated predicate offences and financing of terrorism, and for the dissemination of the results
of that analysis377. The countries are further organised into eight regional groups under the aegis
of the Egmont Group378.
Meanwhile, additional enforcement mechanisms as well as the surveillance and monitoring
function are given to the official sector. Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF
has slowly but consistently been mapping new areas of operations for itself. At present, the Fund
describes its core activities as surveillance, providing technical assistance, lending, economic
research and statistics379; development of standards and codes; and “the fight against money
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laundering and terrorism financing”. However, ‘development’ seems to be a bit of a
mischaracterisation here. Of the standards and codes governing the 12 key areas380, the IMF
authors just three381. For the other areas, the IMF simply rubberstamps the standards developed
by other private sector agencies such as the Basel Committee, FATF and the OECD382.
(Interestingly, money laundering and terrorism financing are the only key area that merits a
separate mention in the IMF’s core activities.)
The role of the IMF further reinforces the cross-referential legitimacy issue discussed above.
However, the surveillance functions of the AML-CTF regime are the visible manifestation of the
power-knowledge bind. The FIUs as well as the self-reporting they mandate show the
internalisation of the discipline and the power relations of the AML-CTF regime by individual
jurisdictions. The duty to report – “dissemination” – speaks of the processual, strategic aspects of
power that further objectifies subjects by extracting knowledge about them and further deploying
that knowledge to control them better. The administrative categorisation of jurisdictions into
eight regional groups is also interesting. At one level, it represents a categorisation that is
broadly in line with scientific classificatory principles that facilitates the objectification of the
subject: each jurisdiction is evaluated against its peers in a particular region. At another, the
categorisation is an administrative hierarchy of knowledge in a bureaucracy. On a less benign
reading, however, the classification is reminiscent of Arendt’s exposition regarding divisions: the
managing of dissent by divisions that preclude coordinated political action. Further, such a
division also carries the advantage of creating the perception of a dispersed – as opposed to a
centralised – authority.
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With the IMF’s active involvement, the standards and codes work their way into the fabric of all
international economic transactions and relationships383. This technique of enforcement operates
within the official sector as well as at the level of the market (discussed below)384. Within the
IMF, these standards and codes have virtually colonised its operations and are a crucial
component of four of its five functions. First, the IMF usually works in almost all of its officially
supported standards and codes into its loan agreements with states385. Further, in some cases,
compliance with standards such as those of the Basel Committee is a prequalification for IMF
loans.386 In others, compliance is a guarantee of better terms on the next loan387.
The standards and codes are also at the heart of IMF surveillance operations. In 1977,
surveillance of the “general economic situation and policy strategy of each member country388”
became a key part of IMF operations. In 1995, the IMF began its “data dissemination” work 389.
But the most significant was the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) which was
launched in 1999 in conjunction with the World Bank. With the “soundness of financial
systems” as its aim, the FSAP seeks to “analyze the resilience of the financial sector, the quality
of the regulatory and supervisory framework, and the capacity to manage and resolve financial
crises. Based on its findings, FSAPs produce recommendations of a micro- and macro-prudential
nature, tailored to country-specific circumstances390”. The programme hinges on detailed
assessments of the extent of a country’s compliance with financial sector standards and codes391.
Not only are these assessments published as Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSCs), the FSAP also provides the groundwork for the Financial Sector Stability Assessments
383
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in which IMF staff address issues such as the stability of the financial sector and assess its
potential contribution to growth and development392.
While there has been considerable critical evaluation of how IMF conditionality regarding
economic policies reinforces the skewed power dynamic between the global north and south393,
there isn’t sufficient attention paid to how financial regulations do the same. Some of this
inattention owes to the language of the discourse: with “soundness” and “stability” as ostensible
aims, it becomes hard to challenge both the regulations and the surveillance. Also, couched as
the regulations are in the language of science – “analyse the resilience of the financial sector”;
“recommendations of a micro- and macro-prudential nature” – the regulations become
inaccessible to laypersons and only available for reading by specialists, which further legitimates
the involvement of these specialist institutions. Finally, given the purportedly ‘voluntary’ nature
of submission to FATF discipline as well as the fact that enforcement lies with separate
institutions such the IMF and the World Bank, there is even less consideration of the power
relations that buttress the AML-CTF regime. More simply, while a country’s submission to both
FATF and IMF discipline appears voluntary, it actually exemplifies Weber’s notions of the
‘unfree’ contract that stems from and re-inscribes problematic power relations.
The multiplicity of regulators and enforcers obviously muddles the assignment of responsibility
as well as accountability: as discussed below, it becomes difficult to isolate legislative intent or
escape regulation when multiple authors and enforcement agencies are involved. However, these
difficulties are compounded by two additional issues: governance structures and legitimacy.
FATF itself exemplifies these problems. Although the number of its members has increased from
the original G7 to 39394, jurisdictions of the global south are grossly underrepresented while the
OECD contingent dominates395. This is significant primarily because the agency claims a global
392
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regulatory ambit: it assumes for itself the responsibility to “set standards and promote effective
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering,
terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system
[emphasis added]396” and also calls itself the “guardian and arbiter” of these standards397. The
assumption of this ‘responsibility’ is, of course, predicated on a certain representation of the
social world that conceives money laundering and terrorism financing as “threats to the integrity
of the international financial system” (see below for critiques of this assessment) but also on a
constructed myth of superiority over all others. However, this act of usurpatory ventriloquism –
the right to speak for all – is free of both democratic representation and a mandate398. More
specifically, FATF’s governance structure – as an example of a closed bureaucracy – is designed
to exclude other voices through, for example, membership criteria. As such, many of the
jurisdictions affected by these regulations will never get a seat at the table.
The lack of representation is – or should be – a blow to FATF’s legitimacy as a global
organisation. However, the effect is mitigated by both its ‘output legitimacy’ (that is, the
legitimacy conferred by the perceived efficacy of the regulations; discussed below) and the
relational legitimation of FATF by other organisations. For example, after the IMF added the
FATF recommendations to its list of standards and codes in 2002, the World Bank and the IMF
“substantially increased” technical assistance available to those countries looking to strengthen
financial, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks for anti-money laundering and the combating
of terrorism399. In the last 10 years alone, some 40 countries have availed of AML-CTF capacity
building funded by IMF partners400. While one reading of this turn of events posits the IMF and
the World Bank as prime instruments of regulatory convergence401, the increasing numbers of
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jurisdictions signing up for AML-CTF capacity building also suggests enhanced legitimacy of
FATF and its 40 recommendations.
The legitimising effect of this approval becomes even more pronounced in the context of the
market. A study of enforcement practices at the level of the market shows how the market
functions as an IMF/ World Bank amplifier and thus, indirectly, buys into the AML-CTF
discourse and adds to the legitimacy of the FATF 40. Some commercial banks, for example,
insist on IMF conditionality as a precondition to lending to states402. The debt ‘clubs’ usually
insist on an IMF clause in their agreements with countries403. Many private financial institutions
and investors base investment decisions on IMF surveillance data404. As a result, the publication
of AML-CTF compliance data brings to bear an inordinate amount of pressure on the noncompliant state405, which is looking to the international financial markets for funds. Not only do
states with better compliance have lower debt risk premia and better sovereign credit ratings 406,
even states use compliance as a ‘signalling device’ to potential trading partners and international
investors in order to attract trade and investment407 – an interesting example of a jurisdiction
recognising the identity imposed upon it by FATF. As Brummer argues, non-compliance with
key international standards (such as AML-CTF regulation) poses significant reputational risks:
not only does it cause counterparties in international financial agreements to re-evaluate their
expectations regarding a regulator’s future conduct, it also undermines incentives to cooperate
with such a regulator in the future408. Even market players, he says, generally perceive adherence
to major international standards as a mark of good regulatory practice409. Further, in the specific
context of money laundering and terrorism financing, some of these surveillance and
enforcement functions have also been privatised with the responsibilisation of financial
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institutions as well as independent professionals (lawyers, accountants, jewellers and brokers
etc).
At a country-level too, the multiplicity of regulators and enforcers at the global level is
reproduced with equally dizzying results (see Chapter 4). As far as the state is concerned, the
involvement of finance ministries, central banks and law enforcement agencies is presumed;
however, in states as markedly different as the US and Pakistan, the military has also elbowed its
way to the table. While the interest of the legislature in the regulation is justified, the
preponderant influence of religious groups on the regulation in Pakistan makes little sense (see
Chapter 4). Theoretically, this disaggregation of powers ought to make little difference: since all
states are obliged to adopt the FATF 40, ostensibly there isn’t too much autonomy left for
national-level institutions (discussed below)410. However, this assertion of power by FATF does
not preclude the possibility of an active resistance by individual jurisdictions: since all states are
partially responsible for implementing and enforcing the regulations, this ‘discretionary window’
becomes the prize fought over by existing power players within the polity. (For a detailed
discussion of how this plays out in a mid-sized economy such as Pakistan, see Chapter 4.)
3.3 Of harms, inadvertent and deliberate
The problems with the AML-CTF regime identified in contemporary literature are diverse but
can be usefully categorised into three sets: conceptual problems; structural or procedural
problems; and collateral damage411.
Conceptual problems
The primary problem, as Halliday et al delicately phrase it, is that it is hard to find clear
objectives for the AML-CTF regime since international organisations and states themselves
“seek to use AML/CFT to solve different problems412”. Given the fogginess of FATF’s declared
410
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objectives for preventing money laundering, it is perhaps inevitable that the most excoriating of
critiques focus on the rationale for the AML-CTF regime. The term ‘money laundering’ was
originally coined to describe the practice of sluicing dirty money through store-front operations
(such as laundromats) and cash-intensive businesses (such as car washes)413. The operation
created the impression the money was legitimately earned and thus, protected against seizure by
law enforcement agencies. Nearly 100 years after this coinage, however, FATF still speaks of the
phenomenon as flowing from profit-generating “criminal acts414” and sees money laundering as
the “processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin … [so that] the criminal
[may] enjoy these profits without jeopardising their source415”. Given how financial crime has
evolved since, it is hard to see the FATF-generated discourse as anything other than the active
work of political representation designed to authorise – as Bourdieu would call it – collective
action in the aid of those making such representations.
Accordingly, most critics take exception to the FATF definition and argue for the expansion of
the term to cover crimes and misdemeanours that embody the spirit of the practice: tax abuse
(including tax evasion and avoidance)416; trade-related malpractices (including transfer pricing
and Base Erosion Profit Shifting, for example)417; white-collar crime418; capital flight and the
proceeds of informal economies. Ruggiero, for example, contends that it was well known by the
1990s that drugs money is a very small component of dirty money and these other categories
make up for the rest419. As he argues persuasively, crime/ drugs/ terrorism money occupies the
popular imaginary as well as the official rhetoric or discourse against money laundering and
gives rise to myths that “clean but vulnerable financial institutions are being soiled by
contaminating criminal attacks” and that militant groups are “violent entrepreneurs rather than
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religious or political combatants420”. As such, this discourse merits unpacking to reveal the
myths as representations of reality, not reality itself.
FATF’s explications regarding how laundering affects business and the global economy are
similarly rejected as unpersuasive. The FATF discourse claims that the banking and financial
industry depend on their reputation for integrity; that criminal complicity would damage “the
attitudes of other financial intermediaries and of regulatory authorities, as well as ordinary
customers”; and that money laundering “damages the integrity of the entire society and
undermines democracy and the rule of the law” by rewarding crime and thus propagating it421.
This discourse further mobilises the instrument of ‘science’ or technicalities by citing
consequences such as changes in money demand, prudential risks to bank soundness,
contamination effects on legal financial transactions, and increased volatility of international
capital flows and exchange rates due to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers422. Illicit
money is also posed as a threat to the functioning of the market: the infusion of dirty money
allows unprofitable enterprises to survive and present unfair competition to legitimate businesses
that do not have access to such pools of funds. FATF also maintains that economies with
growing or developing financial centres – as distinguished from developed economies – are
potentially at highest risk because “established financial centre countries implement
comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes” and launderers prefer countries and financial
systems with weaker or ineffective countermeasures. This, FATF cautions, may entrench
organized crime within such jurisdictions and will dampen future foreign direct investment
because the country’s commercial and financial sectors will be seen as subject to “the control
and influence of organised crime”. The fight against money laundering, says FATF, is a fight
against crime since starving the criminal enterprise of funding will necessarily arrest its
continuation. In simultaneous play here are several of the constructive and instrumental
techniques and strategies of power: there is the divisive power that sets up arbitrary boundaries –
compliant/ non-compliant; strong systems/ weak systems – to segregate the individual
jurisdiction from others as well as within itself (by imposing a particular identity on the said
jurisdiction). There is also an identification of the ‘inherent dangerousness’ or the ‘potentiality’
420
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of a jurisdiction as opposed to its actuality in terms of the risk it poses to the global system.
Finally, there are the vivid descriptions of the impending crisis: risks to bank soundness,
increased volatility of capital flows, entrenchment of organised crime, for example.
Each of these arguments is categorically debunked in the critical literature. Many critics argue
that reputational costs for financial institutions are overblown423 and point to the growing
number of global banks – many from the purportedly safe “established financial centres” – that
have emerged unscathed from AML-CTF investigations424. The phenomenon offers one of the
clearest examples of the difference between ideational power and the way it is materially
organised. Despite frequent incidents of money laundering detected by regulators, say the critics,
these banks have not been held liable for criminal prosecution nor have their licences been
withdrawn – most get away with fines and only the marginal players are ever forced to give up
licences425.
The laundering-crime causality is similarly refuted. Swathes of critics have pointed to the lack of
evidence that AML-CTF methodologies prevent crime426. As Naylor explains, supply-side
criminologies, or crime control policies that target offenders, were evolved in response to
predatory crimes (robbery, fraud, counterfeiting etc); their transplant to “demand-driven crimes”
does not work because such markets cater to the impermissible desires of “polite society”427.
While there is demand for drugs or tax abuse methodologies, there will be supply of laundering
services. Further, he argues, contrary to popular perception, crime does not pay and certainly not
as much as it is assumed to. This is largely because the risk of getting caught forces criminals
such as drugs traffickers to set up additional layers of intermediaries, each with their own cut.
423
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While the fear of state sanctions reduces the size of the ‘take’ at each level, it does not eliminate
the incentive to commit the crime. The idea of fabulous wealth being reinvested into the business
can thus be seen as one borrowed from corporate history and is contradicted by the operations of
criminal enterprises428. And while illicit money can create market distortions, this applies as
much to white-collar crime as it does to drugs money429.
The FATF argument about volatility and cross-border flows are similarly discredited. First, as
Halliday et al argue, there is no scientific evidence to prove AML-CTF regimes produce
domestic and/or international financial stability430. Second, as Ruggiero points out, the
laundering of drugs proceeds isn’t transnational but mainly a localized endeavour, effected
through real estate, construction or accomplices in the economic or political sphere (lawyers,
accountants, corrupt politicians etc)431. Finally, as Naylor contends, criminal enterprises are
rarely structured like transnational corporations with established supply chains: convergences
between criminals in different jurisdictions are generally episodic and short-lived and rarely, if
ever, correspond to the ‘Godfather’-like relationships popularised in fiction and cinema432.
Significantly, the insight also holds true for militant organisations433.
FATF’s perception about the vulnerabilities and risks to economies with growing or developing
financial centres is also challenged. First, AML-CTF controls in developed countries are as lax
as the ones in other jurisdictions434. Indeed, some critics see the perception of lax controls in the
growing/ developing countries as having been deliberately created at the behest of the onshore

428

Naylor supra note 221 at 2-3; 21; 31
Ruggiero supra note 7 at 201
430
Halliday et al supra note 412 at 5
431
Ruggiero supra note 7 at 203.
432
Naylor supra note 221 at 2-3; 21
433
Jessica Stein & Amit Modi, “Producing terror: organizational dynamics of survival”, in Biersteker and Eckert
supra note 365 at 27-8. The authors argue that commander-cadre militant organisations – as opposed to
“network” organisations – can only exist in particular circumstances: in weak or failed states; in regions within
states that are outside of government control; or in countries where governments or parts of the government
allow the groups to function. This is because militants violate laws and require secrecy to commit their crimes and
hierarchical organisations are more susceptible to detection by law enforcement agencies.
434
Alldridge (supra note 101 at 445) argues that the political nature of FATF is evident in the fact that the US has
not drawn any adverse consequences for its failure to meet AML-CTF requirements; see also Cuellar supra note
355.
429

109

jurisdictions to stave off competition from the offshore jurisdictions435. Second, the regulatory
capture FATF fears is already in effect in developed countries: shortcomings in AML-CTF
models are introduced at the behest of domestic economic and political interests436. Further,
since regulators develop their thinking in close and constant relationships with those they
regulate, the regulations often resonate with contemporary market philosophies and imperatives.
Ruggiero demonstrates this using the example of financial regulators who begin to perceive new
financial products and associated risks as a necessary part of market innovation and so, opt for
what he calls “light-touch regulation437”. Third, launderers prefer jurisdictions with stable
political systems with strong rule of law and vibrant finance industries, such as those found in
developed countries. This is why laundered monies are frequently routed through smaller
jurisdictions to destination countries such as the US, UK, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Hong
Kong and Luxembourg438.
However, despite their criticism of FATF’s rationale, few critics thoroughly investigate other
possible objectives for increasing regulation. While some posit the use of such regulation as a
political tool in line with foreign policy objectives439, others view it as a domestic law
enforcement policy tool440 or even a bid to increase the arbitrary powers available to law
enforcement agencies441. Some have set out state greed – for confiscated assets442 or tax evasion
dollars443 – as a possible motive; still others point to the construction of a multimillion dollar
‘compliance industry’ on the edifice of this regulation and its growing ‘exports’ of training and
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education initiatives444. Although each account is compelling and accurate on its own, these
alternative rationales lack a unifying thread. Each of the ‘motives’ can trigger increasing
harmonization. But none of them individually have the force to carry through a project as
ambitious as global harmonization because there are too many voices around the table, both at a
global level and within a jurisdiction. At a global level, the power of ‘strong’ states is countered
by resistances from weaker ones; at a domestic level, the interaction between the sources of
power (military, economic, political etc) within a polity as well as the multiple interests of each
actor/ institution/ network affect the trajectory of regulation. More simply, as corroborated by
accounts of global trade regulation, global harmonisation of AML-CTF standards cannot be
attributed to the desires or the power of one.
First, while the US has certainly deployed AML-CTF regulation as a foreign policy tool to
further its political objectives, there seems little reason for all other states to throw their
collective weight behind the regulations and to implement the same within their own jurisdiction.
This would be particularly true of the states that are the subject of US foreign policy. Second, the
insistence on global harmonisation makes little sense if the regulatory objective is to control
crime within individual jurisdictions. Even if, for the sake of argument, the theory regarding
globalised crime networks were to be accepted, as Naylor contends, such syndicates do not have
footprints extensive enough to merit world-wide regulation. While jurisdictions within the
operative network of the crime cartel would have incentive to harmonise regulation, unaffected
jurisdictions or even those on the periphery would have little reason to do so. Particularly since
preventive regulatory efforts require significant budgetary outlay but do not confer
commensurate, quantifiable political advantages (for example, voter-pleasing, precise data about
the quantity of harm prevented). Third, state greed for confiscated assets or tax evasion dollars
can only be a real regulatory imperative for countries seeing such outflows. Other jurisdictions
with economies that stand to benefit from such inflows – onshore and offshore jurisdictions etc –
are unlikely to be as enthusiastic about implementing AML/ CTF regulation. This is a point
confirmed by the Panama and Paradise Papers disclosures. Finally, only countries that have the
infrastructure and capability to export AML-CTF ‘compliance’ products would benefit from the
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creation of a harmonized, captive market. The ‘importers’ of such products are thus unlikely to
endorse the creation of such a regulatory market.
There is also a significant strand in the critical literature regarding the subversion of law. First,
AML-CTF regulation proceeds on the basis of suspicion445. It overturns the criminal law
presumption of innocence and places the burden of proof on the accused. Second, it deviates
from fundamental legal principles such as due process446; reasonable suspicion and even
evidentiary requirements447. Third, the regime responsibilises private-sector third parties for
reporting crimes, even those who are in relationships traditionally protected by the law448. There
is also strong criticism about the use of laundering offences as a “proxy”: since proving criminal
liability in predicate offences is harder, prosecutors often substitute the easier-proven laundering
offences and draw “disproportionately severe penalties” for laundering for predicate offenders449.
This also has the consequence of expanding prosecutorial discretion and power – including the
ability to expand the scope of evidence that can be admitted at trial or documents that can be
subpoenaed450.
While most critics rightly identify the war on drugs/ terrorism/ weapons of mass destruction as
the moment of crisis that authorised this departure from established law, too many fail to address
the full implications of such departure. First, with its norms and normalising judgement, its
hierarchical observation, its rewards and penalties, the AML-CTF regime normalises a culture of
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suspicion, of surveillance451. Second, by projecting money laundering and terrorism financing as
affronts to global society, as it were, the AML-CTF regime captures the essence of what
Foucault would call punishment-as-duty. Launderers and terrorists but also those who aid, abet
and facilitate them – even unwittingly – are deemed culpable for “the crime that has wronged
them all452”. Finally, even the departure from established legal conventions and principles is law,
in that it empowers some and entrenches certain interests.
There are also issues with the governance structure of the AML-CTF regime regarding,
particularly, legitimacy, accountability, bias, transparency and opportunism. There are concerns
about the “de-territorialisation of jurisdiction” – both for the offence of laundering as well as
reduced significance of the geographical location of the predicate offence – by assigning the
devise of regulation to a “deliberately unrepresentative agency”453. Significantly, as Halliday et
al confirm, several assessors and country officials say that their professional judgements were
pushed aside by “political” concerns during FSRB and FATF plenaries454 – a point corroborated
by some Pakistani interlocutors. While there is considerable truth to such charges, the complete
picture is more complicated, as evidenced by a simultaneous reading of Hulsse, van Duyne and
Sassen in the context of legitimacy and authority.
Hulsse’s deeply insightful contribution is that voluntary compliance with global rules requires
persuasion about the rules but also the problem the rules are meant to solve. In a vein similar to
Bourdieu’s explication regarding self-consecration by a priest, Hulsse argues that international
organisations problematize money laundering through processes of social construction so as to
win the right make the rules around laundering and to secure the compliance of those who have
not been involved in the rule-setting process455. Since ‘club organisations456’ such as FATF lack
democratic legitimacy (or ‘input legitimacy), they choose problematisation as a means of
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generating ‘output legitimacy’ for themselves (that is, the legitimacy acquired when rules are
perceived as effective for resolving the problems they are meant to address)457. Leveraging its
position as the only international organisation dealing exclusively with money laundering allows
FATF to build the myth about its superiority. According to Hulsse, FATF “talks” money
laundering into existence as a global problem that can only be resolved by “international
countermeasures”458. Further, adds van Duyne, FATF does so in emotive language designed to
convey the seriousness of the threat by an “inflationary ‘colouring’ of reality”. The object, he
contends, is the construction of “a rhetoric of fear” that articulates imaginary risks to society and
the global financial system – the discourse of crises. This fear – of drugs, of organised crime, of
terrorism –, in conjunction with political rituals such as the threat of exclusion, negates all
opposing views and helps further the objectives of the regime459.
While Hulsse and van Duyne do not delve into how the rules are operationalised, Sassen offers
key insights that can usefully be applied to the AML-CTF regime. Global regimes, she argues,
become operative once “instantiations of the global” are constructed within the national. That is,
‘global rules’ are operationalised after they enter the national domain through national
legislatures and judiciaries; the worldwide operation of national firms and markets; political
projects of nonstate actors; diasporic networks; and changes in the relationship between the
citizen and the state. These “denationalised processes” – that is, networks and formations,
including normative orders, that connect subnational or national processes/ institutions/ actors
but not necessarily through the suprastate or interstate system – are oriented towards global
agendas and systems and away from historically shaped national logics460. This is exemplified by
the attitudes of those in the financial industry and from disparate states who – despite the
differences between their jurisdictions – advocate for similar rules. (van Duyne mockingly refers
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to them as “the congregation of believers461”.) However, a point that merits greater recognition is
that the domestication of global rules also confers additional legitimacy to these rules by
stripping them of their global, political origins.
Questions of power aside, there is also a significant thread in the critical literature dealing with
the lack of evidence regarding the efficacy of AML-CTF regulation. There are frequent questions
about the appropriateness of the measures to combatting all kinds of money laundering or the
financing of militancy, especially since the latter follows no detectable patterns462. The 9/11
operations were mostly routed through large US and British banks and even Financial
Intelligence Unit personnel admit (the then) FATF’s nine Special Recommendations would not
have caught the transactions of the conspirators463. This is also because the financing of
militancy is generally cheaper than is envisaged464. There are as many questions about continued
laundering by the banks and about the regime’s ability to distinguish between countries with high
levels of corruption and huge levels of illicit monies; significantly, even FATF has not been able
to demonstrate how compliance with its standards can help achieve its stated objectives465.
Crucially, most critiques inadvertently illustrate the material versus ideational dichotomy when
they – explicitly or implicitly – speak to the lack of corporate and political will in combatting
money laundering and/ or terrorism financing. The corporations are seen as interested in only
profits466 and resist AML-CTF compliance by pursuing what McBarnett calls “creative
compliance” strategies467 – what Lukes would call “hidden transcripts” – when they are not
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protected by beneficial ownership laws. The states, meanwhile, have their own logics,
determined by the interaction of the sources of power within the polity and the multiple interests
of the actors/ networks/ institutions involved with or affected by the AML-CTF effort. Apart
from the issues of policy capture and regulatory capture, some authors note the gaming of system
by states, which stick to the letter of the law to effect a potent resistance to the regime468. The
impact of regulations depends on how they are enforced and discretion and lax enforcement are
often baked into national regimes. As Cuellar contends, even where countries sign up for FATF
standards, national governments still maintain control over budgets, enforcement policy and
prosecutorial discretion (for example, prosecutors’ salaries or the number of regulatory
investigators)469. However, the most profound consequences of the lack of political will – or the
mounting of resistance – come into play on the global level: the AML-CTF regime cannot
prevent money laundering by states470, terrorism financing by states such as Saudi Arabia and
Qatar471 or even the shoddy implementation of regulations by recalcitrant states such as Pakistan
(see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion). While the cooperation between states in effecting
repatriations, for example, is obviously conditioned by their politics, nowhere are political
considerations more important than where states are directly or indirectly involved in any of
these activities. As the New York Times editorial notes, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are key US
allies and this translates to lack of action against them on the AML-CTF front.
The conceptual issues associated with terrorism financing regulation are even more problematic
than those associated with money laundering. The primary problem with regulation attacking
terrorism financing is that it ignores the demand for terrorism: militant organisations cater to the
emotional, spiritual and financial needs of their supporters and volunteers who comprise the
“alienated, disenfranchised and humiliated472”. Instead, the dominant discourse regarding
terrorism financing constructs an alternative reality, which characterises militants as violent
entrepreneurs. As Stern and Modi caution, any regulation that does not address this core issue is
bound to fail. Further, current terrorism financing regulation rests on a series of erroneous
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assumptions. First, counter-terrorism financing regulation is predicated on the simplistic
assumption that all such organisations are similar473. Second, it is further assumed that the
transfer of terrorist finances occurs within formal financial institutions; in amounts capable of
detection; and in distinguishable patterns. Third, it is assumed that the principles of regulation
applicable to formal financial institutions (for example, Customer Due Diligence or CDD) can
easily be extended to informal value transfer systems (such as hundi/ hawala operators) or other
potential sources of financial transfers. Fourth, Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) are
erroneously understood as key actors in the financing of terrorism. Finally, an emergent nexus
between terrorism and organised crime is assumed474. None of these assumptions are borne out
by reality.
The regulators’ conception of militant organisations is mostly derived from the structures of
transnational corporations, which operate on the basis of centralised, hierarchical decisionmaking with functionally specialised units and systems in a transnational context. First, as Stern
and Modi explain, militant organisations are markedly different from each other in organisational
structure, goals and form. Second, while some do follow the hierarchical commander-cadre
structure envisaged by regulators with the ‘parent’ organisation providing funds (whether on an
episodic basis or an ongoing basis), others operate as relatively independent nodes of a network,
with each organisation responsible for their own fund mobilisation and generation475. Third,
funding patterns for such organisation are both variegated and evolving. Besides drawing on
state support, charitable donations and direct solicitations, these organisations are involved in a
mix of legitimate businesses and illegitimate ones (such as extortion rackets, kidnappings for
ransom, bank robberies etc)476. The point that needs underscoring is that militant organisations
do not rely on crime – let alone organised crime – for financing. While militant groups may have
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transactional relationships or tacit alliances with criminal groups, these are usually temporal or
episodic in nature477.
Further, the relative composition of funding also evolves as the organisation evolves in response
to internal and external pressures. Internal pressures, such as a strategic alliance with a criminal
group, for example, would trigger a greater reliance on criminal funding while an alliance with a
madrassah would increase the dependence on state funding (foreign and domestic) as well as
charitable donations. External pressures, such as an internationally coordinated crackdown on
money transfers, would push many militant organisations to explore both domestic sources of
financing as well as diversify into legitimate businesses, which could provide a steady income
stream. In the decade after 9/11, for example, Al Qaeda transformed its global funding strategy
to set up more legitimate businesses478. While militant organisations may have some interface
with both formal financial institutions and IVTS, their contact is not limited to either479. Further,
IVTS are not designed like formal financial institutions and are unlikely to have the
organisational or human resource heft required to implement the regulations applicable to banks
(for example, CDD requirements)480.
Finally, there is the question regarding the resemblance of the surveillance apparatus to the
Foucauldian version of Bentham’s Panopticon481, where the prospect of permanent visibility
leads to an internalization of discipline by prisoners (here, broader society) and their selfsurveillance. There is also a small chorus of concerns among the critics about the co-option of
civil society in policing and surveilling potential offenders through a new paradigm of security
governance: criminalization of new offences; responsibilisation and administration of
knowledge482. While the increasing cost of compliance has mostly been passed on to the private
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sector (banks etc), this has brought into sharp focus the costs of this passage: as Tsingou notes,
there are also costs associated with assigning the legal role of guardian to the private sector483.
Structural/ procedural problems
The foremost problem still remains that of credible estimates regarding the volume of money
laundering. A few authors have devised complex and involved methods of assessing volume484
but the most bandied about figure remains “two to five percent” of global GDP, first used by
Quirk in a 1996 article and since 1998, attributed to then IMF managing director Michael
Camdessus. The precision of the estimates has been further compounded by definitional issues
over the years as ‘money laundering’ grew to encompass terrorism financing; the financing of
weapons of mass destruction; corruption; tax avoidance and trade-related malpractices (including
transfer pricing and Base Erosion Profit Shifting, for example) 485. Some authors advocate the
additional inclusion of white-collar crime486 while others point to capital flight and the proceeds
of informal economies487. Further, AML-CTF is said to catch only a small proportion of criminal
proceeds and exonerates political, corporate and criminal corruption. Post 9/11 particularly, there
are concerns regarding the ability of the AML-CTF regime in capturing new digital and virtual
currencies; underground economies and IVTS such as hawala/ hundi, fei ch’ien, Black Market
Peso Exchange, and hui kwan488. This has compounded the estimation error, which obviously
has consequences for any resolution strategies.
Another seemingly intractable problem is that the AML-CTF regime is predicated on a series of
fundamental misunderstandings and many deliberate structural deficiencies. First, the regime
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‘invisibilises’ or ignores the role of capital in influencing regulation and glosses over the fact that
the final destination for illicit funds are onshore havens and not the offshore havens. Second, the
system cannot separate the revenues of white-collar crime from those of organized crime489 and
most regulatory activity ends up focused on the organised crime aspect alone. For example, there
is an inordinate focus on currency transactions490 and the placement-layering-reintegration
model, which is irrelevant for other financial crimes491. Finally, the system wilfully ignores the
issue of capacity: besides lax and myopic regulators with limited oversight capacity, many
jurisdictions also have systemic capacity constraints that often leads to data overload of
regulatory systems492 and/ or law enforcement arms incapable of using the data generated in their
investigations493. (Both phenomena are borne out by Pakistan’s experience; see Chapter 5.)
Collateral damage
Unfortunately, while the inadvertent harms caused by the AML-CTF regime are mounting, there
are few considered analyses of the “bads” produced by the regime494. As such, mention of these
harms remains peppered over the critical literature.
Tsingou speaks of the targeting of smaller jurisdictions and notes that developing countries can
ill-afford the outlays on compliance495. Several authors speak of derisking (that is, when
financial institutions terminate or restrict business relationships with remittance companies and
smaller local banks in certain regions of the world) and the consequences for swathes of the
population in poor countries496. These are particularly aggravated when chunks of the population
are dependent on foreign remittances sent by family members working abroad through informal
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value transfer systems (IVTS) such as hundi/ hawala. Halliday et al, for example, fear an AMLCTF-trigger crackdown on IVTS could potentially reduce remittances in these countries;
increase administrative and financial costs on voluntary organisations that are unable to pay and
reduce charitable donations to Islamic charities, which perform many public service functions in
poor countries497. Similarly, Wilks thinks greater client scrutiny by financial institutions could
increase the risks of profiling by governments in developed countries498.
Tsingou, meanwhile, makes an important generalised point when she cautions about greater
tolerance of “surveillance creep”: not just more surveillance by states but more acceptance of the
same by citizens everywhere. She quotes bank officials as saying that greater financial sector
surveillance is an opportunity for financial institutions to know their clients better and tailor
more products for them499. However, there is a darker side to this too: AML-CTF regimes may
also be used against political opponents by authoritarian rulers to deny them banking or other
facilities; to increase surveillance over their accounts; and prosecute or impose penal taxes for
non-disclosure in addition to opening up more opportunities for illegal extortion for private
gain500. While Cuellar also concedes the AML-CTF regime could give governments more power
than society would like, he rather naively insists that that this is an argument for careful
institutional design rather than the abandoning the objective of disrupting criminal finance501.
Critically, none of the above authors document or examine how AML-CTF regulation reentrenches existing power relations at both the global and the local level.
3.4 The missing link
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The criticisms against the AML-CTF regime are mounting up. Unfortunately, even the critical
takes within the literature remain, for the most part, firmly state-centric and/or institutionally
focused. This poses five distinct but interrelated problems.
First, regulation is seen as either a state-sponsored iteration; a balancing of the interests of
competing states502; or the output of what Drezner refers to as a “club IGO503”. Treated
independently, all three are conceptually problematic and entirely inadequate to their explanatory
task. As used here, “state-sponsored iteration” refers to regulation that crystallises around,
expresses and secures the interests of the state. The unarticulated assumption of most authors
writing about AML-CTF regulation is of the state as a unidimensional, monolithic singularity
with clearly defined and impregnable interests504. This assumption ignores the fact that as an
actor (see discussion in Chapter 2), a state has multiple interests and objectives it pursues
simultaneously while continually readjusting the weightage it assigns to each505. The assumption
also neglects the fact that the state, as a place, is the site for competing power interests that find
expression through state policy at various moments. That is, there are rifts and fractures within
polities – interest groups working at cross purposes – and the regulation emanating from the
state-as-place is driven in different directions by these sources of military, economic, political,
and/or ideological power506. The interests and identity of ‘the’ state are clearly mutable; to
privilege the notion of state-driven regulation is to attribute to the state a homogeneity of purpose
and an autonomy that it clearly lacks.
Take the example of law and order. While the preservation of law and order is a key objective of
the state-as-actor, so is the preservation of relationships integral to the functioning of the state.
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And so, while states maintain law and order through crime control policies, states also sabotage
crime control policies because of the reflexive relationship between organised crime, economic
and political power507. Meanwhile, the regulation emanating from the state-as-place prioritises
the preservation of law and order for its political constituency (voting citizens and their elected
representatives) but also the disruption of law and order for the commercial interests of its
economic constituency (the arms manufacturing industry, for example) 508.
The notion of AML-CTF regulation as the outcome of competition between states is similarly
flawed because it sets up a fictional monolithic state with ‘fixed’ interests against other, similarly
fictionalised states. This reduces conflict on the terrain of regulation to unhelpful, simplistic
binaries: “great powers concert509” versus the rest of the world; rich states versus poor states;
onshore havens versus offshore havens; supply-side criminologies versus deviancy theories510.
Similarly, this notion does not admit of convergences or alliances between powers.
Problematically, this theory reads unanimity of motivation in mere regulatory convergence. More
importantly, it diminishes the outcome of sophisticated power politics (including tactical
alliances and oppositions) and involved bargaining to zero-sum games: AML-CTF controls or
not. While Drezner correctly argues that power asymmetries affect both process and outcome in
game theory as it applies to international bargaining by states on regulatory issues511, he doesn’t
507

See, generally, Frank Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, crime and deviance (London, Pluto Press Limited,
1976) for a trailblazing theory of Marxist criminology and the application of this analysis to the relationship
between corporations, state and crime. Pearce develops the idea of an ‘imaginary social order’ to explain why the
behaviour of police, state and corporation diverges from their stated priorities. See Woodiwiss supra note 222 for
a fascinating account of how organised crime shores up existing structures of economic and political power and
how states and corporations are complicit in promoting and propagating organised crime. For specific application
of this theory to the Canadian financial services industry and the Montreal construction industry, see Margaret E.
Beare, “Shadow Boxing against the Crimes of the Powerful” in Steven Bittle, Laureen Snider, Steve Tombs & David
Whyte, eds, Revisiting Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance (Abingdon, UK, Routledge Press,
2018) at 45-59.
508
Such a priority would manifest itself in state policy through, for example, gun controls or the lack thereof.
509
Drezner defines these as the governments that oversee large internal markets. Since 1995, he says, the great
powers in the financial realm are the US and principal EU members as they have the largest capital markets in
terms of bonds, equities and banks assets. Supra note 503 at 5, 123
510
Simply, supply-side criminologies are techniques of crime control that begin with the premise that crime is a
part of everyday, routine aspect of modern society and not a pathology or abnormality in an individual that
requires special redress (deviancy theory). Accordingly, supply-side criminologies acknowledge the limited capacity
of the state in controlling crime and responsibilise civil society to control crime by limiting the supply of criminal
opportunities, shifting risks, redistributing costs and creating disincentives. For an excellent discussion, see David
Garland, “The limits of the sovereign state” (1996) 36:4 Brit J Crim 445–471. For an instructive look at how the
theory applies to contemporary crimes such as corruption, see Beare supra note 296.
511
Drezner supra note 503 at 51-2

123

address the issue of competition between the “great powers”512. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
interaction of powers effects changes within actors and institutions as well as the positions they
assume in relation to each other. However, the regulation-as-competition narrative does not
admit such nuance.
This becomes clearer when one looks at how AML-CTF regulation came about. As seen above,
the US was the primary mover of AML-CTF regulation, both at the time of its inception and
after 9/11. However, the focus on the state-driven aspect of global regulation only succeeds in
characterising the US as the playground bully or the hegemon that, for reasons specific to its
domestic and foreign policy, induced, pressured and coerced the six other G-7 countries to sign
up for the regulation. While there may be some truth to such a description, it is unlikely to be the
only reason. (For example, at the time that the US and France pushed for the creation of FATF,
Switzerland made its support contingent on an agreement that tax evasion would be kept beyond
the FATF purview513 – an example of how the Gramscian concession is sometimes essential to
the mobilisation of consensus and how the interaction of powers produces change within
groups.) Even if Canada agreed to support AML-CTF regulation to indirectly protect its status as
an onshore haven from competition with offshore havens and France wanted to check tax
evasion from its shores, the reasons for the UK endorsement are less obvious. This is because the
reputation of several British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies as money laundering
havens is well established514 as is the fact that these jurisdictions function as ‘feeders’ for the
City of London, which is the ultimate destination for laundered monies515. Support for such
regulation in the face of these political and economic links would have been problematic for the
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UK516. There is even less to explain why Germany, Italy and Japan signed up as well. The notion
of competition in this context suggests that all seven had clearly intelligible interests, were
motivated by similar concerns and six of them allowed the political heavyweight (the US) to
push them into endorsing AML-CTF regulation.
The theory of institutionally-driven regulation also fails because it imputes to the club INGOs an
autonomy and legitimacy that do not exist independent of their members. Club INGOs, by
definition, use membership criteria to exclude states with different preferences and confer
benefits on members to ensure collective action517. But such institutions borrow the authority of
their members; they do not have authority or, indeed, legitimacy of their own518. Further, the
delegation of global regulation by great powers to a non-state actor such as a club INGO, argues
Drezner, is a strategy to pre-empt objections to great power regulatory initiatives by weaker
governments, corporations and other I/NGOs. The real purpose of a club INGO, he says, is to
allow great powers to control the regime’s governance structure in a less public way519 – the
secrecy or invisibility most theorists find essential to the most potent power. To contend that
FATF, the G7 or the OECD can or do drive harmonization on their own is thus a
mischaracterization. Clearly, state-centric and institution-specific accounts of global AML-CTF
regulation remain problematic.
The second point is of constructed invisibility. To evoke Althusser again, the invisible becomes
so because it is repressed from the field of the visible520. Privileging state-centric or even
institution-specific accounts of the evolution of money laundering regulation necessarily makes
invisible other actors and explanations because it posits the state as the primary beneficiary. It
invariably results in a hunt for state motives. Accordingly, most of the critical literature locates
rationales for AML-CTF regulation within the project of the state: foreign policy; greed for tax
dollars; domestic law enforcement etc. Not only does this focus diminish complex, multifactorial
accounts of power politics to bedtime stories of mean and usurious self-interest, these stories
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invariably reinforce the state as the autonomous central character, the main beneficiary521. As
Althusser cautions, the function of the visible field (here, the state or institutions) is to forbid any
sighting of the invisible; the invisible does not exist outside the visible but is “the inner darkness
of exclusion, inside the visible itself [emphasis in original]”522. The focus on states and
institutions thus subsumes the other characters, the other beneficiaries.
This is not to imply that the motives attributed to the states are inaccurate; they are only
incomplete since they provide the perspective of the fictionalized autonomous state alone523. But
this incompleteness has critical consequences. Until the interests of other actors are factored in,
these motives of state remain the sole basis for judging the efficacy, adequacy and excesses of
the regulation. Even when the politics, structure, legitimacy, and accountability of the regulatory
architecture are discussed, the extant literature sees AML-CTF regulation as a manifestation of a
state’s policy objectives in a vacuum. That is, even the critics only assess AML-CTF regulation
on whether, for example, it prevents drugs trafficking or terrorism; whether it stabilizes the
global financial system; whether the regulations infringe on human rights; whether there is
adequate political will to enforce the regulations. These are obviously important questions but
regulation cannot be judged only on how it satisfies, exceeds or underdelivers on the objectives
of one actor, however important. The omnipresence of the state cannot be denied but its
omnipotence is questionable. Where power is both doing and not-doing, states express
themselves though actions/reactions vide law and public policy but also, increasingly, through
inaction at both524. As such, a state’s lack of political will, for example, must be seen to originate
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elsewhere and benefit someone other than the state. But the focus on states diverts scrutiny of
how the regulation satisfies other, equally significant actors.
Take the example of global capital, an indisputably powerful non-state ‘actor525’. Recent
estimates regarding the volume of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) suggest corporations are
responsible for the bulk of money laundering: the UNCTAD report of 2014 contends that money
from crime (drugs, racketeering and terrorism) accounts for only a third of total IFFs; corruption
contributes only 3 percent while two-thirds of the total IFFs stem from cross-border tax-related
transactions, about half of which consist of transfer pricing through corporations. Comparatively,
the Global Financial Integrity 2015 report estimates that trade mis-invoicing accounts for 83.4
percent of measurable IFFs on average. Clearly, global capital is a very significant character in
the current AML-CTF regime and the material aspect of power and the way the AML-CTF
regime is organised reflects this. Yet the definition of money laundering on the FATF website
continues to speak of laundering in terms of “criminal acts” such as “illegal arms sales,
smuggling, and the activities of organised crime, including for example drug trafficking and
prostitution rings … embezzlement, insider trading, bribery and computer fraud526”. More
significant, however, is that the critical literature, too, does not seriously evaluate the role of
global or local capital in shaping and/or enforcing the current AML-CTF regulation.
This is particularly surprising because several authors have noted the absence of a substantive
treatment of capital in the AML-CTF regime. Early critics spoke of the omission of white-collar
crime and corruption527; later critics pushed for the inclusion of corporate crimes including tax
evasion and avoidance528. There is also a growing body of literature that looks at specifically
trade-related malpractices529. Many have written about the lack of corporate will to combat
money laundering and complained that the commitment to AML-CTF regulation lasts only
525
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during economic booms530; others have documented “law voidance” or “creative compliance” by
corporations as a means of getting around regulation531. Both the mainstream media as well as
scholars have picked up on the role of big banks in terrorism financing and remarked on the
weak sanctions for them532. Critically, many scholars recognise that rich countries benefit from
the AML-CTF regime since they are mostly the final destination of laundered monies;
interestingly, a few even admit that the purported laxity of regulation in the offshore centres is a
bid by the rich countries to skew the regulatory market in their favour533. Unfortunately, none of
these very significant insights are mounted into a larger discussion of the role of capital; the onus
still remains on the state to remedy these non-systemic ‘defects’. Even the hypercritical strain in
the literature continues to see global capital as an inadvertent beneficiary of regulation, not a
driver534.
The point that merits underscoring is that the excluded or the invisible also shape policy by the
fact of their exclusion or invisibility. To put it another way: the invisibility of an actor does not
preclude their inclusion or the representation of their interests in a policy. If anything, their very
absence helps strengthen the regime by reinforcing the perception regarding the impartiality of
the policy and thus its legitimacy. Note, for example, that several critics speak of ‘weaknesses’
such as discretion and lax enforcement baked into the AML-CTF regime535. The Panama and
Paradise Papers showed that AML-CTF controls in developed countries – particularly those with
flourishing onshore centres – were as lax as those in other jurisdictions. These disclosures were
subsequently borne out by a slew of investigative reporting and research. In Canada – one of the
G7 proponents of AML-CTF regulation – Cribb and Oved emphasised how rules regarding
beneficial ownership continue to encourage laundering. This is despite Canada having been
asked at least four times to do away with such protections and for lawyers to be conscripted in
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the compliance effort536. Meanwhile, the government-sponsored report on casinos in British
Columbia revealed a laundering model sophisticated enough to merit its own name – the
‘Vancouver model’537. In the UK – another G7 proponent – after a banking leak exposed a
Russian link to a charity run by Prince Charles538, a Treasury Committee concluded that
“hundreds of billions of pounds” could have been laundered through the country each year but
the government had no precise figures about the amount539. Meanwhile, the UK Foreign Office
caved into threats of legal action or secession by the British Overseas Territories and withdrew
its demand they set up public registries to reveal beneficial owners540. In each of these examples,
the benefits to capital are clear but its influence on public policy is more tenuous, less visible.
Third, that these ‘weaknesses’ are built into the regime shows they are both systemic and
deliberate – the ‘hidden transcripts’. These are not regulatory ‘loopholes’ or ‘defects’
serendipitously detected some 30 years after the UK and Canada signed up for the regulation;
they were always intended to be part of the regime. As Tsingou and Segura-Serrano correctly
argue, eliminating money laundering would be politically untenable since the developed
countries that are home to the largest financial institutions or global centres of finance (for
example, London or New York) would be loath to give up the political weightage they enjoy
because of this position541. But the critics of global AML-CTF regulation fail to interrogate the
causes of this regulatory schizophrenia on part of the states – the desire to achieve two
conflicting outcomes (the material and the ideational) with the same regulation. Tsingou, for
example, says that the regime creates the appearance of public action while “less than more
deliberately” strengthening the position of the biggest and strongest players: the onshore markets
and the largest financial players. Who the regime acts for is something she does not explore in an
otherwise sophisticated analysis of the political economy of AML-CTF. Only by admitting the
power and influence of actors other than the state can the seeming schizophrenia can be seen for
536
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what it is: the output of the interaction of powers. In his explication of “sham standards”,
Drezner argues that such standards are a “notional” set of global standards with weak or nonexistent monitoring that “relieve or redirect domestic or civil society pressure for significant
global regulations” in the absence of interstate consensus542. As Beare contends: “the rhetoric of
compliance can be very strong and serve to obfuscate a reality of neglect543”. What a state wants,
what it professes to want and the regulation it agrees to are all conditioned by its interaction with
other actors.
Fourth, the interaction of powers poses a formidable challenge to the issue of accountability
within the AML-CTF regime. At the most granular level, the issue is of multiplicity of
regulation. Take the example of the Customer Due Diligence (CDD) regulation. The regulation
has long been an integral part of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 544
and the FATF guidelines elaborate on the same in great detail545. Meanwhile, both the Basel
principles and the FATF guidelines are used in the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSCs)546. Today, CDD procedures are a key requirement of most central
banks and are accordingly woven into the domestic legislative or regulatory fabric. But despite
there being so many authors of the said regulation, no single regulatory body can be held
accountable, or even responsible, for the regulation547. As Black explains, polycentric regulatory
regimes548 are not based on or mandated by national, supranational or international law. As such,
they lack clearly defined structures such as courts, legislative committees, auditors and
ombudsmen etc that can hold them accountable. Further, neither do they have clear jurisdictional
boundaries nor do they boast an easily identifiable set of democratic participants in their
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processes549. Finally, the diffusion of authority among many layers of regulation, enforcement
and monitoring – as evidenced by the structure of the global AML-CTF regime – further
complicates the issue of accountability. How, asks Black, is a standard-setter to be held
accountable for the ways the rules are enforced or an enforcer accountable for rules it did not
write550?
The accountability issue acquires even greater significance when seen in the context of FATF’s
evaluation processes. Black’s critical contribution is how she deploys critical accounting
literature to argue that “giving account” is a discursive schema – or habitus, in Bourdieu’s view –
through which participants in an accountability relationship (here, FATF and the jurisdiction
being evaluated) make sense of their own and each other’s roles, “which is constitutive of their
relationship and is fundamentally shaped by it551”. To put this another way: the ability to hold
certain jurisdictions ‘to account’ for AML-CTF failures draws on and thus reproduces the
fundamental imbalance within the inter-state relationship.
There are also a slew of new accountability-related problems waiting to emerge. For example,
the 2007 financial crisis wrought changes in the ownership structure of the big global banks as a
consequence of the buy-ins by host governments as well as Sovereign Wealth Funds. This will
set off regulatory conflicts of interest as home governments are transformed from regulators to
part owners – a government that stands to profit directly from the laundering business has even
less incentive to crack down on the same. However, the more problematic accountability issue is
the acquisition of political roles by wealth funds owned by foreign governments such as Qatar,
Kuwait, China and Singapore552. As a financier of militancy or a tax haven, neither Qatar nor
Singapore would be interested in strict AML-CTF controls. As owners of influential banks, they
would be better positioned to lobby for the global regulation they want and even less accountable
for it. At its core, the issue remains of mutability of actors, players and regulators; the interaction
between them and the various levers each pulls.
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The final point is about silos. As the foregoing shows, there is an intimate nexus between the
AML-CTF regime, the state and capital. However, there are very few attempts in the critical
literature to consistently situate and understand AML-CTF regulation from within the broader
political economy553, not as a criminological exercise independent thereof. This is particularly
important since dependence on capital is a universal issue and cannot be categorised as a poor/
developing country issue. While earlier waves of scholarship focused on offshore centres and the
centrality of the laundering business to their respective economies, more recent work shows a
similar dependence in many onshore centres too.
Financial institutions, for example, are obvious beneficiaries of money laundering. Despite
ostensibly ever-tightening AML-CTF regulations, banks across the developed world are
frequently embroiled in laundering scandals involving, among others, drug cartels, corrupt
oligarchs and criminal organisations. While fines and investigations for money laundering have
been a recurring and well-documented feature at Citigroup, Bank of New York, HSBC, Barclays
and RBS, other global banks such as Banco Santander554, Bank of America555, BNP Paribas
SA556, Commerzbank AG557, Credit Suisse558, Danske Bank AS559, Deutsche Bank560, Goldman
Sachs561, J.P. Morgan Chase562, MUFG Bank563, Nordea Bank ABP564, Société Générale565,
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Standard Chartered Bank566, Swedbank AB567 and UBS568 have also faced trouble with
regulators and investigators as has an unnamed Canadian bank. Significantly, most of these
laundering events have taken place in the last five years; ironically, most of these banks are
signatories to the Wolfsberg Principles569. Apart from the inefficacy of the regulation in
preventing laundering, the business is clearly profitable enough to tempt banks to err repeatedly.
The advantages to banks are both in terms of profits and commissions on these transactions but
also in terms of deposits, which banks then lend to individuals, businesses and governments. In
consumption-driven credit economies such as the ones seen across most of the developed world,
household savings rates are typically low and such deposits are key to shoring up financial
intermediation570. After the 2007 financial crash, for example, the head of the UN Office on
Drugs and Crime said that the proceeds of organised crime were "the only liquid investment
capital" available to some banks on the brink of collapse and, according to evidence from
officials in Britain, Switzerland, Italy and the US, a majority of the $352 billion of drugs profits
were absorbed into the economic system as a result571. Further, when Americans were found to
be using Swiss bank accounts to evade taxes in 2010, the US passed the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act, which requires financial firms in other jurisdictions to reveal details about their
American clients. Significantly, the US did not see fit to sign new international standards for
exchanging similar financial information with other countries and US banks are known to be
566
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flush with money from foreign investors using shell corporations to hide money from their own
governments and law enforcement572.
Meanwhile, entire economies have grown up around laundering. The historic literature and
reportage on laundering typically featured breathless accounts of the offshore centres and small
jurisdictions – Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, ‘exotic’ islands such as the Bahamas, to
name a few – that structured their economies and their financial industries around the laundering
business. In the last 10 years, equally breathless accounts are surfacing about the onshore centres
in the US, UK and Canada573. However, that the industries undergirding these centres are now
critical to their domestic political economies is mentioned only in passing.
For example, the formation of shell companies is big business in the US, particularly Delaware,
Nevada, Oregon and Wyoming574. A recent Global Financial Integrity report observes that more
corporations are established annually in the US than in any other jurisdiction and cites an
estimate pegging this number at two million575. The business obviously generates employment
for a battalion of, among others, local lawyers, bankers, accountants, auditors, agents, lobbyists
and government officials576, who plough their earnings back into the economy through
consumption and pay taxes on incomes, investments and consumption. Additionally, the business
also generates about 25 percent of Delaware’s budget in corporate taxes and fees577 – money that
finances government spending. While the centrality of the business is reflected in domestic
politics, it is rarely articulated in public policy578. Across the border, meanwhile, Canada’s
reputation as a ‘clean’ jurisdiction has translated into a major marketing effort: Oved and Cribb
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report that the Canadian flag is used on “dozens” of global websites to lure foreigners seeking
anonymous companies fronted by nominee directors that can be set up overnight – a service
known as ‘snow washing’579. As with the US, the infrastructure and human resources central to
this enterprise – the lawyers, bankers etc – are key to the Canadian political economy; as in the
US, they’re generally represented in domestic politics but absent in public policy580. The Peter
Graham report for the government of British Columbia, too, speaks of how the casinos in
Vancouver are key employers in their communities.
The impact of doing away with laundering will also be amplified wherever laundering is
embedded in key political economy systems. While militant and criminal organisations as well as
corrupt foreign politicians are often mentioned, laundered monies also fund charities581, football
clubs582, Hollywood films583 and political parties in electoral systems where campaign finance is
regulated584. As Ruggiero cautions, even the laundering of drugs money isn’t a transnational
enterprise but a local endeavour that happens through real estate or construction or accomplices
in the economic or political sphere (for example, corrupt politicians or officials; failing
businesses; lawyers; accountants etc)585. Doing away with laundering will then entail a
fundamental rethink of, for example, the role of corporations in campaign finance in the US.
Most significantly, from a critical political economy perspective, laundering has a nexus with
property development in global cities such as London, New York, Toronto and Vancouver. In
London, for example, the booming property market in high-end residential accommodation and
ambitious commercial projects is attributed to waves of foreign investment, not all of it clean586.
More than 60 percent of the owners of Britain’s tallest residential skyscraper, for example, were
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foreign nationals, including a Russian oligarch with ties to Vladimir Putin, the former chairman
of a defunct Nigerian bank and a Kyrgyz vodka tycoon; nearly a quarter of the transactions for
the luxury apartments were routed through shell companies in secrecy jurisdictions587. While
much is made of the laundering aspect and irrational market dynamics in property prices, there is
inadequate attention paid to the fact that property development and construction provide both
direct employment and a fillip to the manufacturing588 and services industries (financial service,
real estate brokerage firms etc) associated with them. Given this nexus, a crackdown on money
laundering would cause the speculative bubbles to burst but could also trigger and propagate
steep economic downturns in the construction and property-finance markets. Further, the
downturns would also manifest themselves in decreased consumer spending power in these
economies. Interestingly, such linked effects are not limited to just the onshore and offshore
centres but also countries that export capital to these countries. (For a detailed discussion, see
Chapter 5.)
There are also fears regarding the effects on the global political economy. In their December
2015 report, for example, the research and advocacy group Global Financial Integrity estimates
that $1.1 trillion were funnelled out of developing countries in illicit financial flows589. As the
laundering issue mills through its life cycle, there are concerns regarding increased calls for
repatriation from developing countries590. This will, obviously, pose significant challenges for
the jurisdictions asked to return monies.
This is borne out by the experience of the World Bank-OECD Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR)
initiative, which facilitates the return of corruption monies to the countries of origin. In its 2014
report, the group says that between 2010 and June 2012, a total of 41 asset recovery cases were
reported by eight countries – Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Switzerland, the UK and the US. Of these, 29 cases involved the freezing or seizing of assets and
587
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12 were returns. However, only Switzerland, the UK and the US reported returns in the same
period, a total of 12 cases valued at $147.2 million. Between 2006 and 2009, $276.3 million
were returned. The report attributes the staggeringly low success rate – based on the proportion
of returns relative to the outflows from developing countries – to the lack of coordination
between all stakeholders in both requested and requesting jurisdictions, “including those
responsible for setting policies, law enforcement and justice officials, banks, private companies
and their intermediaries591”.
The finding is corroborated by the experience of Switzerland. Several developing countries have
variously petitioned Switzerland to return monies stolen by Politically Exposed Persons. In 2015,
Switzerland instituted a law that allows for the return of funds held by foreign dictators in Swiss
accounts592. However, several provisions of the said law are open to entirely subjective
interpretation that may be construed in derogation to the rights and interests of the countries of
origin and thereby impede the return of monies593.
The critical point here is that both the above examples concern the return of corruption monies, a
category that makes up just three percent of IFFs. Further, this category is possibly the easiest to

591

Gray et al 2014 pp 17-18. Significantly, the report does not account for the effect of inadequate training and
funding of law enforcement officers. The forensic audit skills required to trace monies held by multiple shell
companies and parked in Special Purposes Vehicles across multiple jurisdictions require heavy training and funding
inputs. OECD Better Policies supra note 515.
592
Michael Shields, “Swiss to ease seizure, repatriation of dictators' funds”, Reuters (May 26, 2016); online
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-assets-idUSKCN0YG29Z
593
The section regarding progressive conditions where an asset freeze is to be deemed admissible reads as follows:
“[where] the government or certain members of the government of the country of origin have lost power, or a
change in power appears inexorable; [] the level of corruption in the country of origin is notoriously high; [] it
appears likely that the assets were acquired through acts of corruption or misappropriation or other crimes; [] the
safeguarding of Switzerland's interests requires the freezing of the assets.” Available at
https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/44109.pdf at 2. Especially problematic are Article 15,
which states that the presumption that the funds are of illicit origin will follow if “the wealth of the individual who
has the power of disposal over the assets or who is the beneficial owner thereof increased inordinately, facilitated
by the exercise of a public function by a foreign politically exposed person; [and] the level of corruption in the
country of origin or surrounding the foreign politically exposed person in question was notoriously high during his
or her term of office”, and Article 17, which prescribes conditions for repatriation of funds (”The restitution of
assets is made in pursuit of the following objectives: [] to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants of the
country of origin, or [] to strengthen the rule of law in the country of origin and thus to contribute to the fight
against impunity.”).

137

prove and prosecute, given the visibility of the individuals involved594. Even so, the lack of
success in repatriation suggests a key lack of political motivation on part of the destination states.
The material cannot be ignored and has a bearing on how even ideational power is enforced and
implemented. Where the expanded definition of illicit financial flows includes tax evasion and
avoidance and the volumes of outflow are much higher (between two-thirds and 83.4 percent of
measurable IFFs), the key question becomes: how will corporations respond to the calls for
repatriation? Even if states had the forensic ability required to investigate and reconstruct the
financial records of transnational corporations, do these states have the power and ability to resist
the influence of these corporations? And finally, even if they had this power, would they want to
exercise it to return the monies undergirding their own economies?
3.5 Conclusion
Despite the inexorable drive towards global harmonisation, there is much that remains deeply
problematic about the AML-CTF regime. Its architecture as well as the evolution of global
regulation testify to a fractured and incoherent politics at every level of governance and it is
tempting to conclude, like Mann, that the regime is more cock up than conspiracy. However,
despite the inherent unpredictability of outcomes in power plays, in the 30 years since its birth,
the AML-CTF regime has consistently delivered both power and profits to key players. More
simply: the power-profits nexus is too happy a coincidence to be either happy or, indeed,
coincidental. Instead, one is reminded of Lee Stewart’s gem: “Tax havens are the financial
whorehouses on the edge of town. We fuss about them, howl that the activity is illegal, but we
don't shut them down, because the town fathers are in there with their pants around their
ankles595”.
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Until the AML-CTF regime is analytically situated within the broader global political economy,
it will forever remain susceptible to hijacking by narrow interests in the name of ‘national
security’ and ‘organised crime’. Given the multiplicity of competing – and often irreconcilable –
interests of the actors, logically, regulatory harmonization ought to remain a pipedream. Simply
put, there are just too many voices at the table for them to speak as one: globally, there are states
vis-à-vis other states; developed states vis-à-vis developing ones; and individual states vis-à-vis
transnational regulators. Even domestically, there is contentious opposition between the various
arms of state (for example, the military vis-à-vis the judiciary); state bureaucracies (central banks
etc) vis-à-vis domestic politicians; state institutions vis-à-vis the people; states vis-à-vis criminal
organisations; and even regulators vis-à-vis industry. Given this complexity, the best way to
proceed appears to be a careful study and articulation of the myriad interests at stake and how
they fuse and diverge in a particular context and by consistently answering ‘who profits’, ‘which
power’. The following chapter speaks to this.
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CHAPTER 4: Power politics: the causes of the non-implementation of AML-CTF
regulation in Pakistan
Since February 2018, Pakistan has been on the FATF grey list and under tremendous pressure to
improve its conformity with global anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing
(AML-CTF) regulations. This chapter resolves that pressure into its constituent elements: why is
it so important for Pakistan to implement AML-CTF controls and why it does not manage to do
so.
The chapter draws off a set of 32 interviews conducted in Pakistan over the summer of 2018.
Within the government, the interviewees included those with a deep understanding of the
workings of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as
well as the National Counter Terrorism Authority; financial sector regulators within the State
Bank of Pakistan; investigating officers within the Financial Intelligence Unit596 and the Federal
Board of Revenue; law enforcement agencies (including public prosecutors; the police, the
Federal Investigation Agency and the corruption watchdog National Accountability Bureau).
Private-sector interviewees included industry participants, especially bankers who work on the
AML-CTF compliance effort; lawyers; economists; academics; parliamentarians; charity
organisations; rights activists as well as journalists who cover militancy in Pakistan. While most
of the interviewees had intimate knowledge of Pakistan’s AML-CTF regime because of their
work, several also had direct knowledge of the details of Pakistan’s interaction with global
regulators since they represented Pakistan at some meetings.
The chapter opens with a brief discussion of Pakistan’s AML-CTF architecture and then moves
to a discussion of the themes identified in the interviews. The objectives of the interviews were
twofold: first, to examine the operation of geopolitical power in the context of AML-CTF
regulations. While the broader question was whether AML-CTF regulation poses a threat to the
principle of sovereignty at international law, the more immediate line of enquiry was the relation
between the current pressure on Pakistan on the AML-CTF front and international relations. That
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is, how does the pressure on Pakistan reflect its engagement with its key allies and adversaries as
well as its appeasement or frustration of their political or geostrategic objectives?
The second objective was to study how global AML-CTF regulation filters into Pakistan through
domestic power sources, which are military, economic, political, ideological and judicial597. The
implementation of global regulation is conditioned by the variety of interests of each power
source as well as the interaction between the sources of power within a polity. For example,
given the predominance of the military establishment in the polity and its dependence on illicit
monies for a variety of economic, political and geostrategic interests in derogation of the
interests of the other sources of power, the establishment remains the first line of resistance
against the implementation of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan.
The concluding section argues that AML-CTF regulation needs to be understood as a technique
of power subject to contestation. This contest between differently sized powers, which are also
given to forming strategic alliances, necessarily preclude predictable regulatory outcomes. At the
global level, it is not enough, for example, for the US as the sole superpower to want the
regulation implemented; less powerful states – as well as groups within such states – still retain
the ability to mount a significant resistance by impeding meaningful implementation. That said,
as a technique of power, AML-CTF regulation also re-entrenches established power hierarchies
within a polity and poses severe consequences for the citizens of a country, be it enhanced
surveillance or political victimisation.
4.1 Pakistan’s AML-CTF regime
Pakistan’s endorsement of the FATF 40 is well-reflected by its domestic legal framework. The
most significant of these legislative instruments are the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997; the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2010; the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947; the National
Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) Act of 2013 as well as relevant portions of statutes such as
the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860; the Companies Act of 2017; the Banking Companies
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Ordinance of 1962; the Income Tax Ordinance of 2001; the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act
of 2016; the Customs Act of 1969 as well as the Control of Narcotics Substances Act 1997.
Besides these, terrorism-related offences are also governed by minor laws such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance of 2000; the Investigation for Fair Trial Act of
2013; and the Arms Act of 1879. In addition to the laws, AML-CTF regulation is also affected
by the National Action Plan to counter terrorism of 2015 as well as policy documents and
guidelines issued by Nacta, which is the lead agency in dealing with terrorism financing in
Pakistan; the State Bank of Pakistan, which is the banking sector regulator, and the securities
regulator Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.
Further, Pakistan is also signatory of a host of international conventions including the OIC
Convention of Combatting International Terrorism; the UN Convention against Corruption; the
SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism; the UN Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) and the UN
Convention against Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention). Pakistan has further signed up
to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333, 1373, 1390, 1455 and 1526, which
variously deal with the financing of terrorism; the banning of terrorist organisations, dismantling
their apparatuses, choking terrorist funding and freezing their assets; as well as the freezing of
assets of certain individuals and entities. Pakistan has also inked 29 bilateral/ multilateral
agreements regarding terrorism and 29 extradition treaties598.
According to the existing structure for the enforcement of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan, 27
federal and provincial agencies are involved in the effort. The most prominent among these are
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), the Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA), the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the Inland Revenue
Department (Income Tax), the Directorate of Customs Intelligence and Investigations, the AntiNarcotics Force, the corruption watchdog National Accountability Bureau, the State Bank of
Pakistan, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, the Frontier Corps, the Airport
Security Force and the four provincial Counter Terrorism Departments.
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Pakistan’s recognition of the validity of FATF and, as a corollary, its complicity in its own
subjugation is evidenced by its assumption of membership of the Asia Pacific Group (APG) of
the Egmont Group of FIUs in 2000. In 2007, then-president General Pervez Musharraf accepted
the standard FATF prescription for ‘normalisation’ – a law to govern both offences that would be
acceptable to FATF – by issuing a presidential ordinance called the Anti-Money Laundering
Ordinance599. (Earlier legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 – especially the 2002
amendments regarding the financing of terrorism and extremist groups – and the Control of
Narcotic Substances 1997 both contained provisions against money laundering. However, neither
was particularly effective since, first, they confined the scope to terrorism and narcotics as
compared to the wider-ranging classification of money laundering as a predicate offence and
second, there was limited implementation of the two.)
The institution of the law marked the beginning of a biannual surveillance discipline that set up
Pakistan, like all other FATF-monitored jurisdictions, as an object of knowledge. Through a
series of “reports and registers600”, calibrated assessments and evaluations – the structured,
structuring dispositions Bourdieu speaks of– FATF instituted a habitus that was oriented towards
practical functions such as compliance with global standards but at a deeper level, was supposed
to inculcate a way of acting and reacting according to principles that were never articulated as
‘formal rules’ – for example, the submission to constant surveillance.
In its February 2008 assessment, FATF flagged inadequacies and vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s
AML-CTF regime and pushed for greater compliance with its prescribed norms and standards601.
In October that year, FATF repeated this ‘normalizing judgement’602 and in 2009, Pakistan
underwent its second mutual evaluation603, thereby implicitly accepting its identity as a
vulnerable jurisdiction. While appreciating Pakistan’s continued cooperation with the World
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Bank and the APG, FATF’s February 2009 assessment reiterated its concerns – concerns that
were subsequently documented in the report on Pakistan’s mutual evaluation in July 2009604.
With its inordinate focus on risks, FATF captured the ‘inherent dangerousness’ of the
jurisdiction. In its October 2009 statement, FATF spoke of the risks again and also pointed to the
fact that the Anti Money Laundering Ordinance was set to expire in November that year. Urging
Pakistan to adopt a more permanent law, FATF also threatened to consider taking action “to
protect the financial system from the ML/FT [money laundering/ financing of terrorism] risks
emanating from Pakistan [emphasis added]”605. FATF repeated the same call in February 2010,
noting this time that the ordinance was set to expire in March 2010. FATF’s representation of a
common interest – the protection of the financial system – and the threat to take action if
Pakistan did not make the appropriate changes to its laws worked: later that year, the law was
revised and adopted by Parliament as the Anti-Money Laundering Act606.
In its June 2010, October 2010 and February 2011 statements, FATF remarked on Pakistan’s
“high level political commitment” to an action plan aimed at fixing its deficiencies by
“adequate” criminalisation of money laundering and terrorist financing and the demonstration of
procedures to identify, freeze and confiscate terrorist assets. While the reference to the political
commitment suggests Pakistan’s consent, the true balance of power is indicated by the use of the
words ‘adequate’ and ‘demonstration’, which set up FATF as the arbiter and the authority on
what constitutes either. While FATF commended, in progressive reports, Pakistan’s expansion of
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money laundering predicate offences and the provision of guidance regarding Suspicious
Transaction Reports (STRs) to financial institutions, it demanded Pakistan set up an “effective”
Financial Intelligence Unit besides regulating money service providers and improving and
implementing “effective” controls for cross-border cash transactions607. Again, only FATF could
decide what constituted ‘effective’. In June 2011, FATF echoed the same concerns, additionally
noting that Pakistan’s lack of implementation of the terrorism financing offence608.
In October 2011, FATF ratcheted up the censure. Pakistan was placed on the list of jurisdictions
“not making adequate progress [emphasis added]” on the action plan and FATF peevishly noted
that Pakistan had failed to give an “satisfactory response [emphasis added]” to its June 2011
concern about lack of implementation of the terrorism financing offence. Giving a deadline of
February 2012, FATF threatened to “identify” jurisdictions such as Pakistan as “out of
compliance with their agreed action plans [emphasis added]” and to ask its members “to
consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with the jurisdiction [emphasis
added]”609. While the querulousness of the tone and the patronising language could be
considered offensive on their own, more significant was what the assessment signified: the
establishment of power relations whereby FATF was empowered to demand and Pakistan, to
comply; the representation of non-compliance as moral dereliction of a ‘duty’ owed to the world;
and the subjective assessment of what construes ‘progress’, ‘adequate’ and ‘satisfactory’.
In February 2012, FATF made good on its threats regarding naming and shaming. As ever, in
line with the “microrewards” Foucault speaks of, FATF appreciated Pakistan’s enhancement of
the capacity of the FIU, the approval of an AML-CTF strategy and the provision of training to
relevant stakeholders. However, simultaneously, FATF issued the same caveats about the need to
institute FATF-compliant terrorism financing legislation; the ability to identify, freeze, and
confiscate terrorist assets; money service providers and cross-border cash transactions610. By
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June 2012, Pakistan had additionally issued the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
(Enforcement) Order of 2012; issued AML-CTF guidelines to exchange companies and a
currency declaration notification for the implementation of its cash border controls but FATF
was still pushing for terrorism financing legislation and demonstration of capability to identify,
freeze, and confiscate terrorist assets611. The inexorable dressage and the call for greater
accountability – ‘demonstrated capacity’ – led Pakistan to introduce CTF measures in Parliament
by October that year, but FATF maintained its reservations about the adequacy of the
legislation612. In February 2013, FATF recognised that Pakistan had increased the maximum
monetary sanction for non-compliance with the UNSC resolution (UNSCR) 1267613. However,
now FATF wanted Pakistan to amend its Anti-Terrorism Act to ensure it met FATF standards
regarding the terrorist financing offence and the ability to identify and freeze terrorist
assets614. By June that year, Pakistan had amended its Anti-Terrorism Act but not enough to meet
FATF’s mandated “international standards” regarding the identification and freezing of terrorist
assets, hence FATF asked for further amendments615.
By October 2013, Pakistan had sufficiently internalised the FATF discipline and a greater
willingness to implement meaningful change: it issued a Statutory Regulatory Order redefining
terrorism as well as an Anti-Terrorism Amendment Ordinance establishing procedures for the
identification and freezing of terrorist assets. While noting that the new laws would allow
Pakistan to implement UNSCR 1373616, FATF worried about the temporal nature of both laws
and asked Pakistan to expedite parliamentary approval of the two617. The invocation of the UN
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Security Council is significant because it shows how FATF appropriates the ‘common
interest’ – as represented by the UNSC – to conceal its own interests; the constant
expression of dissatisfaction, meanwhile, strengthens FATF’s ability to progressively
mandate further changes.
However, till February 2014, Pakistan had not managed to get the laws approved by
Parliament and ended up reissuing the ordinance618. By June 2014, FATF had been
mollified enough to move Pakistan a notch higher: instead of calling on its members to
consider the threats posed by Pakistan, FATF now asked members to consider the
“significant progress” made by the jurisdiction on implementing its action plan, including
the criminalisation of money laundering and terrorist financing; the establishment of procedures
to identify, freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; the setting up of a fully operational and
effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit; the regulation of money service providers;
and the improvement of cross-border cash controls. FATF also announced a surveillance and
monitoring mission – an on-site visit – to confirm that Pakistan was, indeed, doing what it had
promised to619. The visit was unable to materialise till October 2014 due to security concerns but
FATF remained hopeful of visiting Pakistan before the FATF meetings in February 2015620. In
its February 2015 statement, FATF finally announced Pakistan had met the legislative and
regulatory requirements “for its commitments” and was no longer subject to “ongoing
monitoring” under its AML-CTF compliance process although it was expected to continue
working with the APG621.
However, the honeymoon was short: in February 2018, Pakistan was back on the grey list despite
the de facto finance minister’s offer to FATF to fix deficiencies by June that year622. In June
2018, the FATF statement spoke again of Pakistan’s “high-level political commitment” to work
with FATF and the APG to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies.
The new action plan, however, was a veritable laundry list of highly subjective, technical
618
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prescriptions targeting Pakistan’s potential dangerousness – not its actuality – with regard to
terrorism financing. More particularly, Pakistan was to i) demonstrate its ability to “properly”
identify and assess terrorism financing risks and guarantee “risk-sensitive supervision”; ii)
“prove” that AML-CTF violations drew remedial actions and sanctions and that these actions
had an effect on AML-CTF compliance by financial institutions; iii) take enforcement action
against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTS); iv) prove that authorities identify cash
couriers and enforce controls on the illicit movement of currency and understand the risk of cash
couriers being used for terrorism financing; v) improve inter-agency coordination including
between provincial and federal authorities on combating terrorism financing risks; vi)
demonstrate that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) identify and investigate the widest range of
terrorism financing activity and that investigations and prosecutions target designated persons
and entities, and persons and entities acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated
persons or entities; vii) demonstrate that terrorism financing prosecutions result in “effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” and enhance the capacity and support for prosecutors
and the judiciary; viii) demonstrate “effective” implementation of targeted financial sanctions
against all UNSCR 1267- and 1373- designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf,
including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets and
prohibiting access to funds and financial services; ix) demonstrate enforcement against terrorism
financing sanction violations “including administrative and criminal penalties” and the
cooperation of provincial and federal authorities on enforcement cases; and x) demonstrate that
designated persons are deprived of access and use of the facilities and services they own or
control623. The same statement was repeated in October 2018624.
In February 2019, FATF noted that Pakistan had operationalised an integrated database for its
currency declaration regime and revised its terrorism financing risk assessment. However, these
gains were more than offset – for FATF, at least – by Pakistan having missed the January 2019
deadlines for several action items. Accordingly, FATF determined that the jurisdiction did not
demonstrate “a proper understanding” of the terrorism financing risks posed by Da’esh, Al
Qaeda, Jamaat ud Dawa, Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad,
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the Haqqani network and persons affiliated with the Taliban. Again, FATF trotted out the
laundry list from the previous two statements, adding a May 2019 deadline625.
In June 2019, FATF commended Pakistan for its recently developed terrorism financing risk
assessment addendum but insisted that Pakistan didn’t show “a proper understanding of
Pakistan’s transnational TF risk”. Pakistan was accordingly advised to continue work on
implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by adhering to the 10-point
agenda outlined in February and October 2018 as well as February 2019 by October 2019
“[o]therwise, the FATF will decide the next step at that time for insufficient progress 626”.
Critically, there is no “spectacular” theatre of punishment, as Foucault would call it, just its
inevitability: “the sad necessity of a legal vengeance to the people627”.
4.2 Geopolitics at play
Even a flat reading of the chronology above indicates a politics that seems to have little to do
with either money laundering or terrorism financing. Quite simply, the timing and tone of each
FATF statement from the time Pakistan joined the APG in 2000 till 2018 makes little sense until
they are situated within contemporaneous geopolitics. However, two points here merit particular
mention: first, as discussed in Chapter 2, power is no zero-sum game. While it is tempting to
conclude domination in FATF-Pakistan relations or to opt for an oppressor-oppressed binary,
such a conclusion ignores the fact that all actors have some power in relation to each other and
power, in itself, is both imposition and resistance. Second, the outcome of every power struggle
needs to be viewed with an eye to both the interaction of the sources of power as well as the
multiple interests of each source.
Both points are well-reflected by Pakistan’s FATF experience. Given the state of hostility with
India and the fractious battle over Kashmir since 1947, Pakistan’s unofficial foreign policy – as
determined by its military establishment – has included support for militant proxies in Kashmir
since the early 1990s628. These geostrategic imperatives – as the ‘rationale’ for both money
625
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laundering and terrorism financing – remain unchanged: Pakistan still faces a hostile India in the
east. While Pakistan’s initial desire for militant proxies in Afghanistan was born of its desire for
“strategic depth” and the fear of an “Afghan-Indian pincer effect to undo Pakistan629”, the
operation of Indian proxies on the western front is now cited as an additional concern. That said,
Pakistan’s nurturance of militant groups in Afghanistan since the late 1970s was at the behest of
and with the active complicity of its closest allies, the US and Saudi Arabia. Both were driven by
different – and evolving – compulsions: the US was looking to defeat the march of the USSR;
meanwhile, Saudi Arabia had been incubating jihadis in Pakistan to be used elsewhere for a
while before the Afghanistan issue flared up. However, after the 1979 siege of Mecca, when
armed civilians attempted to overthrow the House of Saud, the Saudi government increased
funding for jihadis exponentially. By the mid-1980s, the Saudis found another reason to fund
militants in Pakistan: to increase their influence in the region vis-à-vis Iran630. The respective
roles of the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the war in Afghanistan and, by extension, their
roles in money laundering and terrorism financing are well documented in both the academic
literature and the mainstream media. In their history of AML-CTF regulation, for example,
Braithwaite and Drahos note that the CIA “has an interest in being a major launderer of dirty
money itself, while making it harder for the competition to do so” and that “drug interdiction was
subordinate to the foreign policy goal of the defeat of communism631”. Meanwhile, an interesting

misunderstanding (New York, Perseus Group, 2013), for additional details: as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US
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example of the politics of the era is offered by a US-funded Urdu primer used in madrassahs
during the time, which transliterates as A for Allah, J for jihad, K for kaafir (infidel)632.
However, this is not to imply that Pakistan or even the military’s sole interest in money
laundering and/or terrorism financing is born solely of regional insecurities: the military is also
motivated by its economic as well as institutional interests633 – the interaction of powers and the
multiplicity of interests within a source of power that Mann speaks of. While the US, Saudi
Arabia and some European allies funded the effort, Pakistan had the responsibility of training
and liaising with the Afghan mujahideen and providing military bases to the US. The money was
almost entirely funnelled through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)634. The
involvement of the ISI in the Afghan heroin trade and access to the CIA arms pipeline enriched
many ISI generals but also provided covert funds for Pakistan’s nuclear programme as well as
ISI-backed misadventures in Kashmir635. (The involvement of the CIA in the Afghan heroin
trade is said to have financed the CIA’s own shenanigans in the-then Soviet Union.) For this
‘cooperation’ in both laundering and terrorism financing, Pakistan received $10 billion in
military and economic assistance from Washington in five years as well as a studied ignorance
about its nuclear programme; the drugs trafficking by the army; the lack of democracy; the
public floggings636 as well as its involvement in the Sikh uprising in India637, which was soon to
spread to Kashmir638. The economic imperative – the aid from the US, corruption opportunities,
the proceeds of the drugs trade – is clear but so are the ‘institutional’ interests. The nuclear
632
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programme, for example, was core to Pakistan and its military’s aspirations regarding the future;
the studied silence regarding Pakistan’s dictatorship as well as its human rights violations helped
cement military dictator Ziaul Haq’s hold over the country. Meanwhile, journalists who covered
the last decade of the Cold War describe the region as awash with petrodollars; about Pakistani
military planes “stuffed with dollars” crossing the Durand Line and about gunny sacks full of
dollars being distributed among militant groups from the gates of the Saudi embassy in
Islamabad639.
Pakistan’s role in both money laundering and terrorism financing is thus neither new nor
unknown to the world. To presume such a country was ever AML-CTF compliant is
disingenuous, bordering on the ridiculous. Yet between the time of its creation (1989) and its
first statement regarding Pakistan (2008), FATF had nothing to say about Pakistan’s AML-CTF
deficiencies. This stance did not change even after 2000, when Pakistan joined the APG. The
significance of this silence has not gone unnoticed: the one issue all interviewees agreed on was
that the pressure on Pakistan is a consequence of global politics, more particularly Islamabad’s
currently contentious relationship with the US640. This becomes clearer by looking at the
evolution of the Pak-US relationship after the end of the war in Afghanistan and the dissolution
of the USSR in 1991.
After the Afghan jihad petered out, the ISI redirected the trained fighters to Kashmir641. The
move was significant because it showcased what Mann calls the reflexive, internal
transformation of a power source in interaction with other sources of power. The encounter with
the US-Saudi combine and the experience in Afghanistan convinced the ISI of the efficacy of
proxy warfare; the enfeebled political class that had come into power in 1988 was in no position
to dictate otherwise to a military establishment fattened on the military and economic excesses of
the previous 11 years under dictatorial rule. Further, by 1990, the ISI had already engineered the
fall of Benazir Bhutto, further weakening political challengers to its power in Pakistan642.
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As early as 1992, the US threatened to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism for its
support of Sikh militants; Muslim militant groups active in Indian-administered Kashmir as well
as the running of militant training camps in Pakistan and in Kashmir. While Pakistan’s official
position was that the groups were freelancers, the statement was designed to throw off the US –
the resistance – while continuing with proxy warfare. Critically, the US knew of these hidden
transcripts: it alleged the complicity of “organs of the Pakistani government controlled by the
President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff643”. The threat did not materialise,
possibly due to subsequent changes in the administration of both countries: Bill Clinton assumed
office in November 1992 and Nawaz Sharif was removed from the Prime Minister’s office in a
coup in 1993. Clinton’s penchant for India and the resulting US-India entente blindsided
Pakistan644 and Pakistan inscribed its resistance by increasing clandestine support for Kashmiri
militant groups (although it was forced to move its facilities for Kashmiri militants to
Afghanistan)645. Interestingly, the US was aware of the developments: besides mainstream media
reports about the presence of militant training camps near the Afghan border in Pakistan, a 1995
cable from the US State department to its consulate in Karachi recognised the ties between the
(now defunct) Kashmiri militant group Harakat-ul-Ansar646 and Afghan militants such as
Jalaluddin Haqqani647. However, the US chose to ignore these ties and the same memo
concluded that neither posed a threat to the US or its interests648. Significantly, the period
between 1995 and 1996 was also the year the US government had the FATF presidency649 and
there too, there was a continuing silence about Pakistan.
In 1996, to neutralise the threat of the pincer effect, the ISI helped install the Taliban government
in Afghanistan and persuaded Saudi Arabia and the UAE to recognise, support and fund the
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Taliban through the ISI650. Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan under Taliban protection in
the summer of 1996 and the following year, the new government of Nawaz Sharif recognised the
Taliban government at the behest of the ISI651. The move shows both the evolving interests of
the military – it realised the benefits of a friendly government in Kabul after the US-Saudi
‘creation’ of the Taliban – but also serves as a clear example of how the interaction between
military power and political power affects the direction of ‘state’ policy.
By 1997, the US knew that Pakistan was providing Saudi Arabia-subsidised oil as well as wheat
to the Taliban; suspected that Pakistani military advisors were training Taliban fighters and
estimated that between 20 percent and 40 percent of Taliban fighters were Pakistani652. In
addition, the US also knew that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were training Kashmiri militants653.
The retaliatory nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 attracted US sanctions but not AMLCTF charges. While the possession of nuclear weapons is thought to have further emboldened
the ISI in the conduct of its clandestine operations in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, till 1998,
the official position of the US remained that official Pakistani government support for militant
groups could not be presumed654.
According to some readings, the US resisted criticising Pakistan in line with its other political
interests: the US wanted the latter to exercise its influence over the Taliban for the extradition of
bin Laden for several acts of terrorism, especially the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania as well as the USS Cole in 2000655. But Pakistan’s failure to do so did not
materialise in public censure nor comment on the fact that when the US eventually lobbed cruise
missiles at training camps in eastern Afghanistan, it ended up killing – among others – 21
Pakistani militants and some ISI trainers656. Indeed, some commentators attribute the success of
the Taliban only partially to the support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and primarily to the silence
650
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of the US657. Abbas, for example, cites the US State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism
report for 1999, which pinpointed – for the first time – South Asia as a major centre of
international terrorism. Not only did the report speak of Pakistan’s tolerance of “terrorists living
and moving freely within its territory”, it also criticised Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri militants
as well as the continued operation of certain madrassahs that served as “conduits for terrorism”.
Yet Pakistan was not included in the list of seven countries sponsoring terrorism since “it [was] a
friendly country [] trying to tackle the problem”658. It is unclear whether the declaration was a
Gramscian concession to Pakistan’s interests or a representation of reality designed to curry the
US favour with the Pakistani establishment. But it is equally clear that for the US, foreign policy
considerations triumphed the desire to eliminate terrorism financing. However, as an ostensibly
independent organisation devoted to the eradication of money laundering and terrorism
financing, FATF’s silence was mystifying. FATF was either living in a media-free bubble or it
chose not to act at the behest of the US; circumstances suggest the latter.
The jostling between military and political power was underway within Pakistan too. Early in
1999, premier Nawaz Sharif and Indian premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee moved towards a détente
but the Pakistan military-led Kargil misadventure in the spring of the same year undid the
gains659. In October that year, Musharraf overthrew Sharif in a coup and assumed office as the de
facto head of state. In 2000, the US asked for Pakistan’s help in capturing Abu Zubaida, one of
bin Laden’s key lieutenants, who was thought to be living in Peshawer. Simultaneously, Pakistan
was also told to stop supporting terrorism in India and Kashmir660. According to Rashid, the US
and some European countries knew that the ISI was helping the Taliban campaign661. Yet this
assessment was not reflected in Pakistan’s first mutual evaluation by FATF at the time it joined
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as a member in 2000662. When Russian President Vladimir Putin told US President George Bush
about the Pakistan Army and intelligence services links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda at the G8
summit in July 2001, the US officials chose to dismiss it as “Russian bitterness toward Pakistan
for supporting the Afghan Mujahideen, who had defeated the Soviet Union in the 1980s663” and
chose to believe, instead, Pakistani officials who said that neither the ISI nor the government
assisted the Taliban militarily664.
While 9/11 forced Musharraf to ostensibly ally with the US665, the ISI was not willing to
completely abandon its “strategic assets” in Afghanistan666 and disguised its insubordination in
‘hidden transcripts’. While Musharraf claimed that he was sacrificing the relations with the
Taliban to protect the Kashmir cause667, the assertion was not borne out by Pakistan’s conduct.
While Pakistan made no effort to impede the US bombing of Afghanistan, it ensured that
“hundreds of Pakistani military advisors and ISI operatives assisting the Taliban were
evacuated668”. Meanwhile, the December 2001 attack by Kashmiri militants on the Indian
Parliament showed that Pakistan’s policy on militancy remained essentially the same669. The ISI
continued to provide fuel, arms and ammunition to the Taliban through 2002, despite its waning
influence over the Taliban leadership – as evidenced by the 1999 massacre of Shia Hazaras in
Bamiyan670 and the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in the spring of 2001671.
Additionally, some 10,000 Pakistani militants also crossed over into Afghanistan to help the
Taliban672.
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In May 2002, under US pressure, Musharraf told the ISI to tell the militant groups in Kashmir to
desist but by September that year, he allowed the groups limited engagement – which drew a
public reprimand from the US in early 2003673. Over the next few years, Pakistan ramped up its
covert resistance to the US pressure. The Musharraf regime made a show of very public arrests
and detentions of militants, followed by quiet releases674; maintained a selective focus on
sectarian groups as opposed to jihadist groups675; and instituted well-publicised bans on militant
groups, which responded by changing their names and continuing with business as usual676.
Critics, both internal and external, claimed that the regime was “at best, [] warehousing some
extremists and leaving others untouched for fear of alienating the religious right677”. In response,
the military establishment initially argued that they were helpless before the courts, which were
releasing the detainees for want of evidence regarding their militant activities within Pakistan’s
territory678. Subsequently, the establishment launched a concerted narrative about ‘good Taliban’
versus ‘bad Taliban’, claiming the former were misguided individuals capable of
rehabilitation679. By 2005, US intelligence discovered that the activities of the Taliban were still
being directed from Pakistan; the Spain and the 7/7 attackers were found to have trained in
Pakistan and several countries’ intelligence services found that the country was a principal
recruiting ground and logistical centre for global militants680. Significantly, the developments
were well-documented in the mainstream media, both foreign and local. Yet, if the silence from
FATF is any indication, the organisation remained completely oblivious to the situation in
Pakistan. Meanwhile, despite knowing about Pakistan’s support for financing terrorism, the US
continued providing large amounts of military and economic aid to Pakistan in exchange for
militants681.
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The tide turned in 2007, when the US told Pakistan that the tribal areas along the Durand Line
had become safe havens for the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Since Musharraf and the Pakistan
Army seemed unable or unwilling to do anything, the US deployed armed drones in the area682.
The year proved a watershed for Musharraf in many ways: he issued the Anti-Money Laundering
Ordinance; deposed the chief justice of Pakistan twice683; faced two concerted campaigns against
himself by the Lawyers’ Movement; was forced to call for national elections and eventually
resigned as army chief. (The significance of the internal developments is discussed below.) The
final blow proved to be a December 2007 expose by the New York Times (NYT), which spoke of
how US funds for the war effort were being siphoned off by Pakistan to help finance “weapons
systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban”. The Pakistanis were accused of
inflating reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs684. While the NYT piece
estimated that reimbursement claims were inflated by 30 percent, a Guardian article two months
later claimed that 70 percent of the $5.4 billion given to Pakistan had been “misspent”. However,
the most sobering aspect of the article was its pragmatic conclusion that recognised the multiple,
even conflicting objectives of a state: “analysts and officials say the US is unlikely to turn off the
cash tap anytime soon, given Pakistan's importance in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other
foreign fugitives685”.
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Significantly, the year 2007 also marked a profound shift in US-India relations with
ramifications for Pakistan-US relations as well as Pakistan’s relationship with FATF. The
Clinton-era entente had matured into a deeper engagement: the US needed India as a bulwark
against Chinese influence in the region and rewarded India with a civil nuclear deal. While India
was now considered a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan was still the international pariah and
this led to the waning of Pakistani influence over the US686. Shortly after, in February 2008, the
19-year-old FATF suddenly ‘discovered’ that Pakistan’s AML-CTF regime had vulnerabilities.
The timing of the ‘discovery’ suggested US influence rather than coincidence – an example of
how AML-CTF regulations help reinforce existing power relations. However, till February 2009,
FATF did not propose anything more than greater adherence to global standards. Instead,
Pakistan was commended for its cooperation with the World Bank and the Asia Pacific Group
(APG). Significantly, the February 2009 assessment came shortly after the Mumbai attacks of
November 2008, when India accused Pakistan of complicity in the attacks due to its support for
Hafiz Saeed, co-founder of the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and chief of the
controversial Islamic charity Jamaatud Dawa (JuD)687. After the attacks, India pushed the UN
Security Council to declare Hafiz Saeed a terrorist and the JuD a terrorist organisation 688. In
December 2008, the UNSC did so and the Pakistani government moved to place Saeed under
house arrest. Significantly, no criminal charges were filed against Saeed since the government
argued that he had not conducted any terrorism-related activity on Pakistani soil; consequently,
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Saeed was freed by the Lahore High Court after a few months of captivity689. The blandness of
the FATF February 2009 report is all the more surprising, given that all these developments were
public knowledge.
It took FATF another four months to appreciate these developments, which were reflected in its
July 2009 damning indictment of Pakistan (see FN 604 above for a synopsis of the evaluation
report). But the report itself was riddled with inexplicable inconsistencies – an indication of the
unpredictability of outcomes even when big powers are pitched against smaller powers. For one,
the so-called “inadequacies” of Pakistan’s AML-CTF regime were now significant enough to
merit a dense 262-page report but not important enough to replace the inadequacies/ risks/
vulnerabilities descriptor with a stronger noun. Second, the use of the word “vulnerabilities”
suggests the unintended presence of loopholes within a system, which are susceptible to
exploitation. However, the methods detailed in the FATF report – for example, the use of
corporate entities or real estate transactions to launder monies; the use of cash couriers or
charities for financing terrorism – indicated the existence of vibrant, flourishing systems
designed to effect the same, not loopholes capable of exploitation. More simply, the defects of
the regime were systemic and abuse of the same was an ongoing reality, not a remote possibility.
Yet FATF chose to maintain the fiction of unrealised risks and unexploited vulnerabilities in
Pakistan. Third, the analysis itself suggested influences, if not authorship, independent of FATF.
Take the example of the freezing of militants’ assets. Of the 66 key findings about Pakistan, most
related to the procedural requirements for the central bank and the securities regulator, the legal
framework and other technicalities. However, the report also noted Pakistan’s failure to freeze
the assets of militants when the individuals had not committed acts of terrorism in Pakistan. A
key component of FATF’s methodology for mutual evaluations is the jurisdiction’s own
assessment of risks. While assessors are not bound by such assessments, the process specifies a
high degree of cooperation and consultation690. Even after the UNSC ban, Pakistan chose not to
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press criminal charges against Hafiz Saeed and argued he had not committed terrorist acts on
Pakistani soil; as such, Pakistan was unlikely to have flagged the issue or agreed to such a
reading. From a wider terrorism financing perspective too, the role of the ISI or domestic and
foreign funding of Islamic charities – for example – ought to have merited greater FATF
scrutiny691. Consequently, FATF’s decision to focus on Hafiz Saeed instead, without naming
him, raised eyebrows. This ties in with the perspective of several interviewees who said that the
pressure brought to bear on Pakistan by FATF was a consequence of Indian lobbies working on
the US government and Pakistan’s inability to defend itself692.
Even the linkages between FATF and the UNSC693 are mostly seen as a naked play for
‘borrowed legitimacy’ by a largely illegitimate club led by the G7694, which needs the moral
authority of a more democratically representative Security Council to justify its calls for greater
accountability. Were FATF really convinced of the salubriousness of the AML-CTF regulation,
contend some, it would have worked harder on raising awareness around the world rather than
demanding accountability and conducting summary trials of jurisdictions it deems noncompliant695. And FATF would have not needed the endorsement of bodies such as the UN or
the IMF or the World Bank. As such, these interlocutors expect the FATF-UNSC nexus to go the
way of the Conference of Disarmament; the Decolonisation Committee and the UNSC CounterTerrorism Committee696.
The FATF pronouncements coincided with a period of intense political turmoil in Pakistan.
Musharraf’s dismissal of 61 judges of the superior court in November 2007 had triggered a
countrywide protest against him by lawyers who were joined by civil society activists, political
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parties as well as ordinary citizens. The December 2007 assassination of the leader of the
Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) Benazir Bhutto added more heat: over the next 15 months, the
country witnessed a series of battles between the lawyers and their allies, the military
establishment and mainstream political parties in both courtrooms and on the streets697. The
February 2008 general elections ushered in the new Pakistan Peoples Party government but the
public campaigns against Musharraf, courtroom theatrics and secret negotiations between the
Lawyers’ Movement leaders, the military establishment and the political parties continued698.
The military facing the US-FATF combine in the summer of 2008, consequently, was an
enfeebled version of itself, diminished by its interaction with a newly resurgent political power
and an increasingly emboldened judicial power. The US then demanded that Pakistan act against
several militant groups, including the Haqqani network. While the military establishment agreed,
it insisted on, first, setting its own pace and taking out the easier targets initially, and second,
more equipment and assistance from the Americans. The US continued its policy of conducting
drone strikes in Pakistan while the ISI strategically engineered ‘public’ protests against those
targeting ‘their’ militants – thereby creating the illusion of a political power that supported the
actually enfeebled military power – and told the incredulous Americans that the main decisionmaking body of the Taliban – the Quetta Shura – did not exist699. The Pakistani resistance effort
was alive; to say that FATF admonitions regarding Pakistan’s AML-CTF controls were low
priority for Pakistan during this period would not be a stretch.
Soon after came a series of disclosures that threatened to expose Pakistan’s resistance effort. At
some point after the Mumbai attacks, the CIA discovered that the ISI had been involved in the
training for the attacks700; the Times Square attacker in 2010 was found to have links with
Pakistan; Osama bin Laden was shot dead in Pakistan in May 2011 and a planned operation
against a bomb-making factory in North Waziristan was compromised701. The US kept asking
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Pakistan to crack down on terrorism financing702 and, based on the material found in bin Laden’s
compound, threatened to go public about Pakistan’s role if the Pakistan military continued to
stoke anti-American rhetoric within the country703. After the September 2011 attack on the US
embassy in Kabul by the Haqqani network, the US told Pakistan it knew about the relationship
between the Haqqani network, the Pakistan Army and the ISI and wanted action against the
network704. Significantly, in October 2011, FATF decided to list Pakistan for not making
adequate progress and, in February 2012, greylisted Pakistan for being out of compliance with its
action plan. The decision was read as strategic: an interviewee close to the national counterterrorism effort said that FATF was brought on as a pressure tactic when Pakistan failed to
accede to US requests to crack down on terrorism financing. The inclusion of FATF transformed
a bilateral engagement to a multilateral one – with the ‘common interest’ enhancing the
legitimacy of US demands – and that too, at an organisation “where Pakistan also ha[d]
enemies705” who could be reliably be expected to ratchet up the pressure.
For the next three years, FATF and Pakistan played the chicken game. FATF maintained steady
pressure with a series of progressive demands designed to inculcate greater compliance; Pakistan
continued with its tacit resistance by responding with an equally steady stream of legislative and
administrative dribs and drabs that never translated into anything meaningful. The US had
recommitted to Afghanistan with a surge in troops and Pakistan was still relevant to the effort –
knowledge that probably conditioned the Pakistani resistance. But a low-intensity Pak-US
conflict played out in the background: for example, the US attack at the border town of Salala in
Pakistan in November 2011 killed 28 Pakistani soldiers and Pakistan responded by shutting
down the NATO supply route and withdrawing permission for the US to use the Shamsi airbase
in Balochistan706. Sporadically, US and NATO forces accused Pakistan of compromising their
military operations by leaking information to militant groups; Pakistan responded with suitable
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outrage and claimed it was being targeted by jihadi and sectarian groups for its participation in
the US-led war on terror707 and enumerated the death toll in Pakistan since the launch of the
war708. NATO supplies were pilfered en route to and from Afghanistan709 and the ‘wares’
surfaced in bazaars in Pakistan’s urban centres; Coalition Support Fund payments stuttered and
the US Congress pushed to reduce aid to Pakistan710. Even though Pakistan was removed from
the grey list in February 2015, the US kept pushing the government and the military regarding
their support to militant groups. In July 2017, for example, US withheld $350 million in
Coalition Support Fund monies since it felt Pakistan was not doing enough to disrupt terrorism
financing.
But the 2018 greylisting at the behest of the US was substantially different711. First, Pakistan’s
grey listing went against the protocol identified by FATF. ‘Greylisting’ is a naming-and-shaming
technique triggered by an evaluation of the ‘errant’ jurisdiction by the relevant regional group
and leads to stricter monitoring of the jurisdiction712. This imposition of an identity – as Foucault
would read it – produces its own set of disciplinary effects: as FATF notes, “Public
identification, and the prospect of public identification, encourages countries to swiftly make
significant improvements713”. The Asia Pacific group was scheduled to conduct a mutual
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evaluation of Pakistan in June 2019714. However, in January 2018, the US nominated Pakistan
due to its support for the Haqqani network as well as cross-border currency smuggling via
exchange companies opened on the border with Afghanistan at Parachinar715. According to the
process detailed by FATF, a nomination by a FATF member triggers an evaluation by the
relevant regional group, where the ‘accused’ jurisdiction has a chance to defend itself and is
given a year to implement the changes prior to public listing716. In Pakistan’s case, however, the
APG did not seek a reply from Pakistan; its financial systems were not evaluated; and it was not
offered the one-year reprieve either. Instead, FATF endorsed the US rationale and the
nomination led directly to grey listing717. Since FATF operates as a closed bureaucracy with
secretive decision-making, there was no prospect of an appeal to anyone other than FATF itself.
Second, there was a profound change in FATF’s attitude towards Pakistan. After decades of
silence and some low-level bickering, FATF abruptly took on a blatantly aggressive stance that
showed a cementing of a skewed power dynamic. Alleging neocolonialism, several interviewees
point to the fact that Pakistan doesn’t have “a seat at the table where decisions are made about
us718” and that there is little room for negotiation or leeway719. Several interviewees who
attended FATF meetings in the past speak of the “demeaning” treatment of Pakistan by
participants at the meetings720. Meanwhile, central bank officials complain that at meetings with
the US and FATF, their version is invariably contradicted with supporting evidence721. Further,
there is also a focus on potentiality: FATF’s assessments of Pakistan are based on perceptions of
high risk without evidence722. For some, this is what makes the current set of FATF demands so
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dangerous: the evaluation of Pakistan’s risk is entirely subjective and Pakistan is asked to deliver
on intangibles723. For example, while FATF had previously only focused on Pakistan’s technical
compliance – that is, the laws and institutions required to regulate the phenomenon – there was
now a series of demands to prove efficacy724. Given Pakistan’s history, a graduated transition
from technical to effective compliance would have been completely understandable. However,
the suddenness of the change suggested that the impetus was more political than regulatory.
Finally, Pakistan was issued a series of extremely tight deadlines to implement changes. Many
believe the timeline is a consequence of the adversarial relationship between the US and
Pakistan725. Take the example of the call to improve inter-agency coordination between
provincial and federal authorities. As discussed below and in Chapter 5, the issue is an
enormously complicated political one involving civil-military relations; federation-provincial
relations; relations between provinces as well as turf issues among state agencies. To expect that
Pakistan could overturn decades of legislative and administrative history to implement
meaningful change within a calendar year was akin to tilting at the windmills. Or, look at the
curiously-worded call to demonstrate that terrorism financing prosecutions result in dissuasive
sanctions. Even if Pakistan successfully prosecuted the Haqqani network, for example, how
would it show that the prosecution dissuaded other militant groups except by a dramatic fall-off
in militant activity? As discussed in Chapter 3, militant groups are essentially political actors, not
economic agents who would conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the risk of prosecution against the
gains of militant activity. Even if Pakistan were to completely withdraw all state support for
militant activity in Kashmir and Afghanistan, it would still not be able to deliver on a call, which
does not recognise the autonomy of militant groups and is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding regarding their motivation.
Unlike the previous grey listing which accommodated Indian influence, the 2018 one is
attributed primarily to the US726. Besides its general desire to run the capitalist system, many
believe the US pressure stems from a diverse mix of objectives: its desire to ‘win’ the war in
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Afghanistan, to justify its $1 trillion outlay on the war and destroy the Haqqani network 727.
Despite everything, they say, Pakistan remains central to these ambitions. However, those closer
to the national anti-terrorism effort contend that the centrality of Pakistan in the fight against
terrorism began shifting between 2011 and 2013 and the current situation is a consequence of
apathy towards Pakistan, its domestic imperatives and particularly, the military’s narrative728.
Simply, the US does not need to keep Pakistan sweet for its Afghanistan effort. However, insist
these commentators, Afghanistan isn’t the only lens and evolving US interests make the Chinese
angle key to a more nuanced understanding of the current relationship between the US and
Pakistan729.
While Sino-Pak relations have historically been strong, China began work on the One Belt, One
Road initiative in Pakistan in 2013 when most foreign investment was dwindling and/ or
confined to portfolio investment. The influx of Chinese monies allowed Pakistan to stay afloat at
a time its relationship with the US was fraying and its access to global capital was consequently
being choked. Since its 2015 acquisition of a warm water port in Pakistan, China has been busy
working on key road, energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan (and in 60 countries)730. The
acquisition of the port sparked US fears regarding militarisation of the port and the expansion of
the Chinese naval footprint in the region731. The 2018 announcement of Sino-Pak military
cooperation added to these fears. According to current plans, the two countries will make a new
generation of fighter jets at factories in Pakistan and Pakistan will also host several satellite
stations key to the launch of China’s Beidou Navigation System732. For Pakistan, the jets will
prove a substitute for the US-made F-16s it is finding harder to buy733. For China, Pakistan is not
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only a large market for arms, it will also serve as a showcase for China’s arms and equipment
building capacity as well as Beidou734. As such, several interlocutors fear that Pakistan and its
economy will become the battleground for the US and China735. Besides this, since the US is also
assiduously courting India as a counterfoil to China, the chances of Pakistan being hit harder on
AML-CTF issues as a result of Indian influence is virtually a foregone conclusion736.
According to an interviewee who led discussions from the Pakistan side, initially, long-term
Pakistan allies China and Turkey (who are FATF members) voted against the move to nominate
Pakistan in 2018 as did Saudi Arabia (which is a FATF observer). However, in a telling example
of how the interaction of powers in global politics determines regulatory outcomes, two of the
three eventually backed down. China was seemingly lured by the prospects of the FATF
presidency737 while Saudi Arabia came back to Pakistan with advice to mend relations with the
US738.
The causes for the flip in the Saudi position are contested and show just how unpredictable
simultaneous power battles at the global and local level can be, especially since outcomes at both
often condition each other. Some argue that the kingdom was peeved at Pakistan’s refusal to join
the Saudi-UAE-Bahrain-Egypt blockade against Qatar in 2017 and/ or Pakistan turning down its
request to send troops to Yemen in 2015739. However, others contend that such a reading is
simplistic and point to the fact that Pakistan had refused similar requests in both 2002 and even
during the 1990s without attracting reprisals from Saudi Arabia740. The difference, they say,
stems from three factors. First, the decision to send troops was turned over to the Pakistani
parliament, which took a very strong and very public position against Saudi Arabia – a reaction
that neither the Pakistani government nor the Saudis expected. The departure from the more
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diplomatically finessed decisions of the past is what is said to have turned the Saudis against
Pakistan and not just Islamabad. The second reason has to do with Saudi Arabia’s desire to
reposition itself globally. Fear of being the next Da’esh target is thought to have pushed the
kingdom even closer to the US, which seemingly conditioned its support on a changed public
policy towards the financing of militancy741. While the kingdom has been inching towards
political and social reform since the beginning of the century742, the move gained steam under
the present King Salman bin Abdul Aziz and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman743. The
prince, particularly, is credited with a deepening of relations with India and Saudi Arabia’s
withdrawal of support for Pakistan at FATF is also partially attributed to India’s influence744. But
in the ultimate analysis, Saudi Arabia is said to have caved in to US pressure745.
The move could not have come at a worse time for the embattled PML-N government. In July
2017, it had lost its prime minister and party chief to the scandal erupting from the Panama
papers. In a bid to downplay the grey listing, in February 2018, the de facto Pakistani finance
minister announced on the floor of the Parliament that Pakistan had successfully emerged from
its previous greylisting and that the latest development would have no significant impact on
Pakistan’s economy. Shortly afterwards, he was publicly upbraided in a meeting by the US
Undersecretary of Treasury746.
Many interviewees feel that improved relations with the US will resolve many of the FATFrelated issues Pakistan is currently facing747. Indeed, other interviewees point to that fact that
Pakistan seems to be the only one among its peers – India and Sri Lanka, for example – that is
being targeted for non-implementation and that too, on very tight deadlines748. FATF, they say, is
741
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being used as a political tool by the US – a technique broadly in line with the coercive economic
measures that the Trump administration seems to favour as a foreign policy tool749. Such a
reading is corroborated by other US moves: in September 2018, the US refused to reimburse
Pakistan for $300 million spent under the Coalition Support Fund head and the US secretary of
state told the IMF to ensure that its bailout for Pakistan would not be used to repay Chinese
loans750.
The political imperatives of the US within the AML-CTF effort, argues one interviewee, can be
gauged by the money laundering case against Pakistan’s largest bank HBL751. In the summer of
2017, the New York Department of State Financial Services presented HBL’s New York branch
with a charge sheet listing 53 suspicious transactions and threatened the bank with a penalty of
$630 million752. The crux of the problem emerged as the correspondent account maintained by
the Saudi bank Al Rajhi753 at HBL. Were the prevention of terrorism financing as critical as it is
made out to be, he argues, the case against HBL would have been a federal one and not pursued
under state law. Other interviewees – especially those who had worked for global banks in the
past – are similarly convinced that FATF is a tool used by the US government against foreign
banks754.
As the above shows clearly, geopolitics drives the enforcement of AML-CTF regulation, not
deviance from FATF policy755. That Pakistan was taken to task by FATF for terrorism financing
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only after its relationship with the US had soured shows that enforcement can be pursued or
deferred according to the political exigencies of key actors. However, the critical point worth
underscoring here is that of relational invisibility: foregrounding one (for example, AML-CTF
regulation or FATF) necessarily backgrounds or ‘invisibilises’ others (here, geopolitics or the
US). While Pakistan deserves a certain amount of blame for its support of militant activities, the
question worth asking is, who does this Pakistan-specific attention render invisible?
The answer becomes clear when one recognises that Pakistan is a beneficiary of terrorism
financing monies, not a source. Foreign funding is a very significant source, if not the primary
one, for most religious groups in Pakistan756. While the government of Saudi Arabia is no longer
directly financing militant groups and Sunni madrassahs in Pakistan, the same are being financed
through charities funded by Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE757. While scholars
have long contended this758, the fact does not receive adequate global attention nor does it trigger
calls for greater compliance with global CTF standards. For example, despite having financed
terrorism in most Muslim countries and having confessed to the same, Saudi Arabia was
accepted within the FATF ranks as a member in 2019759. The decision makes little logical sense
but eminent political, military and economic sense: as a long-term US ally, Saudi Arabia has
historically parked its oil wealth in the US and enjoys exceptionally close economic and military
ties with the US760. Since the US conditioned future support on the cessation of terrorism

of the fact that Pakistan is on the grey list whereas Afghanistan, despite being the theatre of war, isn’t. Interview 6,
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financing, FATF membership for Saudi Arabia was a useful way of demonstrating the same.
(The move has further triggered speculation that the membership was the US quid pro quo for
the 2017 US-Saudi deal, which allowed the Saudi company Aramco to buy Liquified Natural
Gas from the US, or for the “$110 billion arms deal” Trump was eager to claim as his761.) That
said, the US does not seem to expect much AML-CTF compliance from Saudi Arabia other than
FATF membership – an illustration of how economic capital can be converted to political capital
and how the material often guides ideational power. Similarly, FATF also chooses not to enforce
invasive AML-CTF regulation against Saudi Arabia. Critically, FATF’s mutual evaluation of
Saudi Arabia does not even recognise that the kingdom ever funded terrorism762.
In Pakistan too, the specific issue of Saudi funding of terrorism is rarely discussed and Indian
aggression is mostly cited as the impetus for financing militancy. After the terrorist attack on the
Army Public School in December 2014, for example, the government came up with a National
Action Plan against terrorism. However, a journalist who covers parliamentary debates says that
while the legislation contained a clause about funding, it was not debated in Parliament. Instead,
the interior minister told the Parliament he couldn’t say which madrassahs were financed by
Saudi Arabia763. Since the minister was known to be close to the military establishment, the
journalist understood the former’s silence as stemming from the establishment’s aversion to
discussing the issue. According to the head of the parliamentary committee on national security,
the ‘official’ reason given to legislators is that of “maslak” [sect]764. While the reason implies an
affinity among co-religionists – the majority of Muslims in Pakistan are Sunni – this affinity
(imagined or real) is unlikely to be the sole or even the primary reason765.

761

While some argue the deal was originally floated under Obama, after Khashoggi’s death, Trump has faced an
uphill task pushing the deal through Congress. Daniel Flatley, Margaret Talev & Nick Wadhams, “Trump Considers
Emergency to Bypass Congress on Saudi Arms Deal”, Bloomberg (May 23, 2019); online
https://news.yahoo.com/trump-considers-emergency-bypass-congress001623269.html;_ylt=AwrC1C3AR_BcAC8AxAvwFAx.;_ylu=X3oDMTBybGY3bmpvBGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMyBHZ0
aWQDBHNlYwNzcg-762
See the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report on Saudi Arabia, available at https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER-Saudi-Arabia-2018.pdf
763
Interview 10, senior journo. Nasr, on the other hand, argues that madrassahs would not have existed in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, were it not for Saudi organizational and financial funding. Frontline supra note 757.
764
Interview 17, senior parliamentarian.
765
This is because even the Sunnis are divided according to the school of Islamic thought they follow. While the
rifts within Sunni Islam have profound consequences for the politics of the religious groups, vis-à-vis their foreign
patrons as well as their local competitors, a more detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this project.

172

This is because, first, while the Pakistani state has an unstated orientation towards Sunni Islam, it
is officially neither Shia nor Sunni. That said, major Muslim donors such as Saudi Arabia have
personal relationships with the ruling elite in Pakistan766, a fact that engenders a kind of
clientelism that precludes transparency. Second, Pakistan is home to a sizeable number of
Shias767 and has an inglorious history of violent sectarian conflict. Part of the reason to downplay
Saudi funding is likely the fact that the most virulent Sunni militant groups drew their funding
from Saudi Arabia768 and admission of the same would be a betrayal of the unofficial,
unacknowledged sectarian orientation of the state. Third, Pakistan has also become a
battleground for the Saudi-Iran feud for supremacy in the region769. Since the early 1980s, Iran
has also been funnelling money to Shia militant groups and madrassahs in Pakistan770, which has
generated a relatively new wave of Shia militancy. Disclosing the full extent of Saudi funding
could potentially further stoke sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Finally, there is also a political
economy angle: the Pak-Saudi relationship has historically allowed Pakistan to avail of
significant grants as well as deferred oil payments during times of economic sanctions 771 and
Pakistan has cultivated Saudi Arabia as a deep-pocketed, fall-back strategic partner for times its
economy or territorial sovereignty are under attack772. Besides being a significant trading partner,
Saudi Arabia also boasts the largest number of Pakistani workers outside of Pakistan and is, thus,
a key source of foreign remittances773. Further, the military establishment has enjoyed close ties
with the Saudis, providing both training and personnel for the Saudi armed forces, and has been
well-compensated for the same. Finally, Saudi Arabia also happens to have considerable
influence over the UAE, which has ripple effects on Pakistan. For example, the UAE provided
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some of the documents for the Panama leaks, which eventually led to the dismissal of premier
Nawaz Sharif, a key political opponent of the militant establishment774. Besides being a haven
for Pakistani wealth, the UAE is also a significant trading partner775 and the second largest
source of workers’ remittances for Pakistan. The mix of political, economic, ideological and
military imperatives has ensured that Pakistan has never – as one parliamentarian puts it – had
the guts to tell the Saudis to desist from financing terrorism nor has it wanted to talk about the
issue776.
However, geopolitics and relational invisibility are not just limited to terrorism financing
regulation but also feature in money laundering regulation. Some interviewees called FATF “a
white man’s club777” and voiced resentment of the fact that its regulations seem to benefit only
the destination countries, that is, the countries where the illicit funds end up, and that this fact is
largely underappreciated. Many alluded to US hypocrisy regarding its own tax havens and the
CIA’s money laundering using the BCCI in the past778; others pointed to the fact that most tax
havens do not follow FATF rules either779 and further identified the economic benefits of the
AML-CTF regime for these countries. Even those more charitably inclined – or even hopeful –
about the positive aspects of the AML-CTF regime confess bewilderment about implementation
and enforcement strategies pursued at FATF. One interviewee speaks of a FATF meeting where
Brunei was taken to task for its deficiencies, despite its small size and lack of relevance to the
world economy. “I didn’t understand the vehemence of the dressing down or why FATF wasn’t
considering a differential application of FATF standards, given the negligible amounts of money
laundering, crime and terrorism financing in Brunei,” he says. Other participants at the meeting
had no explanations and Brunei eventually agreed to both the technical assistance and the FATF
plan, leaving the interviewee with the distinct impression that the standards “are not just about
financial stability, security, regime strengthening or controls780.”
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On the specific charge of terrorism financing, one interviewee, for example, points to the need
for greater proportionality in assessing terrorism financing allegations. On the one hand, this is
an argument for the problem of Pakistan’s support for militant groups to be seen relative to its
size on a global scale and for a simultaneous investigation of those financing terrorism within
Pakistan781. On the other hand, this is an invitation to see Pakistan as a country comprising
peoples and businesses, all of whom do not deserve to be labelled as “terror-financing, terrorismsupporting” by FATF. The G7 have political, strategic and vested interests, argues the
interlocutor, and the reasons for labelling Pakistan so are also socioeconomic and/or geostrategic.
Instead of attacking Pakistan for non-compliance on specific standards, he says, FATF would do
better to interrogate the causes of terrorism and the causes behind the causes. The example he
chose was of Sri Lanka, which managed to crack down on terrorism without having achieved full
compliance with FATF standards. Similarly, he argued, the core Pakistan-India issue needs
resolution before the issue of terrorism can be put to bed782. However, the more pragmatic lot
contends that both India and Sri Lanka are treated better because they have economic clout they
convert to political power – something Pakistan lacks783.
However, while politics is key to achieving strategic alliances that help condition power, so are
representation and the presenting of a counternarrative to challenge the dominant discourse. An
interviewee who represented the Pakistan government at the FATF meeting prior to the grey
listing said that he was privately commended for his defence by Greece and the UK. However,
he admitted that Pakistan has rarely managed its key international relationships: the negotiators it
sends to such meetings are rarely experienced; the country has not hired good lobbyists or
publicists in the US; nor has it cultivated relationships in Europe. In his reading, Pakistan’s
“ridiculous rhetoric about its ‘sacrifices’” at such meetings tends to alienate others who look at
Pakistan’s previous conduct as well as its broken promises. Instead, he suggests that Pakistan’s
interlocutors explain why so many Taliban live in Pakistan: “Instead of pretending the Taliban
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don’t live here, we need to explain that they have families here; there are tribal links; strong
business ties; many come here for medical treatment784”.
4.3 Domestic politics
The question of domestic sources or centres of power is important because the enforcement of
even global regulation inevitably depends on local histories, laws and institutions. To put it
another way, the global is filtered through the local, is translated by the local before it is
operationalised. While the FATF 40 recommendations are stitched into domestic legislation in
toto and are endorsed by Pakistan – Sassen’s “instantiations of the global” – enforcement
depends on how the domestic centres of power perceive, receive and translate the FATF 40 in
line with their own needs and imperatives and how these centres, in turn, influence the
development of institutions. For example, while Pakistan has a slew of laws and is signatory to a
host of conventions proscribing money laundering, its countrywide conviction rate of illegal
money changers and hundi/hawala operators is less than 17 percent785. Eliminating the practice
requires sustained cooperation among the domestic sources of power (military; political; judicial
etc) as well as state institutions (LEAs; courts etc).
While FATF’s inability to factor in differences in economic systems and business cultures was a
recurring motif786, interlocutors express greater frustration with FATF not even seeking to
understand why the AML-CTF regime in Pakistan looks the way it does. As an interviewee
argues, Pakistan’s performance on AML-CTF needs to be seen in the broader context of civilmilitary relations in Pakistan; the peculiarities of Pakistan’s democracy as well as the wave of
anti-American sentiment in society in the wake of US strikes in Pakistani territory and military
operations in the tribal areas, both of which were later seen as examples of Musharraf’s
subordination to the US787. More simply, Pakistan’s current resistance to AML-CTF controls is
the outcome of older, ossified power contests between and within power sources, at a national
level, a regional level and a global level.
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Take, for example, the 2018 national elections. While political parties from the religious right
had never secured sizeable electoral gains788, the political attractiveness of religious groups for
voters changed with the 2018 elections. An unprecedented number of far-right parties (and even
militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) contested the elections and the
hardline Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) emerged as the third-placed party in several national
constituencies, registering over 42,000 votes in some urban constituencies789. According to one
estimate, each candidate for the 336-seat National Assembly needed a minimum of 200 million
rupees ($1.4 million) in campaign finance790. While the estimate is a general comment on
electoral expenditure in even developing countries, it also speaks volumes about the amount of
funding available to religious parties and militant groups. There are reasons these groups draw
funding from both domestic and foreign sources; there are reasons these groups are now pulling
voters. The charge that the Pakistani ‘state’ wilfully and obdurately supports terrorism financing
is based on a concerted refusal to recognise these reasons, let alone understand the imperatives of
the power centres that guide them.
There are two important caveats here. First, like states, the needs and imperatives of each power
centre are complex, multifactorial and formed in interaction with multiple constituencies. Take
the military, for example. To conduct its proxy wars in Kashmir and elsewhere, the military
needs militant groups to provide fighters as well as religious groups who will indoctrinate them.
However, to preserve institutional legitimacy within a civilian population terrorised by militancy,
the military also needs to demonstrate the will and capacity to take on militant groups. There are,
further, elite constituencies within the military such as the officers’ cadre who draw the lion’s
share of the military’s institutionalised corruption and, as such, have an interest in appeasing the
US as a key military ally791. But even the non-elite constituents – the rank-and-file soldiers –
require appeasement through the provision of, for example, subsidised food rations; utilities and,
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post-retirement, jobs in the private sector792. The needs and imperatives of the military, as a
source of power, are necessarily informed by each of these factors – military, political and
economic – and the interests of each of these constituencies.
Second, the needs and imperatives of a power centre are also conditioned by its interaction with
other centres of power, both in real time and in a historical context. To continue with the above
example: since Partition, war with India has been the raison d’etre of the Pakistan Army and the
spectre of war, its justification for predominance. To preserve this dominance and maintain its
right to define ‘national interest’, the military needs to undercut potential challengers such as the
political class as well as the judiciary. However, to maintain the illusion of democracy and rule
of law for both its Pakistani and foreign publics, it also needs for the political and judicial groups
to be perceived as (somewhat) legitimate and independent.
The study of AML-CTF regulation as a technique of power is fascinating precisely because it
demonstrates, first, this balancing, rebalancing and repositioning both within and between the
sources of power. Second, it also explains the unpredictability of outcomes in the interaction of
powers. Just as the US simultaneously wants and doesn’t want AML-CTF regulation on the
global stage, the military establishment also wants the regulation to deploy against political
opponents while protecting its favoured militant groups from the same. And while the political
class may resist the regulation due to its potential for abuse, they can also see its potential as a
check on the power of the military to conduct proxy wars and, as a corollary, the righting or
rebalancing of the civil-military imbalance.
This section takes up the three main sources of power793 and describes this reflexive interaction.
Military power
The military establishment or the Deep State is, of necessity, a key actor within the Pakistani
AML-CTF project. This is because, first, the military establishment has been a key player in the
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Pakistani polity since 1953794 and continues to shape both internal and external policies. While
the fact has been more obvious under military rule, even civilian rule has been subject to and
conditioned by the military establishment. Second, as the sole driver of the country’s foreign
policy (especially the use of militant groups as a tool of foreign policy)795, the military
establishment is completely invested in the implementation – or the lack thereof – of AML-CTF
regulation in the country. Third, the military establishment remains the sole arbiter of the
country’s national security, including conflicts with domestic groups796. Since the political
fallout from the use of military force in the restive Balochistan province under Musharraf, the
military establishment has begun using sectarian militant groups against sub-nationalist militant
groups as well as some political adversaries. This strategy further reduces any desire to clamp
down on the financing of militant groups797.
All interviewees concede that the Deep State is the most significant impediment to the
meaningful implementation of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan. Even as it proceeds with an
overenthusiastic anti-money laundering campaign against politicians, the Deep State maintains a
cavalier disregard for all other launderers as well as financiers of militancy despite increased
pressure from both the US and FATF798. The reasons are said to be a mix of political, economic
and strategic ones. This is not to suggest that the relationship between militant groups and the
military establishment is uncomplicated: since Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terrorism
and a 2007 military-led operation against a madrassah in Islamabad, even the Deep State has
been subjected to several attacks by militant groups in retaliation for its ‘betrayal’ of the militant
cause799. While many had hoped that the horrific attack on the Army Public School (APS) in
Peshawer in December 2014 that killed more than 150 people, including 132 children, would
prove a turning point for the thinking within the Deep State, reports from the field indicate
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otherwise. Instead, argue many, APS was used to provide political cover for selective operations
against only some militant groups active in Pakistan; the ones active in India and elsewhere were
left untouched800.
Meanwhile, the military establishment continues to deploy its ‘good Taliban’ versus ‘bad
Taliban’ and “strategic assets” narrative801. In 2017, for example, the military brought forward
the notorious militant Ehsanullah Ehsan, once the spokesperson for the militant group Tehreek-eTaliban Pakistan and the man who had confessed to having shot teenager activist Malala
Yusufzai in the head in 2012, and presented him to the media as a “misguided youth”. Ehsan,
said the military, had been led astray by “the enemies of Pakistan” but had since realised the
error of his ways and surrendered to the security forces802. The obvious strength of the
relationship between the Deep State and militant groups also shows up elsewhere. A journalist
who covered the 2005 earthquake relief effort, for example, remembers having travelled in
military helicopters with “LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba] boys”. “They were dropped off at the PakistanIndia border and for days, border security was in the hands of non-state actors because the army
was busy helping earthquake survivors,” he says. The story shows a deep institutional
dependence on proxies, which is further corroborated by accounts of Pakistani militants from
Peshawer fighting International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Kunduz and Mazare-Sharif in Afghanistan. While these militants are called ‘terrorists’ in public, say observers, they
are also accorded well-attended public funerals. As such, the militant groups need to be seen for
what they are: state-sanctioned, judicial and political groups as well as security agencies803.
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Both points – institutional dependence as well as public approval – are key to understanding
Pakistan’s resistance. The evolution of the military from benefactor (that is, as one of the
‘creators’ of proxy groups) to beneficiary (that is, in terms of its institutional dependence on
them) is an example of how different imperatives cause a reflexive internal transformation within
a source of power. More simply, the shift was caused by the tempering of the military’s strategic
and economic interests with its institutional interests. Meanwhile, the increased influence of
these proxies on the decisions of the military shows how even a non-elite group with only a
claim to ideological power can find, to paraphrase Sassen, puissance in its encounters with power
over time. Till 1970, for example, religious parties had never won more than 1/10th of the
popular vote. However, they rose in importance as a pressure group as a consequence of the
breakup of the country in 1971; prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s invocation of “Islamic
socialism” as a populist strategy; president Ziaul Haq’s avid courtship of religious parties as
political allies804 and, finally, the creation of militant groups.
This influence as well as the institutional dependence on proxies – as fighters in Kashmir, as
quasi-judicial authorities elsewhere, as aid workers across Pakistan, as political challengers to
established political parties (discussed below) – reduces the chances of a crackdown by the Deep
State. Meanwhile, the success of these proxies in some roles (for example, in relief efforts in the
wake of natural disasters; as quasi-judicial authorities or even as the ‘voice’ for a politically
underrepresented group) has also won them considerable public approval and, as such,
legitimacy. While many of these ‘successes’ rest on the failures of the state – for example, its
inability to provide cheap and expeditious justice – the larger point is that many proxies are
proving functions and services the state cannot or will not provide.
Significantly, the spokesperson for the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) – the public
relations arm of the military establishment – refused multiple requests for an interview for the
purposes of this project claiming lack of expertise805. However, the institutional dependence of
the Deep State on militant groups is obvious in how the former interacts with and influences both
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Jaffrelot supra note 14 at 11
In a September 2018 exchange over Whatsapp, after vetting the detailed questionnaire, the ISPR spokeperson
initially suggested contacting the finance minister instead and, 10 days later, “the subject expert in the
government”.
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state and non-state institutions in order to protect its interests and its proteges. Of necessity, this
dependence conditions how AML-CTF regulation is undermined in Pakistan.
According to the constitution of Pakistan, terrorism falls under the remit of both the federation
and the provinces806. Besides national agencies such as the Federal Investigation Agency and the
National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), the provincial police departments are also
supposed to investigate terrorism cases. However, in places such as Balochistan, militants are
issued ID cards by their ‘handlers’807 to ‘protect’ the former from LEAs808. FIA officials speak of
Intelligence Bureau- and ISI-mandated “restrictions” in investigating terrorism financing
cases809. Meanwhile, officials at provincial LEAs speak about how terrorism financing
investigations instituted by the Counter Terrorism Departments at the provincial level or the
local police station are either heavily compromised or run aground by the Deep State. The
officers in charge of the cases are either peremptorily instructed to conclude the investigations810
or handlers arrive to secure the release of those arrested by the police811. Even where the
handlers do not compel the release of the militants, police officials say that their presence
encourages militants to defy cooperation with the police812.
In a slightly different variation of this practice of deliberate obfuscation, other issues that ought
to be investigated rarely are – an example of how state inaction is also a manifestation of power.
At the time Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was killed by a drone in southern
Balochistan, for example, he was in possession of a Pakistani passport and ID card. As one
interviewee reasons, neither document was likely to be issued by “a senior clerk at Nadra [the
National Database and Registration Authority] or an official at the passport office”. Transferring
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Article 141-2 of the Constitution of Pakistan; available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part5.ch1.html
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The term is used in Pakistan to describe those officials in the military or intelligence services who liaise with or
‘handle’ key militants or militant groups.
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Interview 17, senior parliamentarian.
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Interview 19, LEA official. Interestingly, he also admits to “very high-level pressure” to build and investigate
money laundering cases against politicians. When asked for details of how instructions are conveyed to the FIA, he
said communication takes place mostly over Whatsapp messages.
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Interview 3, LEA official.
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Interview 21, retd senior LEA official; Interview 3, LEA official; Interview 4, journo; Interview 5, fmr finance
minister. The practice of agency handlers interfering with police investigations started at the height of the terror
war under Musharraf. Even the civilian Intelligence Bureau was politicised and subject to instructions from the
Military Intelligence. Interview 9, retd senior Nacta official.
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Interview 3, LEA official. He was talking about specifically certain members of the Jamaatud Dawa.
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low-ranking officials as ‘punishment’, he says, is a deliberate tactic to deflect attention from the
powers that authorised such issuance in the first place813. Similarly, in 2012, a militant group
mounted an audacious attack on a heavily guarded Nadra building close to several security
checkpoints in Miramshah in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The militants were suspected to belong
to either the TTP or Al Qaeda and made off with computers, printers and several blank ID
cards814. The case was little reported in the local media and investigated even less. In another
instance, the Sindh government identified between 70 and 80 madrassahs that were receiving
foreign funding. Since a ‘foreign’ element was involved, the provincial government could not act
on its own and was forced to refer the case to the federal Ministry of Interior, which chose the
path of bureaucratic inaction815. While the presence of ‘rogue officials’ or ‘militant
sympathisers’ cannot be completely discounted in any of the above cases, the failure to mount
investigation suggests a higher-order complicity.
The Deep State’s influence over other government institutions is as profound but, due to
routinised interaction over a longer period of time – the inculcation of a habitus – is more deeply
embedded into the latter’s work policies and procedures. The obvious advantage is that of
invisibility: the ‘influence’ doesn’t need to be curried through Whatsapp messages or personal
visits because it has receded so far into the background of everyday work processes – an
illustration of how institutions are internally transformed by the interaction of powers. Take the
example of the list of proscribed organisations maintained by the government under the AntiTerrorism Act of 1997. According to the law, the Ministry of Interior maintains the list on behalf
of the federal government; adds names according to a prescribed notification procedure; and
offers the right of review to such organisations816. However, according to a high-level counterterrorism official, the listing procedure is ignored in practice and section officers and clerks draw
up the list as per the instructions of the intelligence agencies817. A former federal minister
confirms that the ISI still authors policy papers on Afghanistan and the Foreign Office has
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Interview 10, senior journo.
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The first review is conducted by the government; appeals are preferred to judicial authorities. ATA 1997,
section 11B; available at https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Anti-Terrorism-Act-1997.pdf
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Interview 9, retd senior Nacta official. Interestingly, he also said he couldn’t remember a single time an
organization had been removed from the list, suggesting that the review process is largely cosmetic.
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learned not to attempt solo flight818. A former official key to the counter-terrorism effort says the
Foreign Office told him to not cooperate with any jurisdiction that materially disagreed with
Pakistan’s definition of terrorism, a circumscription he understood as excluding everyone except
the Gulf countries, and further instructed him to not to work with the UN Human Rights Council
or the UN Office on Drugs and Crime819.
Given Pakistan is signatory to a host of UN conventions, the advice makes little sense until it is
situated in the Deep State’s suspicion of INGOs after the bin Laden operation820. Since 2015,
Pakistan has been tightening regulations regarding INGOs and between 2017 and 2018, expelled
some 45 INGOs for a variety of reasons. These included amorphous charges such as ‘working
against national interests’; undertaking activities beyond their mandate; working in
“unauthorised” areas and wasteful spending on administrative costs821. While rights activists
protested against the expulsions and the deleterious impact on human rights in the country,
successive governments hinted that the aid workers were foreign spies. Since national security
remains one of the military establishment’s key portfolios, the decision is widely attributed to the
Deep State.
In the last five years, even non-state institutions such as the media have increasingly been
subjected to greater control in the battle for ideological power and predominance by the military.
The country’s two largest media groups saw a drastic fall-off in advertising revenues from the
government for challenging the military’s narrative on militancy and journalists of both groups
were harassed by intelligence agencies. The attacks grew more brazen over time: an
assassination attempt on a prominent TV host; the abduction of a woman columnist822; and the
levelling of blasphemy allegations against one group by an establishment-backed news
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channel823. This control is not limited to a broader, macro-level engagement over ‘national
security concerns’: financial journalists working on the FATF story in Pakistan for mainstream
newspapers, for example, also say that their sources within the finance ministry have been placed
under gag orders by the intelligence agencies824.
While institutional practices are worthwhile indicators, the establishment’s true intention
regarding AML-CTF regulation emerges clearest in its interaction with other power actors. This
is because, first, the interaction reveals what Mann calls the functional promiscuity of sources of
power – political, ideological, economic etc – within the military establishment as a power actor.
Second, the interaction captures the relational aspect of power, the fact that sources of power
develop entwined and in tandem with each other. In its FATF-mandated avatar, AML-CTF
regulation would prevent the military from using militant groups as proxies in India and
Afghanistan, thereby reducing one option for regional dominance in the military playbook. More
significant, however, is the fact that the regulation threatens to unravel the enormously complex
relationship the military-industrial complex has with illicit flows825 and thereby undermine its
subjective position in the Pakistani polity. To put it another way: illicit flows undergird the Deep
State’s power as a predominant actor. They bolster the economic fortunes of the military
industrial complex and guarantee financial independence vis-à-vis the civilian government826;
823

Interview 28, senior journo. With the wave of Islamisation across the country, accusations of blasphemy have
frequently led to mob violence and even murder of those accused of blasphemy. As such, the allegations were
read as an attempt to intimidate the group as well as incite violence against its journalists and employees.
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Interview conducted in February 2019.
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Interview 24, senior journo.
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Significantly, the military budget has never been laid before the Parliament for debate – the military typically
issues an ask and the Parliament signs off on the same. However, after the May 2011 raid in the garrison city of
Abbotabad that killed Osama bin Laden, parliamentarians refused to authorize an 18 percent increase in defence
spending and capped it at 12 percent. Since the military was on the backfoot, the cap was accepted though details
regarding defence spending was still not disclosed to the parliament. Kamran Yousuf, “Budget 2011-2012: Defence
spending up by 12%”, Express Tribune (June 4, 2011); online https://tribune.com.pk/story/182147/budget-20102011-defence-spending-up-by-12/. Subsequent attempts by the parliament to force greater transparency and
disclosure were blocked, presumably at the behest of the military establishment. For example, when the
parliament came back with a draft Right to Information law in 2012, the defence ministry voiced strong objections
but stalled on giving feedback for eight months. Qamar Zaman, “Ensuring transparency: Senate panel finalises
draft Right to Information Act”, Express Tribune (June 14, 2013); online
https://tribune.com.pk/story/563038/ensuring-transparency-senate-panel-finalises-draft-right-to-informationact/. Despite the fact that freedom of information is a constitutionally guaranteed right, the current right to
information law in Pakistan is considered both weak and ineffectual, both vis-à-vis the government and the
military establishment. For overviews, see Centre for Law and Democracy, Note on the Pakistan Right of Access to
Information Bill, 2017 (October 2017); online https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/Pakistan.RTI_.Note_.Oct17.pdf and Article 19, Country Report: The Right to Information
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enable the Deep State to forge strategic alliances with sources of ideological power (for example,
right-wing religious groups); and – most importantly – allow it to conduct expensive political
campaigns to undermine potential challengers such as the political class and the judiciary827.
More simply: illicit flows inflate military power by increasing its economic power, which helps
fund its strategic alliances with economic and ideological power as well as its operations to
undermine its opposition (political and judicial power). The loss of this money – as a
consequence of AML-CTF checks – threatens to diminish the military vis-à-vis the other sources
of power.
Take the drugs trade as an example of illicit flows. Pakistan has long been Afghanistan’s conduit
for international trade in poppy, opium and heroin. A former police officer who was deployed in
the Gwadar port area close to the Iran border in 2004 says the ISI backed the drugs trade and
charged smugglers for protecting their routes. This money, he says, was diverted to militant
proxies in Kashmir828. Today, Afghanistan is said to be producing far more drugs than ever
before and the ISAF and Nato forces are uninterested in curbing smuggling, particularly since
CIA proxies are thought to be running 50 percent of the drugs trade in southern Afghanistan829.
In the absence of a viable banking system in Afghanistan, the movement of drugs to Pakistan and
money to Afghanistan – whether routed through Dubai or the porous Pak-Afghan border – means
significant commissions both ways830. Tighter border security and currency controls – as part of
the AML-CTF framework – would then jeopardise this revenue stream for the military
establishment, thereby weakening its hold over power.

in Pakistan (November 2015); online https://www.article19.org/resources/country-report-the-right-toinformation-in-pakistan/.
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Interview 28, senior journo; Interview 30, senior lawyer.
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Others point to the fact that corruption – as a source of illicit flows – is institutionally embedded
in the military, as evidenced by unexplained accounts of its wealth; its corporate holdings and
landholdings831. There are also accounts of problematic and/or curious investments by or on
behalf of the Deep State. For example, the news broadcast channel Bol is widely believed to
have a strong link with the military establishment, including funding832, while the ISI is believed
to have funded, partially or completely, two expensive war films in Pakistan as well as a spy
thriller out of Bollywood, which featured an ISI operative833. Both media can be seen as attempts
to harness ideological power in service of military power. Significantly, most of the information
about this wealth remains beyond public scrutiny. (Even corruption in defence deals rarely
comes to the public eye834 and even when it does, the details are never disclosed.) While the
fillip to the economic clout of the military – and, as a corollary, its power – is indisputable, the
money also reduces the military’s dependence on the state for both funding and the provision of
public services. For example, the business conglomerate Fauji Foundation was expressly set up
to provide for former servicepersons and runs medical facilities, schools, colleges and training
centres835.
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Interview 24, senior journo. The military’s wealth is understood to originally stem from its monopoly over
logistics; the construction of large infrastructure projects and state-sanctioned real estate. The military-owned and
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“Interview: Aamir Khawas”, Aurora (Nov-Dec 2016); online https://aurora.dawn.com/news/1141640. While badly
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However, the most significant advantage of illicit flows is that, first, they enable the funding of
what one commentator calls “political-type proxies836” against political power. Since the 1990s,
the military establishment has been known to fund the electoral campaigns of politicians running
against those perceived as ‘anti-establishment’. In 1990, for example, the ISI raised Rs 140
million to fund the electoral campaigns of Benazir Bhutto’s rival Nawaz Sharif in a bid to
prevent her re-election as prime minister837. For the 2018 elections, the ISI and the army are
understood as having performed the same role for Imran Khan, this time against Nawaz Sharif.
Both the ISI and the army are said to have helped fund Khan’s rallies across the country;
persuaded winning candidates from other parties to defect to Khan’s party; bullied the press to
positively review Khan’s campaign and attack Sharif; and detained, harassed and disqualified
Sharif’s party workers from contesting the elections838. Further, in order to support Khan form a
robust coalition in the Parliament, the army also facilitated the meteoric rise of three political
parties including Hafiz Saeed’s Milli Muslim League; the Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, which has
ties to the Islamic State; and the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan839. The choice of these three was
particularly interesting: not only religious parties have historically performed poorly at the
hustings, the first two have documented links with proscribed militant groups840 while the third
happens to be a far-religious party841. However, the choice validates Sassen’s puissance-inpowerlessness thesis in that these non-elite groups have managed to create a new kind of
political power. Significantly, FATF is said to have raised the issue in a June 2018 letter, where
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it is said to have asked how the Parliament would legislate on AML-CTF issues when proscribed
persons or members of proscribed groups were in Parliament842.
The 2018 elections also featured a more sophisticated political calculus than the 1990 one:
candidates were funded not just on their ability to win outright but also their ability to serve as
‘spoilers’ who would cause the vote to be split between the spoiler and the anti-establishment
candidate and thus (indirectly) secure the win of the establishment-backed candidate843.
(Perversely, the calculus bears out the degrees-of-power thesis where one’s power can be
increased by strategic alliances with other groups but also, as in this case, by promoting ruptures
and cleavages in another’s power and thereby, diminishing their power.) Increasingly of late,
such proxies have also been mobilised to pressure sitting governments: for three successive years
between 2012 and 2014, for example, Pakistani-Canadian preacher Tahirul Qadri led wellattended anti-corruption protests and sit-ins against two successive governments. The military
establishment initially ignored the disruption and subsequently, when the protests turned violent,
offered to mediate in response to the government’s call for military reinforcements844. In
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November 2017, TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi also staged a three-week sit-in in Islamabad
in protest against the Nawaz Sharif government845. The ‘resolution’ of the crisis was also
mediated by the army chief and video footage showed the director general of a paramilitary
outfit distributing cash to protesters, both events confirming suspicions that the military
establishment had encouraged and facilitated the protest against the embattled Sharif
government846.
This ability to co-opt and mobilise the ideological power of religious groups against political
power depends on the military’s economic ability to fund these groups but, as significantly, on
the its own ideological power as well. Given the circumstances at the time of Partition, the
Pakistani ‘nation’ required a greater ideology that would justify the division of the subcontinent
and distinguish ‘Pakistanis’ from Indians (and, subsequently, from the West). Simply, the new
nation needed an identity and the logical one was a ‘Muslim’ identity. Inevitably, Pakistan’s then
poorly-resourced military also drew on this collective identity formation exercise to make up for
the deficiencies of its troops and arsenal847. Pakistan’s current ideology, or what differentiates it
from others on the global stage, is predicated on this historically derived Muslim identity as well
as its nuclear capability848. Since the military establishment retains control over Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and the Muslim identity of the armed forces was reinforced during the 11 years
of Ziaul Haq’s rule, the military establishment thus imagines itself to be the embodiment of the
ideology of Pakistan: beyond challenge or reproach itself but also a logical aggregator for
Pakistani ideology849.
However, this ideological power needs unpacking. First, the ‘exalted’ status as embodimentaggregator is a Weberian myth of superiority, assiduously constructed and promoted by the
military establishment itself, to secure greater legitimacy for itself as the dominant power in
Pakistan. Second, this ideological power also shapes the military’s decision-making. As Mann
contends, the calculation of interests is influenced by all entwined sources of power and involves
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norms that stem from complex attachments to imagined communities of nation. The
embodiment-aggregator myth, as a manifestation of ideological power, is what enables the
military to conflate ‘Pakistan’ with ‘Pakistan Army’ and project the entwined military, political,
economic interests of the military establishment as those of ‘Pakistan’. The project to undermine
political power, for example, is transformed from a for-military project to a for-Pakistan one.
Meanwhile, the availability of illicit monies makes it easier to simultaneously exercise
ideological as well as economic levers against political power850. Tighter AML-CTF controls
thus represent a significant threat to the Deep State’s ability to take down challengers to its
power and, consequently, its existing predominance.
Political power
As acknowledgement of the relational aspect of power, some contend that the civil-military
imbalance and the abiding influence of the Deep State on state policy regarding AML-CTF
regulation owes to the inertia of the other sources of power851. However, in line with Kennedy’s
contention that the positions of power actors are ossified remains of previous battles, realists
point to the inherently fragile nature of political power as collectively embodied by the
parliament. Unless the various arms of the state implement the will of the legislature, they
contend, the difference between the AML-CTF regulations Pakistan endorses and the ones on its
books will remain intact852.
The most significant example of this regulatory schizophrenia is the ‘renaming’ controversy.
Following Musharraf’s proscription of UN-sanctioned militant groups in 2002, many simply
changed their names and carried on with business as usual. When some parliamentarians raised
the issue in Parliament, the military government fobbed them off853. In 2013, the parliament
amended the Anti-Terrorism Act to cover the renamed entities but to little effect854.
Parliamentarians who questioned the Jamaatud Dawa’s impunity were told that the government
was bound by the Lahore High Court verdict in Saeed’s favour. However, the government had
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no answers as to why it had not appealed the decision before the Supreme Court and did not
provide a copy of the verdict to the house till a Senate chairman ruling to the effect. The court
verdict, say parliamentarians, showed that the state never intended the charges to stick since
weaknesses were deliberately baked into the case. As per the Anti-terrorism Act, the government
is meant to notify a person who is placed on the list of proscribed persons. Since the government
had not done so in Saeed’s case, the court was forced to release him855.
The move, say many, is part of a concerted strategy to enfeeble and delegitimise political
representatives and institutions in relation to the military. Historically, moves by civilian
governments to improve Pak-India relations have been torpedoed by attacks in India856. On the
FATF issue specifically, most parliamentarians (and even government officials in key
departments) confessed to a stupefying ignorance857. Despite requests to the government, the
meetings with FATF and the APG are not discussed in the Parliament and most parliamentarians
rely on the media for news about developments including the grey listing itself858. Critically,
even “the government” is often unaware of what is happening: for example, while India was
investigating the attack on its Air Force Station at Pathankot in 2016, it provided certain phone
numbers to Pakistan for further investigation. Recorded debates in the National Assembly and
the Senate show both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempting to
shift responsibility onto each other. Eventually, the interior ministry told the houses that the
“state agencies” were dealing with the issue. However, the intelligence agencies never came to
Parliament to brief the parliamentarians859. The point is critical: the legitimacy or validity of
parliamentary power too rests on its recognition by others; by refusing to submit to
parliamentary scrutiny, the military establishment implicitly eroded the parliamentary claim to
legitimate power.
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Interview 15, senior parliamentarian.
Interview 15, senior parliamentarian. The 2016 attack on an Indian Air Force Station at Pathankot happened
shortly after Sharif invited Indian PM Narendra Modi to Pakistan; the Mumbai attack in 2008 happened a few days
after Zardari committed to a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons and offered trade talks to India; and Kargil
happened after Sharif invited Indian Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee to India.
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Interview 17, senior parliamentarian; Interview 16, bureaucrat; Interview 8, senior LEA official; Interview 15,
senior parliamentarian. An official at the FIA endearingly confessed that he and his assistant were both “still
learning” about AML-CTF regulation.
858
Interview 17, senior parliamentarian.
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Interview 15, senior parliamentarian.
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Other than their vulnerability to the machinations and the campaigns of the Deep State,
politicians also admit to fear of the militant groups they are expected to legislate against860.
Further, as money launderers are mostly influential persons – wealthy Pakistanis, big business,
politicians, bureaucrats, military officials etc, many of whom also comprise the Deep State –
they also have a significant influence on both the legislators and the laws they pass (that is,
through state and/or regulatory capture)861. More simply, there is no real drive to legislate on
AML-CTF issues862.
The involvement of these powerful vested interests and/ or influential persons also has a bearing
on how AML-CTF regulation is enforced, thereby re-entrenching established power relations.
For example, when the central bank detected money laundering by PPP chief Asif Zardari in
2015, the case was fast-tracked due to the establishment’s desire to bring Zardari down.
However, the timing of the case coincided with the Deep State campaign to torpedo Nawaz
Sharif’s re-election chances. In exchange for laxity in the money laundering case, the PPP is said
to have collaborated with the security establishment in enfeebling Sharif and expediting his fall
from power863; to deliver their end of the bargain, the security agencies are said to have
deliberately tampered with the evidence and investigations against Zardari864.
Judicial power
According to Mann, judicial power belongs with political power. However, in Pakistan, it
deserves a category of its own. Following from the reasons Mann choses to distinguish military
power from political power865, first, judicial power in Pakistan is both administratively and
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Interview 15, senior parliamentarian; Interview 17, senior parliamentarian. One parliamentarian reports a visit
by LeT members to his house while he was raising terrorism related issues in the Parliament. While the
parliamentarian was not threatened overtly, the visit was meant to be perceived for the intimidation it was.
Another parliamentarian argues persuasively, “Given the current environment in Pakistan, once one has members
of proscribed organisations within the Parliament, even people such as me would self-censor their speech for fear
of being misunderstood and accused of blasphemy. The entire Parliament would be held hostage.”
861
Interview 10, senior journo.
862
Interview 17, senior parliamentarian.
863
Interview 28, senior journo. He is specifically referring to Sharif’s losing Balochistan as well as his two-thirds
majority in the Senate.
864
Interview 10, senior journo. In another interview in August 2018, Zardari’s lawyer said that while Zardari’s case
was being heard by a banking court, the state had not formulated the specific charge of money laundering till then.
Interview 7, lawyer.
865
Mann contends that military and political power need to be seen as analytically distinct since a) military and
political power are administratively distinct; b) military power has some power autonomy; c) some armed forces
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institutionally distinct from political power. Second, the superior judiciary retains significant
power autonomy vis-à-vis political power. This is reflected by both its independence in decisionmaking – especially in cases challenging the government and its administrative apparatuses –
and, more crucially, by judicial appointment processes. Historically, the superior courts had
retained the right to appoint judges. While the Parliament attempted to wrest control of this
process through the eighteenth constitutional amendment, tough opposition by the superior
judiciary led to a compromise where there was a role carved out for parliamentarians but the
judiciary retained the upper hand866. Third, with its independent administration of judicial
enquiry commissions, the judiciary has also carved out spaces for itself insulated from political
power and control. Finally, with the wave of judicial activism seen under former chief justice of
Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the judiciary has ventured into what is a no-go area for
political power: civil-military relations867. As such, judicial power deserves to be recognised as
independent of political power.
The role of the judiciary in AML-CTF cases is significant because the doctrine of separation of
powers868 lies at the heart of the Pakistani constitution. As such, the existing AML-CTF
legislation features the judiciary as a key actor. For example, the attachment of property in
money laundering cases under the Anti Money Laundering Act of 2010 can only be authorised
by the courts; even where an investigation officer finds a property implicated in a case, the court

are not organized by the state; and d) the military can conquer new territory while political power can only rule
within its territory. Mann Vol 1; p xiv
866
The nineteenth constitutional amendment describes a nine- or 13-member judicial commission that selects
candidates for, respectively, the Supreme Court of Pakistan or the provincial high courts. Significantly, the majority
in both commissions is commanded by serving and former judges (six and eight, respectively) with two or three
seats, respectively, reserved for law ministers (federal and provincial, as the case may be) and the Attorney
General of Pakistan. The commission forwards the name of one candidate to an eight-member parliamentary
committee, with seats evenly divided between Treasury and Opposition members, that can only reject a nominee
with a two-thirds majority, for reasons to be recorded in writing. Upon such rejection, the judicial commission will
revert with another candidate. Article 175A, Constitution of Pakistan; available at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part7.ch1.html#f407
867
While Mann was referring to physical territory in his explication regarding military power, analytically, the
analogy holds good for judicial power. With a liberal use of suo moto powers, the Supreme Court challenged the
impunity of the Deep State and attempted to hold it to account for its excesses, especially in cases regarding
preventive detention; the privatisation of state-owned entities by the military government; and, critically the
unconstitutional deposing of judges of the superior courts. For a fuller discussion of judicial politics in the context
of civil-military relations, see Ahmed 2015a supra note 683.
868
This doctrine of constitutional law separates the three branches of government – the executive, the legislature
and the judiciary – so that the power of each functions as a check on the power and excesses of the other
branches. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers
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still needs to confirm such attachment. Similarly, LEAs are expected to file regular investigation
reports to the courts; the accused is afforded a hearing before a judge; and only the court can
order the forfeiture of property and prescribe punishment for the crime869. Similarly, under the
Anti Terrorism Act of 1997, judges are expected to supervise and sign off on various procedural
and investigative processes (including detention orders, attachment of property and financial
investigations) as well as punishments.
After 9/11, the role of judges in ‘terrorism’ cases became particularly significant. Then Supreme
Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry focused on many cases of preventive
detention – more popularly known as ‘missing persons’ cases – and served as a considerable
check on military excesses. While independent judges had taken on the state earlier as well870,
Chaudhry initially became the face of judicial resistance to military excesses due to his singleminded pursuit of such cases as well as his two confrontations with Musharraf871. After
Chaudhry’s retirement, however, the judiciary has not proven such an effective deterrent to
military excesses in terrorism cases, both because of its own enfeeblement at the hands of the
military and the resurgence of military power (discussed below).
Even so, the verdicts delivered by the superior judiciary in cases involving AML-CTF regulation
surprised many. For example, not only did the Lahore High Court twice order the release of
LeT/JuD’s Hafiz Saeed, there are also other judgements where the courts disregarded the
objections of the Election Commission of Pakistan and allowed the electoral candidature of
members of proscribed organisations or of those on the terrorism watchlist. Significantly, the
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Interestingly, the FIA identifies the supervisory role assigned to the courts in investigations to be a major
“shortcoming” of the Anti Money Laundering Act. Document given by the FIA; on file with author.
870
See, for example, Mazharuddin vs The State 1998 P Cr L J 1035, in which the Sindh High Court departed from
the British precedent on remedies in preventive detention cases and awarded the detenue compensation for
having been deprived of his rights to liberty and human dignity; the view was subsequently ratified by the Supreme
Court.
871
The arc of this resurgent judicial power was eventually arrested by Deep State-mounted smear campaigns
against Chaudhry as well as public criticism of his hyper-aggressive brand of judicial activism. The first showcases
the transformation of a power source as a consequence of the interaction with the other sources of power; the
second shows the reflexive internal transformation within a source of power as a consequence of the interaction.
See Ahmed 2015a supra note 683 for a more detailed analysis of the power politics of this judicial-military
encounter.
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judiciary disallowed the candidature of several politicians from the mainstream political party
PMLN, including Nawaz Sharif himself872.
Some attribute the decisions to a general attrition in the quality of judges. The Iftikhar Chaudhry
brand of judicial activism in the noughties, they say, sowed the seeds for the present atmosphere
where some judges now feel empowered to wilfully pursue their own “agendas” with a cavalier
disregard for law, precedent and convention873. Others, however, point out that the release of the
JuD chief had more to do with the government than the judiciary. To authorise Saeed’s
detention, they say, the courts needed both for the government to have followed proper
notification procedure as well as the presentation of evidence against Saeed. Since the state –
whether of its own volition or under pressure from the military – failed to deliver on both counts,
the courts were forced to let Saeed go874.
Yet others corroborate such a reading and point to the other ways judicial decisions are
manipulated by the Deep State in AML-CTF cases. In corruption cases against Politically
Exposed Persons, for example, the Deep State uses the judiciary for political victimisation by
influencing both outcomes875 but also the way the case is conducted in court876. In the Nawaz
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Maria Abi-Habib, Shah Meer Baloch & Zia-ur-Rehman, “Violent Extremist or Political Candidate? In Pakistan
Election, You Can Be Both”, New York Times (July 17, 2018); online
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/world/asia/pakistan-election-extremists.html
873
Interview 30, senior lawyer. Another interviewee offers the example of an Islamabad High Court judge who
delivered a verdict demanding that all TV channels play the azaan [Muslim call to prayer] during regular
transmission as well as that of a ‘raid’ on a hospital by the Chief Justice of Pakistan. Interview 17, senior
parliamentarian. In the latter case, the CJP had paid a surprise visit on a politician under trial for corruption who
had been transferred to the hospital. The judge was there ostensibly to determine whether the prisoner was faking
illness to avoid jail – theoretically a task that belongs to the executive. When the judge discovered three bottles of
alcohol in the room, he ordered the removal of the prisoner back to jail. Shafi Baloch, Raza Jafferi & Imtiaz Ali,
“Sharjeel Memon sent back to jail after 'liquor bottles' recovered from hospital room ”, Dawn (September 1,
2018); online https://www.dawn.com/news/1430344
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Interview 15, senior parliamentarian.
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Interview 17, senior parliamentarian; Interview 22, rights activist; Interview 7, lawyer; Interview 30, senior
lawyer. Further corroboration of these accounts comes from a judge of the Islamabad High Court Shaukat Iqbal
Siddiqui who, in 2018, publicly denounced the ISI for pressuring the courts and tampering with the cause lists to
convict Nawaz Sharif and his family ahead of the elections. See also Maria Abi-Habib & Salman Masood, “Military’s
Influence Casts a Shadow Over Pakistan’s Election”, New York Times (July 21, 2018); online
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/world/asia/pakistan-electionmilitary.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer.
876
For example, judges can authorise a state-led petition (vide agencies such as the Federal Board of Revenue or
the National Accountability Board) to transfer a case from a particular accountability court to another with more
establishment-sympathetic judges or by choosing to hear such a transfer petition before hearing an appeal to
overturn a conviction by a lower court. Interview 30, senior lawyer.
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Sharif case, for example, the establishment is thought to have leaned on NAB to move a petition
against the granting of bail on medical grounds to Sharif877. The Deep State’s influence extends
to even the composition of benches hearing particular cases878 as well as the transfer of judges879.
The reasons for the judges’ susceptibility are manifold: some judges are understood as either proestablishment in their personal orientation or survival oriented in that they have decided not to
challenge the army880. While some are susceptible to bribery881, yet others are believed to be
vulnerable to reputational risk882. For example, in the Siddiqui case, his accusations against the
ISI were countered by the institution of corruption charges against him by the Islamabad High
Court chief justice883. Similarly, when a judicial commission set up to investigate the role of the
state in orchestrating the TLP sit-in against Nawaz Sharif in 2017 criticised the role played by
the intelligence agencies in politics and suggested greater accountability for them, the lead author
was subjected to a vicious campaign by social media trolls884, which was followed by calls for
his removal from the Supreme Court885.
Others point to a broader ideological shift in the judiciary as a consequence of the Islamisation of
Pakistani society. Judges are more likely to be lenient with militant groups such as LeT, they say,
because of their own religious affiliations886. There is also an increasing sense of fear among
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Omar Farooq Khan, “Pakistan SC grants ex-PM Nawaz Sharif bail on medical grounds”, Times of India (March 26,
2019); online https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-sc-grants-ex-pm-nawaz-sharif-bail-onmedical-grounds/articleshow/68580781.cms
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Interview 30, senior lawyer. He is specifically referring to the composition of the Supreme Court bench formed
to hear the Panama Papers case against Nawaz Sharif and the exclusion of a judge who was thought to be proSharif.
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Interview 15, senior parliamentarian.
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Interview 30, senior lawyer; Interview 15, senior parliamentarian; Interview 7, lawyer.
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Interview 7, lawyer.
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Interview 30, senior lawyer.
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Siddiqui was due to retire late in 2018 and a positive determination in the corruption reference would have
affected his pension. The move was seen as a bid to convince Siddiqui to resile from his earlier statement about
the role of the ISI in the Sharif conviction. Interview 30, senior lawyer.
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Social media trolls are a relatively new feature in the Deep State arsenal. For the last five years, journalists
critical of the military establishment or its narrative report concerted and coordinated attacks by scores of trolls,
the identity of whom cannot be verified independently.
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I. A. Rehman, “Justice under attack”, Newsline (May 2019); online
https://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/justice-underattack/?fbclid=IwAR2Yw42USVPMthfoj_APBdSx6lqqZV15qPXGYeImzJiiEmZlMEoS3JUDUVk
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Interview 22, rights activist. As an example of this shift in ideological moorings, he points to former CJP Iftikhar
Chaudhry’s decision to preside over his own son’s case in a clear conflict of interest, compounded by a bizarre
twist whereby Chaudhry swore on the Quran that he had no knowledge of his son’s shady business activities.
Chaudhry later recused himself from the case after the conflict-of-interest issue played out further. See also Jon
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judges while adjudicating cases against militants. In 2011, the governor of Punjab Salmaan
Taseer was assassinated by one of his own bodyguards Mumtaz Qadri, who interpreted Taseer’s
show of support for a Christian woman accused of blasphemy as blasphemous conduct in itself.
At each court appearance, throngs of religious groups would shower the convicted bodyguard
with rose petals. When the high court eventually convicted Qadri, it chose to do so under the
criminal code, instead of the Anti-Terrorism Act, a decision attributed to the judges’ fear of
Qadri’s supporters as well as pressure from the Deep State887. According to several senior
lawyers, judges typically ‘sit’ on such cases till they find a technicality to exonerate the
accused888. Till the Musharraf era, say these lawyers, the judges in the trial courts would cede to
personal threats by militant groups and convict those accused of blasphemy. While the superior
courts would reverse the convictions, now the fear is said to have moved up into the superior
judiciary too889.
The foregoing would suggest that the judiciary no longer deserves the label of an independent
power source and that it is – whether due to the machinations of the Deep State or its self-interest
– essentially speaking for the Deep State. However, this would be an unkind and flawed
assessment. The strategy pursued by the Deep State serves as a particularly interesting example
of how the military, as a source of power, develops entwined with political and judicial power.
Post Musharraf, the political climate in Pakistan became inhospitable for overt military
domination. As such, the military establishment needed the judiciary to both serve as a fig leaf
and to legitimate its witch hunt against political power. By deploying military power against the
judiciary, the Deep State effectively mobilises judicial power to undermine political power. Not
only does the strategy enfeeble both judicial and political power by attacking their independence
and damaging their claims to legitimacy, it also pre-empts a strategic alliance between the two
that could target military power. That said, the point that deserves underscoring is this: as Mann

Boone, “Pakistani chief justice's son accused of taking gifts to influence father”, Guardian (June 12, 2012); online
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/12/pakistan-chief-justice-son-gifts.
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Interview 30, senior lawyer. Under the Pakistan Penal Code, the victim’s family can choose to pardon the
murderer in exchange for diyat [blood money]. At that point, the state drops its charges against the convict too.
While Taseer’s family was also pressured to accept diyat, they refused to do so and Qadri was eventually hanged.
However, his ‘supporters’ deemed him a martyr and accorded him a public funeral and a mausoleum befitting one.
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Interview 30, senior lawyer. As evidence, he points to fact that no senior leader of the notorious militant group
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan has ever been convicted.
889
Interview 30, senior lawyer.
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contends, there is no primacy among powers; there are only multiple, overlapping and
intersecting networks of power. Accordingly, even a puissant military still needs judicial power
to legitimate and buttress its hold over power and still needs political power to serve as its face.
Were either judicial power or political power dependent on or subordinate to military power,
they would not be capable of performing either function.
4.4 Conclusion
Despite FATF’s insistence on the inherent salubriousness of its 40 recommendations, the
trajectory of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan is a clear indication of the centrality of politics to
the entire exercise. The US (and FATF, by extension) continued to ignore Pakistan’s
transgressions while it suited them and chose to enforce implementation only after the Pak-US
relationship had soured. The depth of the enforcement effort obviously underscores the fiction of
sovereignty at international law: despite being a sovereign country, Pakistan is clearly not free to
decide whether or how to implement AML-CTF controls. More problematically, however, it
shows the present AML-CTF regime’s failure to appreciate both history and politics and its hamhanded approach to resolving complex issues, which ends up pushing them further under the
carpet. In Pakistan, for example, unless the Deep State’s motivations for financing militant
groups are recognised and addressed, ‘global crackdowns’ on terrorism financing will result in
cosmetic changes that will do little to root out terrorism. Further, this regulatory myopia will
only succeed in facilitating selective crackdowns on some militant groups while perversely
enfeebling the military establishment’s opponents, be they political or judicial. That is, the
enforcement of global regulation is inadvertently strengthening the existing hegemon in Pakistan
by allowing it to cripple other sources of power. This will have profound consequences in the
long-term for both Pakistan as well as the region; many of these are manifesting themselves
already.
But the other argument for a reassessment of the current AML-CTF regulation is a careful
consideration of its perverse effects. There are obvious compliance costs; costs for the political
economy and enhanced regulatory burdens for underfunded government institutions and LEAs.
But there are also less tangible costs: in a ‘broken’ democracy such as Pakistan’s, can citizens
afford the consequent alienation from politics and political power that AML-CTF regulation
represents? Where the Deep State has long monitored the lives of citizens, can a polity afford
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deeper intrusions and invasive surveillance of their financial dealings? In the absence of a viable,
workable social contract, can citizens survive a FATF-mandated policing of all by all. The next
chapter speaks to these issues.
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CHAPTER 5: Looking backward to look forward: assessing the consequences of the AMLCTF regime in Pakistan
A persistent feature of the global anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing regime
is the Armageddon-like imagery deployed by its supporters. Failure to implement appropriate
controls, it is said, will result in a veritable tsunami of criminal activity that will drown the global
financial system. However, the collective hysteria engendered and perpetuated by this discourse
pre-empts a more sober calculation of the problems or consequences associated with the
implementation of AML-CTF controls. This chapter looks to supply that deficit.
Following from the categorisation of harms perpetrated by the global AML-CTF regime in
Chapter 3, this chapter also segregates the consequences or effects of global regulation into three
sets based on their point of origination. The first are the consequences stemming from the flaws
in the AML-CTF conceptual framework. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, terrorism
financing regulations don’t work because they are predicated on a misunderstanding of the
nature and the processes of financing militancy. The second set are the problems specific to the
structure of an economy and its polity. These include, obviously, the economic costs of
compliance as well as non-compliance. The third set of effects are what may be euphemistically
called ‘collateral damage’. These are the inadvertent, perverse, political costs imposed on a
polity by the interplay of global and local forces on the terrain of AML-CTF regulation. The
chapter discusses the originary activity that triggers each of these sets.
This chapter uses the fieldwork conducted in Pakistan to illustrate the problems identified in the
secondary literature. Significantly, many of the illustrations throw up additional layers of
complexity not captured by the secondary literature but which have critical and far-reaching
implications for the study of the global AML-CTF regime. This is because, first, the fundamental
conceptual issues that plague the global AML-CTF regime or the inadvertent political costs of
implementation apply in Pakistan as they do elsewhere too. For example, the inadequacy of
global AML-CTF regulation in arresting terrorism (or even the financing thereof) is a global
problem890. While there are some cultural and country-specific differences – for example, a
militant group in Karachi runs banquet halls and restaurants891 – these are often the manifestation
890
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See, generally, Biersteker & Eckert supra note 365.
Interview 25, journo.
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or localisation of a global trend (such as the running of legitimate businesses by militant groups)
that global AML-CTF regulation is incapable of addressing. To put it another way: the failure to
shut down the banquet halls as a source of terrorism financing is not a jurisdictional law
enforcement failure per se but an example of how global regulators set up this failure with their
original sin of mischaracterising militancy and its funding as a criminal or a regulatory problem
– not a political problem – and layering a series of regulatory initiatives on this broken edifice892.
More simply, AML-CTF regulation fails to check this source of financing because it is not
designed to pick up such issues. Pakistan merely exemplifies these global problems; it is not the
exemplar.
Second, even the consequences specific to Pakistan need to be situated in a wider context. While
it is tempting to conclude Pakistan’s inability to implement AML-CTF regulation owes to the
size of its informal economy, the cash-intensive business culture, political corruption or even
unregulated madrassahs, the more important point is that Pakistan isn’t the only jurisdiction with
such issues. The larger point is that the existing AML-CTF regulation, like global economic
regulation, does not accommodate these differences; instead, it actively seeks to minimise and
ignore difference by foisting regulation that makes little sense in a particular context. For
example, the demand for even tighter controls on bank transfers seems excessive in a country
where only 21 percent of the population owns an account at a financial institution; half the
population is unbanked893; and militancy is financed primarily through cash donations894. To flip
this: does 21 percent of the population merit such regulatory zealotry when militants are known
to avoid the formal banking system altogether?
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FATF encourages countries to evaluate businesses that they suspect of being abused by terrorist organisations
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The disconnect between global regulation and ground realities is not new: much of the critical
literature regarding the Washington Consensus, for example, made a powerful case for nuanced
policy prescriptions that accommodated the differences inherent between jurisdictions895. That
said, this literature was predicated on the considered and considerable documentation of what
Halliday et al refer to as the public or private “bads” or adverse consequences of a regime. As
they rightly note, the FATF regime has proceeded as if it does not produce any bads896. While
the critical AML-CTF literature features some assessments regarding harms897, these are mostly
framed as generic issues or ‘developing world’ issues and remain peppered over the literature.
Critically, these assessments are never mounted as a systematic critique of the AML-CTF
regime. This haphazard focus on the harms – both real and potential – precludes serious policy
prescriptions regarding AML-CTF regulations (such as the ones made regarding economic
regulations)898. While there is a strong general argument to be made for more nuanced financial
regulation, a discussion about ‘Pakistan-specific problems’ is interesting because it shows how
financial regulation – through AML-CTF controls – is replicating the mistakes of economic
regulation.
Finally, Pakistan’s resistance to AML-CTF regulation – or what Sharman & Mistry call lack of
“local ownership899” – needs to be viewed in light of these very significant economic, political,
ideological and even sociological challenges. The representation as Pakistan as a ‘deviant’ needs
to be recognised as an attempt to diminish the import and validity of its domestic imperatives.
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5.1

Conceptual problems

All interviewees who have studied money laundering and terrorism financing during the course
of their work agree that the existing regulations are entirely inadequate to impeding, let alone
arresting either phenomenon. The core issue, as ever, is the global regulator’s fundamental
misunderstanding of the issues involved.
Take, for example, the centrality of banks to the AML-CTF effort. Given FATF’s emphasis on
the collection of copious amounts of data regarding clients, the responses of bankers are
particularly instructive. Significantly, none of the bankers see the greylisting as anything other
than a political move by the US; the primary problem, all agree, is the transhipment of drugs
from Afghanistan and the Pakistani state’s policy regarding militants900. More interesting,
however, is how many see their own role: as one former compliance head for the Middle East
and North Africa region for a global bank remarks cynically, given the volume of illicit funds
circling the globe, the banking industry is better equipped to deal with the problem than any
other901. The observation makes intuitive sense: banks represent an easier regulatory target in
that the enhancement of regulation has not required a widespread political consensus. Further,
and perhaps more significantly, the regulation has been successfully operationalised without
having a completely chilling effect on money laundering activity – an objective dear to some
regulators902. Indeed, as some point out, the existing AML-CTF regime is completely slanted
towards rich countries in the West in that the point of origination of money laundering is being
targeted as opposed to the destination jurisdictions903.
The argument is an indication of the material aspects of power as compared to its ideational
aspects and cuts to the heart of matter identified by several AML-CTF critics: the lack of
corporate (and political) will in impeding money laundering and the regulator’s failure to admit
this. Banks make money from money; more is more. Like their counterparts all over the world,
bankers in Pakistan look to meet performance targets that are linked to deposits904. While
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compliance heads may wish them to focus on target markets with clean sources of funds905, most
bankers end up chasing fund volumes irrespective of the source of funds. Even the stringent
complexity of AML-CTF reporting regulations is largely ineffective: the bank account opening
form in Pakistan, for example, is a dense 16-page document that relationship managers usually
end up filling out themselves instead of asking the clients to do so. As a consequence, the bank
knows even less about the client than it claims to906. Further, there is institutional segregation of
the boots-on-ground bankers and those responsible for effecting AML-CTF compliance, with the
former often pushing the latter for quick approvals without meaningful evaluations907. As one
banker argues, since the compliance people mostly shuffle paperwork and rarely meet clients,
they don’t learn to mine inconsistencies between the client’s profile and their paperwork908.
There is also widespread resentment over the AML-CTF push from the State Bank of Pakistan
(SBP). Bankers say that the banking regulator is focused on ‘proving’ to FATF that the sector is
AML-CTF compliant and chooses to ignore the fact that capacity constraints make achieving
compliance extraordinarily difficult for most banks909. These constraints travel upwards to the
regulator too: in 2017, when a US regulator detected money laundering by HBL, Pakistan’s
largest bank, Pakistani politicians placed the onus on the SBP for not knowing about HBL’s
activities. However, bankers point to the fact that SBP was largely uninterested in knowing910.
Even the LEAs, they say, mostly collect evidence for political leverage, not prosecution; one
banker confided that the earliest request for information from an LEA to his bank was made in
2004 – much before Pakistan was greylisted911. The anecdote further confirms how AML-CTF
905

Interview 2, senior banker.
Interview 2, senior banker.
907
Interview 20, senior banker. He uses the specific example of Citibank, saying the problem was endemic in the
US as compared to Europe.
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when a company reports 20 percent export growth at a time when most exports from Pakistan are recording
negative growth. The discrepancy, says the interviewee, needs to be mined further to discover whether the export
figures are accurate or the business is a front for money laundering.
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of the bottomline for on-going compliance. Interview 2, senior banker. The figures provide an insight into the
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regulation exacerbates skewed power dynamics in a polity by privileging those who hold power
already.
For their part, SBP officials worry that the “mindboggling level of scrutiny” is increasing
compliance costs besides causing overregulation and micromanagement that will hurt their
financial inclusion targets and, consequently, the growth of the economy912. There is both
significant resentment and exasperation about the fact that FATF and the US, while
understanding that many of the regulations don’t fit in a developing country context, continue to
push for “overregulation”913. For example, while a crackdown on the “460 illegal hundi
operators914” may be desirable from FATF’s perspective, Pakistan’s economy relies on the
annual remittances worth some $20 billion915 and the central bank needs to balance FATF’s
desires with its own needs.
Critically, argue some interviewees, FATF regulations do not acknowledge either real-world
processes or the evolution of laundering typologies – a point often raised in the secondary
literature. Even the FIA – with its limited abilities – readily concedes that it has had to shift its
“traditional focus” from cash smuggling/ hundi/ hawalah/ foreign exchange traders to trade
malpractices (which form the bulk of laundering in Pakistan); commercial bank fraud;
cybercrimes and gifts916. However, they say, FATF still fails to recognise that most of the money
from laundered from Pakistan does not cross borders due to hundi/ hawala, which save
transaction costs, and this fact renders AML-CTF controls redundant917. (While some hundi
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This is because, with banks as intermediaries, household savings help finance the activities in an economy.
Lower savings rates typically increase the dependence of a country on external flows such as debt, foreign aid,
remittances etc. The banking sector in Pakistan serves only six million borrowers (3.6 percent of its population)
while the 25 million depositors account for just 15 percent of its population.
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206

operators in Pakistan use banks for settlement, there are enough creative ways around this
problem too: in the UK, for example, air tickets are frequently used for settlement918.)
The inadequacies of the AML-CTF regime as applicable to banks are far sharper when it comes
to terrorism financing. Many point to the fact that data analysis at banks – as distinct from data
collection – requires the development of typologies predicated on patterns. Since militants and
militant groups do not follow patterns – there are no monthly withdrawals or weekly payments,
for example – identifying suspicious clients becomes that much more difficult919. Further, even
data analysis depends on the quality of the data analyst. The AML-CTF compliance head for a
large bank in Pakistan gave the example of the mandated scrutiny of government-issued ID
documents prior to the opening of an account. A recent case involved accounts where the
accountholder’s ‘residential address’ was a mailing box and their mailing address was a
madrassah. The fact that the accountholder provided a NICOP issued in Saudi Arabia920 as his ID
document rang alarm bells for the compliance chief; however, his data analyst and the banker
who opened the account both failed to appreciate the significance921.
That said, the banks are the least of the problem. Terrorism financing regulation does not work,
say LEAs, because FATF doesn’t understand how the terrorism funding model works. For one,
religiously-motivated terrorism is a cash-intensive business and is not usually conducted via
banks922. Second, terrorism financing draws on multiple sources of funding simultaneously –
some legitimate; others, less so. While crackdowns on the illegitimate activities are possible,
hitting legitimate activities is far harder. Finally, the regulation doesn’t account for reflexive,
internal transformation: how militant groups resist the power of the AML-CTF regime by
devising new financing strategies923.
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Consider all the legitimate ways militancy is financed. After 9/11, al Qaeda spearheaded a shift
towards legitimate businesses that would generate constant income streams924. This was to
reduce the dependence on unreliable funding streams (whether from rich donors or crime), which
were further affected by regulatory crackdowns. In Peshawer, a hotel was said to be a front925;
elsewhere, trading companies were set up to trade commodities including sugar. Some militant
groups set up for-profit schools and hospitals926; one group is said to run 40 textile companies
with multiple contracts from foreign universities for supplying monogrammed T-shirts and
caps927. A militant group in Karachi owns a banquet hall, a restaurant as well as rental properties.
On the side, they also steal water from government hydrants to supply to corporations in an
industrial zone at subsidised rates928. These are in addition to membership fees (especially for
religious groups) and the militant ‘lecture circuit’929. While the sale of jihadi literature was once
a prominent source of funding, technology has been a significant disruptor: militant groups are
increasingly publishing material online. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir, for example, which famously set up
a publishing house in Peshawer in the early noughties930, now sends messages to supporters in
Pakistan via Whatsapp931.
The other major source of legitimate financing is private philanthropy. Pakistan is home to a
multibillion-dollar philanthropic regime – among the largest in the world932. Since this
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Interview 11, security expert.
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philanthropy is rooted in community and religion933, it is relatively difficult to dislodge934. This
philanthropy taps into marginal political groups – ethnic, religious and small nationalist groups.
Some of these groups are neutral in terms of their impact on the state but the largest group
comprise the religious parties (including militant groups) used by the state as an instrument of
foreign policy935. Of the total amount of philanthropy in Pakistan, estimate aid workers, between
one and three percent goes to welfare organisations that are secular in their orientation while
more than 90 percent is diverted to madrassahs, mosques and a few large charities associated
with certain militant groups936. (Sectarian groups are also significant beneficiaries937 as are other
charitable causes938.)
Most of the donations are made in cash, both because of the prevalent cash-intensive culture in
Pakistan as well as the fact that cheques draw a withholding tax surcharge939. As such, many of
the mosques, madrassahs and charities end up ‘laundering’ the private donations – in the sense of
anonymising the origins of the money – before diverting them to terrorism financing940.
(Significantly, none of this money shows up in any trails: even charities that are meant to
maintain financial records are widely known to keep two sets of books: one, for the regulators
and auditors; the other for themselves941.) An interviewee gave the example of a mosque in
downtown Karachi he frequents that has been ‘rebuilt’ three or four times in the last five
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years942. Donations are made by salaried citizens; business owners; expats who send “guilt
money” in sums ranging from $10 to $100 for installing, for example, potable water pumps and
ask for no accounts; and charities943. The Jamaatud Dawa (JuD), for example, maintains donation
boxes on a major road artery in the Punjab, which is thought to yield “millions944”; at mosques
and at shops945. Similarly, a wealthy Karachi businessman ‘donated’ his farmhouse to a militant
group, which ended up becoming a financial asset for the group946. Large businesses are also
known to patronise the militant group Sunni Tehreek (ST); an aid worker who frequents the area
close to the ST madrassah speaks of its “very high, fortress-like walls” and regular visits by
people “in Land Cruisers947”.
Added to these amounts is the politically- and strategically-driven funding from private donors
and charities in Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Iran and the UAE. Through the 1980s and the
1990s, madrassahs were known to supply a steady stream of indoctrinated students for the jihad
in Afghanistan948 but their role in financing terrorism itself was little studied. In 2007, after
Musharraf launched a military operation on a madrassah complex in Islamabad, the true
contribution of madrassahs became obvious949. The amount of money available to madrassahs
becomes apparent by looking at the scale of their operations. According to Abbas, there are
between 30,000 and 32,000 madrassahs across Pakistan, which house, feed and educate over 2.5
million students950. The JuD-operated madrassah at Muridke, a small city in northern Punjab, for
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example, is said to house between 3,000 and 4,000 students951. The Sunni Tehreek madrassah in
Karachi, meanwhile, is estimated to house between 15,000 and 20,000 students952. Ironically, the
most rapid growth of philanthropy-financed madrassahs has been around Islamabad, the federal
capital953. However, this is not to suggest that only private monies fund madrassahs: both the
federal government and the government of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been
known to provide financing for madrassahs, including from the education budget954.
A regulatory crackdown on terrorism financing would, as discussed in Chapter 4, require the
military establishment to surrender its policy of using proxies in India and Afghanistan and a ban
on foreign funding. But the more problematic from an implementation perspective would be
crackdowns on legitimate businesses and private philanthropy. First, the range of businesses
operated by militants do not seem to follow any patterns that would suggest a preference for
certain kinds of industries. How then is the state to practically monitor all businesses across all
industries; weed out the ones that are fronts for militant organisations; and conclusively establish
the same for the purposes of law enforcement955?
Second, notwithstanding the inherent difficulties of preventing philanthropically-minded people
from donating, a crackdown on philanthropy would entail severe social repercussions that the
state is unable to mitigate956. Further, in the last 15 years, Pakistan has witnessed frequent natural
disasters such as earthquakes, floods and heatwaves. In the wake of the 2005 earthquake; the
2008 floods; and even a sectarian attack on a minority community in Balochistan in 2013, for
example, the JuD was very visible – alongside the army – in effecting relief operations957. The
madrassahs, too, feed, clothe and educate millions of children across Pakistan; for many parents,

the madrassahs would have an incentive to overstate their numbers and impact, their estimate is lower than the
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the madrassah is a lifeline preventing the death of their children from malnutrition and
starvation958. Even if it were possible to separate the welfare activities of militant groups from
their terrorism activities, given the dependence of the state as well as citizens on the
philanthropic regime, a crackdown is both impracticable and improbable959. This introduces a
political and economic imperative to Pakistan’s resistance to the AML-CTF effort. Given
Pakistan’s persistent current account deficits, the state is both unable and unlikely to commit to
the additional responsibility of, for example, running ambulances or housing madrassah
students960. Even after a February 2019 ban on JuD’s Falah-e-Insaaniyat Foundation, for
example, the welfare organisation continues to function as before961. However, the current AMLCTF regime does not speak to the political and economic consequences of its regulation.
Even the AML-CTF regulations ostensibly targeting illegitimate or criminal activities are
disconnected from ground realities and, equally problematically, ignorant of both spending
patterns as well as the evolution of funding practices. There are two aspects of terrorism
financing: the financing of militant activities (arms, ammunition, suicide jackets etc) and the
sustenance of the militant network (boarding, lodging etc)962. The volume of money involved
becomes significant when it is the primary motive; as discussed in Chapter 3, militant activities
are mostly cost-effective in terms of outlay. While the former category of expense suggests a
significant, trackable amount, many point to the fact that many militant groups draw on “official
supplies963” by raiding army check posts or Nato supplies for arms and ammunition, for example.
Suicide jackets, too, are mostly homemade, with the most expensive element being the steel ball
bearings, which can be purchased for a few hundred rupees in most hardware stores. Meanwhile,
the network outlay is similarly unremarkable for most militant groups964: since many larger
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groups splintered and shifted to a self-financing model to evade detection, costs have fallen
further965. The theft of two cars, contends one interviewee, is sufficient to sustain a typical group
of seven to eight Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants for a year966. As an LEA official candidly
confesses, the motivation to crackdown on terrorism financing is low because militants generally
live spartan, subsistence existences. How, he asks, can anyone investigate every amount that
ranges from $200 to $400967?
The FATF understanding of funding models is similarly criticised. While kidnapping, robberies,
protection rackets, extortion, and the gems and jewellery black markets are well recognised as
terrorism financing avenues968, none of these involve the use of bank cheques or any financial
instruments capable of being traced via AML-CTF regulations969. While FATF mandates that
gems and jewellery traders report suspicious transactions, it doesn’t seem to appreciate the profit
imperative that undergirds black markets: neither party has incentive to report the transaction970.
Similarly, where the Taliban charge protection money from the US convoys headed from
Pakistan to Afghanistan971, there is neither reporting incentive nor desire to disrupt the
arrangement. Further, funding activities continue to evolve over time: at the height of the war in
Afghanistan, for example, extortion demands made in Peshawer were payable in Afghanistan;
now cryptocurrencies are increasingly being used to pay both extortion demands972 as well as
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ransom, even though there has been a decline in kidnapping as a source973. Meanwhile, a
relatively new trend is the collection of agricultural ‘tax’ by militant groups: the JuD and the
Jaish-e-Mohammad collect the tax in southern Punjab, the JuD and Hizbul Mujahideen in
northern Punjab974. Compounding these problems is the size of the informal economy in
Pakistan975 -- a fact recognised by most interviewees, including government officials 976. In the
tribal areas and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for example, the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan and Da’esh are increasingly turning to saraafs [literally: gold traders] in the informal
economy who trade in gold, operate as money lenders and also hundi/hawala operators977.
While FATF is alive to the issue of virtual currencies, it seems equally resigned to its inability to
nullify the threat they pose. In its 2014 report on virtual currencies, for example, it mentions
three cases that were prosecuted but significantly, omits to mention how the three were detected
or even how future regulation could prevent their reoccurrence978. However, when it comes to
issues such as the informal economy; the emergence of ‘new’ actors such as saraafs; or
innovations such as agricultural ‘tax’, even FATF seems to have no answers.
5.2

Structural problems

The issue of structural problems – or challenges associated with the peculiar structure of
Pakistan’s economy and polity – is interesting because it exposes the futility of pursuing
regulatory harmonisation across differently-situated jurisdictions. Like economic regulation,
financial regulation too needs to be designed with an eye to the existing structure and
sophistication of the financial services industry within the larger political economy. Likewise,
global law enforcement initiatives divorced from local realities such as public funding or
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prosecutorial capacity are inevitably doomed. The current AML-CTF regime makes both these
mistakes in Pakistan.
Economic issues
While the link between money laundering and criminal activities is played up, most interviewees
argue that the bulk of laundering in Pakistan takes place in the informal economy979. Also
referred to as the underground/ shadow/ grey economy, the informal economy refers to those
activities in an economy that are not captured by the GDP of the country. These include illegal
activities (for example, sex work; illegal arms trade etc) but, more importantly, also those legal
businesses that either don’t report or underreport their activities980. In Pakistan, the latter
comprise a much larger proportion of the informal economy than the former. Meanwhile,
estimates regarding the size of the informal economy vary wildly: once understood as half the
size of the formal economy, current estimates range between 91 percent981 and double the size of
the formal economy982.
The centrality of the informal economy represents, at once, both the greatest challenge and
impediment to the implementation of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan983. Partially informed by
culture984 and partially induced by fear of the tax authorities985, cash transactions underpin this
informal economy for the most part. The primary problem with the AML-CTF regulatory
system, argue some, is its patronage of the western banking system through its focus on
formalising existing economic and business arrangements instead of dealing with their informal
nature986. That is, instead of understanding how local systems serve the needs of the population –
in some case, better than Western systems – the regulators would prefer to flatten the distinction
into a ‘universal’ model. To comply with AML-CTF regulation, Pakistan would not only have to
completely overhaul the way its economy works, it would also need to effect cultural changes
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regarding cash transactions as well as tax compliance and rejig its tax and customs machinery
overnight. In many cases, these systems are designed in response to local conditions and
supported by domestic power networks. For example, the city of Faisalabad, a major hub for
textile manufacturing, is also home to the largest yarn market in Asia where goods worth
millions of rupees are routinely bought, sold and traded using chits instead of certified financial
instruments987. Obviously, chits leave neither paper trails nor trigger taxes. In a recent case
pursued by the tax authorities, a business owner was found to be stashing money in lockers: the
man had been in business for 30 years and had been making profits in excess of Rs 3 billion per
annum. According to the official in charge of the investigation, at the time of discovery, the
business owner owned 100 lockers full of cash988. Meanwhile, bankers point to the fact that since
business is routinely conducted on the basis of pre-existing social and professional relationships,
the ‘guardians’ of the system facilitate clients by bending rules989.
As elsewhere, trade-related malpractices are a prominent feature of the informal economy and a
conduit for money laundering, both inside Pakistan and abroad990. Trade over- and underinvoicing are popular, both as a means of avoiding taxes and duties but also for capital flight and
reverse capital flight991. An FIA raid on a foreign exchange company, for example, found that
their clients included fish exporters to China whose payments were cleared through Dubai992.
This was because the exporters were routing consignments to China via Vietnam due to the

987

Personally witnessed by researcher in 2013. The chits are instantly redeemable for cash on demand by the
bearer and are used as negotiable instruments. Interestingly, none of the chits have identifying marks: one chit
worth Rs 5 million was scribbled on the back of the foil wrapping of a pack of cigarettes.
988
Interview 26, bureaucrat.
989
Interview 2, senior banker.
990
See, generally, Passas supra notes 7 and 106.
991
Interview 5, fmr finance minister. While capital flight is primarily channeled through hundi/ hawala; export
under-invoicing; import over-invoicing and smuggling (of precious metals, gems and antiques etc), reverse capital
flight occurs through either export over-invoicing or the under-invoicing of imports with high customs duties. Since
Pakistan’s tax laws provide foreign remittances immunity from scrutiny, theoretically, reverse capital flight could
also be routed through formal banking channels. However, the advantage of import under-invoicing is, first, the
avoidance of import duties; and second, the ability to conceal the illegal capital from tax authorities by investing it
in either the real estate market or the informal economy. Typically, the importer pays for the goods with either
monies stashed abroad or foreign exchange bought from Pakistan-based hundi/ hawala dealers and either buys
land or deploys the goods in businesses in the informal sector. For a valuable overview, see Zafar Mahmood,
“Reverse capital flight to Pakistan: analysis of evidence” (2013) Volume 52; Number 1. Spring Pakistan
Development Rev.
992
Interview 6, LEA official. The use of a foreign exchange company for exports is significant because exporters are
allowed export subsidies and guaranteed better rates of exchange by the State Bank of Pakistan.

216

restrictions posed by the Free Trade Agreement with China. Similarly, most of the $200 million
trade with India is routed through Dubai993.
Significantly, property transactions worth billions of rupees are also routinely conducted on the
basis of cash payments to avoid property taxes994. In the province of Sindh, for example, the
provincial government values properties at one rate while the tax authorities issue a separate,
higher valuation. The market value of the property, meanwhile, is significantly higher than both
since a lower, Federal Board of Revenue-notified rate reduces the tax bill and thereby inflates the
market value of the property995. (Since elected politicians and bureaucrats also benefit from the
arbitrage in terms of kickbacks and commissions, there is little inducement to change the rules of
the game. Further, the nexus between the political and the economic elite also precludes such
change.) In a process that some ironically refer to as the ‘blackening of white money’, a buyer
typically pays the notified rate using financial instruments; the outstanding amount is paid in
cash996. Ironically enough, sellers who insist on payment via registered financial instruments
have a hard time finding buyers for their properties or end up selling it for much less than the
market price997.
Property is also the preferred investment choice of domestic launderers: those looking to launder
the proceeds of crime (corruption; illegal trade etc); those looking to conceal from the tax
authorities money from legitimate sources (whether derived through regular practices such as
business profits or irregular practices such as trade malpractices); and those bringing their
monies back to Pakistan (through reverse capital flight schemes as well as regular banking
channels). This is because the real estate sector is unregulated despite its size – current estimates
range between Rs 6 trillion and Rs 7 trillion – and investment in property is rarely, if ever,
scrutinised. Ironically, enhanced global AML-CTF regulations around the world in the last 15
years have increased the volume of laundering in the real estate sector in Pakistan, accompanied
by a meteoric rise in real estate prices. This is because the tightening of AML-CTF regulations
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abroad convinced many Pakistanis to bring their money back to Pakistan998 and the 2009 real
estate crash in Dubai – a favoured investment destination for many wealthy Pakistanis – further
deepened the trend. Much of this money is now thought to be parked in property schemes across
the country999.
While government officials insist they are working towards greater AML-CTF compliance by
bringing the informal economy within the documented sector1000, these claims are contradicted
by others. The culture of cash is so firmly entrenched, they argue, the market adapts itself to
working around FATF-inspired regulatory crackdowns – an illustration of how the imposition of
power inevitably meets with resistance. For example, the rate charged by hundi operators in
Karachi’s Bolton Market is said to have increased from two percent to between six and seven
percent to absorb the higher payoffs to government investigators and monitors charged with
enforcing AML-CTF regulations1001. Similarly, after the institution of FATF-mandated scrutiny
of foreign exchange companies, many such companies have set up shadow companies and agents
to do the same work but for a slightly higher premium1002. Both examples illustrate how the
regime itself generates a new economic formation of avoidance – like tax regimes everywhere
but also like the evolution of terrorism financing strategies. Since the existing system works to
the benefit of all – the ISI, big business and the ruling elite, for example – there is little incentive
to change1003. To eliminate hundi, for example, not only would the government initially need to
offer a better exchange rate than the hundi operators, banks would need to dramatically improve
both their efficiency in terms of costs and transmission times (that is, the time between
remittance and receipt of monies) but also their outreach in rural areas. Since there is neither
political will nor corporate, this never happens1004. Others hold up the example of the property
market to show how a crackdown on laundering is politically untenable. This is because property
developers in the country – including the two largest: the private-sector Bahria Enterprises and
the military-run Defence Housing Authority – continue to benefit enormously from the
differential rates. Not only would the immensely influential developers – including the military
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establishment – lean or prevail upon lawmakers, government officials and LEAs to either dilute
the regulatory initiative or its enforcement, a crackdown would also squeeze the developers’
profits and, correspondingly, challenge the livelihoods of the hundreds of thousands who rely on
these enterprises for their livelihoods. As such, a crackdown would be politically difficult for any
government to effect1005.
The madrassahs and charities aren’t easy game either. As discussed above, many of them provide
public services the state and citizens have come to depend upon. Compounding this dependence
is the fact that even though religious groups and parties qualify as a non-elite group1006, they still
exercise a preponderant influence on the state. First, close contacts with powerful foreign allies
such as Saudi Arabia protect these religious parties and their leaders from the vagaries of the
state. Second, besides their role in indoctrinating soldiers for jihad, religious parties and groups
have frequently lent their services to the military establishment as political actors to be pitted
against the opposition. In the 2002 elections, for example, Musharraf was able to mobilise a sixparty alliance of religious parties in support of the establishment-backed political party PMLQ.
More recently, clerics such as Tahirul Qadri and Khadim Rizvi have proven key disruptors in the
political arena. In light of these services, madrassahs and militant group-backed charities have
consequently been able to successfully resist all efforts towards mandatory registration1007;
documentation of their finances1008; and even curbs on their activities.
Interestingly, even the drugs trade is mostly beyond the pale of AML-CTF regulation. This is
because the material often trumps the ideational aspect of power. The war-ravaged Afghan
economy is producing far more drugs than ever before1009 and given its lack of a viable banking
system, Pakistan remains its conduit to the international market1010. According to an LEA official
who has worked in Peshawer, the drugs trade in the city alone is worth $2 billion per annum and
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close to $1.5 billion are laundered in the city annually1011. Further, the drugs trade is governed by
multiple power centres spanning both the global and the local. And so, while FATF may agitate
the issue of cash smuggling, interviewees recount anecdotes of cash being smuggled across the
border in cars and planes1012 or being routed via Dubai1013. In January 2019, a cash courier was
discovered to have been provided the cash by LEAs personnel in the departure lounge of an
airport, after he had crossed the security checkpoints1014. Even senior officials of LEAs admit to
helplessness when it comes to sealing the porous Pak-Afghan border, particularly when the
military establishment is also known to protect smugglers1015.
Political issues
There are also structural problems specific to the polity that hamper the implementation of AMLCTF regulation, the most important being the federal-provincial divide on the issue of terrorism.
Since the constitution assigns responsibility to both the centre and the provinces, there are
invariably differences in relative priorities and implementation. For example, the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa government is seen as sympathetic to militants1016 and the Punjab government is
also generally perceived as being soft on militants1017. Similarly, when the Sindh police
identified foreign funding of 70-80 madrassahs, foreign policy exigencies forced the province to
defer to the federal government, which chose to sit on the issue till it went away1018. The
devolution of power onto the provinces is cited as a key reason for Nacta’s ineffectiveness1019:
instead of developing a coordinated, national strategy to combat terrorism, Nacta ends up
liaising and negotiating between the provinces and the centre.
The divide has a significant bearing on interprovincial relations. Police officers in Sindh, for
example, complain that sectarian militants from the Punjab are dispatched to Karachi in Sindh to
commit crimes and flee back to the Punjab. While relations between the two provinces have
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always been tense due to fights over water and federal revenue allocations, the core disagreement
regarding terrorism further reduces the possibility of coordination between the police
departments of both. Consequently, the sectarian militants would easily evade the Sindh police at
the Sindh-Punjab border1020.
There is a similar constitutional divide operative even when it comes to money laundering.
While money laundering is a federal subject, crimes – including corruption and terrorism – are a
provincial subject. As a result, the provincial government needs to conclusively establish the
crime and identify the proceeds of crime before the institution of the federal process for
prosecution for the offence of money laundering. Complicating matters, say lawyers, is the fact
that the criminal law system in Pakistan first looks for the crime and then for the evidence to
make the charges stick. For example, they say, the FIA catches money laundering but then
contends it is not supposed to prove the crime. As a result, the defence lawyer is able to make a
strong case of defamation against their client, who walks1021.
Compounding this error is the fact that many of the agencies tasked with investigation into such
offences – the corruption watchdog National Accountability Bureau or the Federal Investigation
Agency, for example – come under the remit of the federal government. Structured coordination
between the provincial and federal governments could potentially resolve this issue.
Operationally, however, the provincial governments end up foregoing the support of wellresourced federal institutions when they most need it and resorting to either poorer provincial
cousins who are less adequate to the task or to their already overburdened police departments1022.
Operational issues
Even the federal institutions are only in relatively better shape and capacity constraints are
frequently cited as a serious challenge to the enforcement of AML-CTF regulation. Lawyers and
public prosecutors, for example, complain about the LEAs’ inability to investigate and collect
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evidence in terrorism and money laundering cases1023. This inability stems from both lack of
expertise and training – especially regarding the laws and procedures governing the collection of
evidence1024 – but equally, manpower and funding1025. The patchy investigation, argue lawyers,
compromises their ability to secure convictions for such crimes1026. Meanwhile, the
government’s lack of faith in its agencies is reflected by the fact that the Nawaz Sharif
government, which was investigating 53 AML-CTF cases, chose to share the details of only one
with FATF1027.
For their part, the LEAs freely admit that financial investigations aren’t their strongest suit but
insist that their performance is pegged to how much the government chooses to allocate to
preventing AML-CTF offences, based on its own priorities1028. The implementation of AMLCTF regulation, they argue, has increased the volume of their work without having affected the
size of staff available to do the work1029. Meanwhile, lower down the totem pole, junior officers
privately admit that the regulation reinforces established power centres and concede to inordinate
amounts of “political influence” in cases involving white collar crime – one even spoke of
having received death threats – as well as the abuse of authority by investigating officials1030.
Further marring the record of LEAs is the internecine warfare: every agency characterised the
others as incompetent1031.
(This patchy investigation-low conviction rate loop creates its own set of problems. At the height
of the Taliban uprising in Karachi, for example, alleged militants were frequently killed by the
police in staged encounters1032. Senior police officials professed attacks on security personnel
while some government officials believed the encounters were a way of disguising the police’s
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inability to investigate terrorism financing1033. However, many police officers privately
confessed to extreme frustration with the role of investigative agencies, prosecution lawyers, the
judiciary as well as the military establishment in helping secure the release of militants arrested
by the police. The extrajudicial killings, they reasoned, cut through the bureaucratic red tape.)
As problematic as the issue of capacity is that of coordination. According to the existing
structure for the enforcement of AML-CTF regulation in Pakistan, 27 federal and provincial
agencies are involved in the effort. The most prominent among these are Nacta, the FIA, the
Federal Board of Revenue, Customs, the Anti-Narcotics Force, the corruption watchdog National
Accountability Bureau, the central bank, the securities regulator, Customs and the four provincial
Counter Terrorism Departments. The original plan was for a taskforce modelled on the UK
Financial Intelligence Unit, comprising public officials as well as private sector professionals
(bankers, chartered accountants, prosecutors, investigators etc), all housed in the FIA1034. Since
the then interior minister wanted to retain control of the taskforce, he insisted on having Nacta as
the lead agency. Since July 2017, Nacta has supposedly been working in close coordination with
the other 26 as well as the provincial governments; non-profit organisations; the judiciary and the
intelligence agencies1035.
On the ground, however, many deny such reports of cooperation. A police official involved with
the counter-terrorism effort says that while there is some cooperation between the military
establishment and the police – especially since the quantum of work has increased – the
implementation of FATF standards is essentially eyewash that makes everyone “feel better about
themselves1036”. On a more fundamental level, however, the police and agencies don’t really
listen to each other and personality-driven clashes drive deeper wedges between the two1037.
Others corroborate such an account: in July 2017, the paramilitary, the police and the ISI jointly
conducted a raid on Central Jail in Karachi and recovered cell phones and a pile of cash. While
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the Counter Terrorism Department attempted to pursue the investigation by filing an official
First Information Report, nothing came of it1038.
The key problem, agree most, is that the investigation and enforcement arms of the AML-CTF
regime are perennially locked in a lock step. For example, while the police can seize the assets of
proscribed groups, they have little to no input into the list itself, which is drawn up by the federal
interior ministry1039. And even though the police are heavily involved with the counter-terrorism
effort and its 425,000 officers across the country would further expand outreach1040, the police
lack the training that would allow them to investigate terrorism financing cases1041. Logically
then, the police ought to refer these cases to the FIA: in practice, however, only the central bank
and the intelligence agencies refer cases to the FIA1042 while the police generally pass on the case
to their Counter Terrorism Department. Even the link between the Financial Monitoring Unit at
the central bank and the FIA is of dubious utility: the FMU flags financial transactions over
$10,000 and enforcement is turned over to the FBR or the FIA, which determines how to proceed
with the case1043. Not only does this process reduce conscientiousness and critical thinking at the
FMU, it further renders the FIA dependent on evidence collected by a non-specialist, noninvestigative agency. One such example is a 2014-15 case, which surfaced in the small city of
Dera Ismail Khan, close to the Punjab-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial border. Militant groups
were found to be involved in illegal banking transactions from Karachi worth several million
rupees. However, neither the FIA nor the SBP thought to check on why ‘trade’ between the two
cities was so vibrant1044.
These problems are compounded in complex cases, which involve more agencies. FIA officials
say there is no legal framework to mandate joint investigations and joint teams are only ever
made by agency heads or when the government or the courts order the same1045. While there are
obvious data sharing benefits to the setting up of such teams, the involvement of multiple
agencies and the failure to clearly divide responsibilities often degenerates into a chaotic,
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uncoordinated mess1046. This view is corroborated by the numbers: between 2015 and 2018, 312
Suspicious Transaction Reports were filed, 50 cases went for trial and only two convictions were
secured1047.
Further undermining this sketchy performance is the absence of data. While the absence itself is
unsurprising – if the global AML-CTF regime cannot come up with reliable numbers, how can a
Third World country? – the responses of government officials administering the AML-CTF
regime in Pakistan are perhaps more revealing. Most readily confessed they had no idea about
the composition and/ or volume of outflows from Pakistan comprising trade, proceeds of crime
and/ or capital flight1048. Some suggested the construction of estimates using State Bank figures
provided to the Supreme Court regarding properties owned abroad by Pakistanis abroad or by the
figures given to the courts and/ or FATF regarding corruption1049. LEAs were even more
categoric in their assertion that there is no way to prove or estimate figures regarding terrorism
financing1050, not even about the volumes choked by the counter terrorism effort1051. Academics,
too, confessed ignorance: when public funding for counterterrorism wings of agencies such as
the Intelligence Bureau and the Counter-Terrorism Departments – let alone military budgets –
are under wraps, they argue, how is one to determine funding for militant groups? As a former
Nacta chief sardonically phrases it, “If we cannot give the exact numbers where tangible, dead
bodies are concerned, how can we put numbers to [intangible flows from] money laundering and
terrorism financing? If you guess at a number in your dissertation, people will begin quoting
you1052.”
Meanwhile, one interviewee cited a series of figures: between $7 billion and $9 billion a year
(according to a US State Department figure derived from the international narcotics control
strategy report); $7 billion a year (from an article in the Journal for Forensic Research and
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Criminology Journal1053) and another “US estimate” for the period between January 2015 and
October 2015 worth $16 billion, “which also includes money coming in through remittances”.
His conclusion was that there are no real estimates1054. However, a prominent economist pegs
outflows from Pakistan at more than $10 billion a year1055.
5.3

Collateral damage

Derisking
Despite all the problems associated with compliance, the specific costs of non-compliance are
seen as even more damaging for Pakistan. Having experienced pariah status in 1998, when the
US imposed economic sanctions on the country for conducting nuclear tests, most Pakistanis
voiced fears regarding potential derisking. As defined by the World Bank, derisking refers to the
unwillingness of global financial institutions to work with banks and remittance countries in
certain areas of the world due to a mix of cost/benefit considerations and AML-CTF concerns.
The problem ends up being particularly acute for those countries that generate low volumes and
present significant AML-CTF risks1056. The global reputation of the country, contend Pakistani
interlocutors, determines commercial relations with the world. If Pakistan is found wanting on
the AML-CTF compliance front, most global financial institutions will reduce or terminate
correspondent banking arrangements with Pakistani financial institutions1057. Not only will this
increase the cost of doing business for Pakistani companies and banks1058, the enhanced exposure
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of foreign banks to their Pakistani counterparts (due to the increased dollar clearance business)
will increase the compliance costs of the foreign banks doing business with Pakistani banks1059.
Not only will this have severe repercussions for trade – commercial transactions will be delayed,
excessively scrutinized and carry long implementation wait times – it will also strain Pakistan’s
relationships across the world as the trading relationships become more difficult. Further,
Pakistan will also find it difficult to raise money from the international capital markets – through
government bonds, loans or even aid – if the world thinks it can be used for financing
terrorism1060. North Korea and Iran have survived the FATF blacklisting so far, argue some,
because both are largely self-reliant as compared to Pakistan. With annual exports and imports
worth $30 billion and $68 billion respectively and remittances at $19.9 billion1061, Pakistan
desperately needs the infusion of aid, loans, remittances and trade. Unlike Iran or Iraq, it can’t
even swap oil for food1062.
These problems will be compounded by the levy of potential sanctions. Not only do most
international banks comply with UN and US sanctions in order to mitigate their own risk1063,
trade, Foreign Direct Investment, portfolio investment1064 and grants will be further affected.
While trade sanctions would potentially lower the current account deficit since Pakistan will not
be importing as much as it does, these ‘gains’ will be more than offset by lower exports, higher
unemployment as export industries shut down and consequent inflation1065.
However, others are more worried about what AML-CTF non-compliance represents in a
domestic context, both politically and economically. In Pakistan’s case, they contend, the biggest
losses are those of capital flight and of potential tax revenues1066. Tax revenue losses translate
into lesser investment in health, education and social security, which lowers the Human
Development Index and, correspondingly, the long-term growth prospects of the economy.
(While some of these losses can be – initially, at least – partially made up by a greater reliance
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on indirect taxes, these will disproportionately burden the poor and further exacerbate the
tensions in society.) The reduced prospects, they say, causes underdevelopment but, as
problematically, the breakdown of the social contract: lesser social cohesion and more violence
and militancy in the country1067.
The economic consequences of capital flight and lost tax revenues are budget deficits, which
create the need for loans and a corresponding build-up of debt. Since significant debt overhangs
preclude the floatation of government bonds, the country is forced to either borrow more
expensive money to service debt or deplete its reserves1068. With the demand for dollars higher
than the supply, the exchange rate collapses and triggers hyperinflation, both feeding off each
other in a vicious cycle1069. The consequent collapse of the economy devastates the population
and leads to widespread rioting. Even the military will not be able to handle such an outcome,
they caution, since not only will it be rendered immobile, even the soldiers will be rioting as
basic necessities become unaffordable1070.
Surveillance
Most interviewees agree that the current AML-CTF regime feeds into financial sector
surveillance by the Deep State and will be used to strengthen its position respective to the other
sources of power such as the political, economic and judicial elites. Many fear that data
generated by AML-CTF controls will be used as leverage for the political victimisation of
politicians by the Deep State. Several interviewees pointed to the multitude of money laundering
cases against Asif Zardari, Nawaz Sharif and other politicians as evidence of the same1071;
meanwhile a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is also being investigated for judicial
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misconduct for failure to declare the properties owned by his spouse as well as his adult children
abroad1072. Further, argue some, this data is also likely to be used against the opponents and
detractors of the Deep State, including civil society organisations, NGOs and INGOs working in
the areas of fundamental rights and democracy, that challenge the established state narrative on
national security. Challenges to this narrative, they maintain, is inevitably accompanied by
attempts to impose greater control over people. An example of how the military establishment
has previously misused global regulations to impose its own agenda is the law regarding
employees at nuclear facilities. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Pakistan is
committed to non-proliferation. However, the Deep State chose to interpret the commitment to
mean that surveillance of employees – in derogation of their fundamental rights, including the
right to privacy – was essential to preventing and curbing proliferation1073. A feature of AMLCTF regulation that exacerbates these worries is the lack of an end-date for prosecution: as a
former attorney general argues, while the Income Tax ordinance has cut-off date of five years
and the Companies ordinance, 10 years, AML-CTF regulation has no cut-off date1074.
However, others also refer to the susceptibility of AML-CTF regulation to abuse by political
governments. The 1990s, for example, saw several successive governments institute corruption
cases against political opponents and a measure of the accountability measures currently being
pursued against Zardari and Sharif are attributed to Prime Minister Imran Khan1075. That said,
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are not the only potential targets: a former minister, for
example, speaks of how his government told banks that the tighter controls on bank transfers
were part of the AML-CTF initiative whereas the real objective was to curb tax evasion and
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capital flight1076. Better surveillance, contends a banker, makes for better prosecutions. As such,
he locates the government’s rationale for AML-CTF regulation in a mix of surveillance, political
or economic motives. Even so, he points to the fact that intelligence agencies collect information
for political leverage, not for prosecutions1077.
While optimists believe enhanced surveillance will only affect PEPs or benefit the friends and
business associates of the ruling elite1078, others point to the latent potential for abuse contained
in the regulation. For example, the Supreme Court’s demand for a list of those Pakistanis who
own property abroad yielded a list of 100 Pakistanis including businesspersons, doctors, soldiers
and lawyers. While there are currently no reports of the 100 being ‘targeted’ further, the
information in itself is both key to constructing detailed financial profiles of wealthy Pakistanis
and can further be leveraged for political and/ or economic gains. As discussed above,
information about the properties owned by the spouse and children of a Supreme Court judge is
being mobilised to bring pressure to bear on the judge for his professional decisions. Similarly,
the money laundering references against Asif Zardari were leveraged to secure his support
against Nawaz Sharif. A logical next step could potentially include more invasive tax
investigations against higher net worth individuals, both to bolster tax revenues but also as a
means of securing greater payoffs and kickbacks for government officials within the tax
machinery. Indeed, an interviewee fears the imposition of travel controls and the legitimate
transfer of money as a prelude to increasing micromanagement of the population by the Deep
State1079.
That said, there is an understudied aspect to surveillance: responsibilisation. The existing AMLCTF regime forces individuals and institutions such as accountants, auditors, jewellers, lawyers,
non-profit organisations, real estate brokers, banks and designated non-banking financial
institutions to report suspicions regarding money laundering and terrorism financing to state
authorities. While the stipulation is meant to communicate the seriousness of the effort to combat
both phenomena, it institutes a wider culture of problematic surveillance. First, the process
‘normalises’ a pervasive, enduring surveillance reminiscent of Foucault’s variation on Bentham
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Panopticon, where everyone is accustomed to the idea of constant scrutiny. Second, more
problematically, surveillance leads to the breakdown of societal bonds in the wake of ‘civilian
policing’. The divisive power Foucault speaks of – that is the ability to segregate certain
individuals from others – reduces the potential for what Arendt sees as concerted political action
against a regime by those most affected by it. For example, many of the above individuals and
institutions owe a duty of care to their clients – most prominently, lawyers, accountants, banks.
By forcing them to report on clients, the state systematically destroys all other relationships and
bonds holding people together and recasts the primary relationship of the citizen with the state
alone. While a discussion of the sociological, psychological and political implications of the
situation is beyond the scope of this project, the situation befits a dystopian fiction, where every
citizen is deemed to owe their primary loyalty to the state only; to faithfully execute the agenda
of the state; with the added responsibility of being their brother’s keeper.
There is also an interesting foreign angle to this data mining and surveillance, which shows how
AML-CTF regulation further re-entrenches established power relations in networks that span
borders. While Tsingou makes a significant point about banks surveilling clients to help design
better financial products, the issue is of far wider applicability than Tsingou envisages. The
political risk industry, for example, has grown exponentially since 9/111080. Once seen as the
poor cousin to the security risk and due diligence industries, political risk has since matured into
a growth industry in its own right1081. Companies such as Control Risks Group and IHS-Jane’s,
for example, offer tailored reports and analyses to their clients about the political threats and
potential disruptions they face in many countries around the world. These reports then form the
basis of business decision-making on a variety of subjects including ground operations, supply
chains, investments, regulation, contract negotiation and tax1082. Critically, these reports are
generated using detailed information about countries and their citizens.
In Pakistan, for example, both Controlled Risks and IHS Jane’s have hired journalists and police
officers, among others, to help write reports, conduct background checks and due diligence for
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corporations and serve as consultants on key projects1083. At the time the industry was in its
nascent stage, reports regarding industries and key political and economic actors were based on
unproven, subjective data – as one consultant puts it, “what we’ve heard from people in the
industry, gossip – generally, information that would be highly libellous, were it to be published”
– and studded with caveats and qualifiers. However, these consultants say there is now an
increasing shift towards verifiable, big data: public records, for example. Since public records in
Pakistan are maintained in English, there are significant amounts of data available (as compared
to, say, China or Myanmar) but, argue these interlocutors, the data is mostly unfiltered and
unverifiable against other sources1084. In such a situation, information culled from AML-CTF
controls can help develop richer data sets by, for example, mapping land registry records against
records of financial transactions.
While most consultants are reluctant to theorise about potential uses of this consolidated data or
the AML-CTF data alone, they do concede that foreign security agencies –particularly the Five
Eyes1085 – would be interested in the same, sometimes to verify their own data and at others, as a
gratis substitute. These consultants say that some of the data generated by the political risk
industry is already being shared with agencies on an informal basis since many of those working
in the political risk business are either drawn from the MI5 or MI6 or have close contacts within
the agencies. The informality of the arrangements, they say, owes to the need to walk the
tightrope between legal and illegal sharing of data1086. However, the arrangement can be seen as
additionally advantageous in that it helps establish multiple sources of information while
maintaining plausible deniability regarding work processes. For example, several consultants are
known to “share” fees with “informants” in sensitive government departments – a revelation that
could be embarrassing for foreign governments, should their agents – as opposed to third-party
consultants – be discovered to be doing so.
Political alienation
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The issue of political alienation in the wake of AML-CTF regulation can be sliced two ways. In
the first, political alienation speaks to what is known as the democratic deficit in the literature
regarding global economic regulation. Given the preponderant influence of the G7 countries in
setting up the AML-CTF regime, AML-CTF regulation can also be seen as further skewing the
North-South power dynamic. As seen in the discussion regarding the evolution of AML-CTF
regulation in Chapter 3 and further corroborated by Pakistani interlocutors, Pakistan lacks a seat
at the table where these regulations are made. As such, it has no input into the content of the
global regulations; little autonomy regarding the processes of their implementation or
enforcement; and negligible ability to mitigate the deleterious impact of the regulations on its
economy and polity. The similarities of the AML-CTF regime to the neoliberal regime are
striking and, significantly, many of the governance-related charges laid at neoliberalism’s door
apply here too: the lack of legitimacy, accountability and transparency, coupled with bias and
opportunism. More simply: the distance from the sources of global power render Pakistan,
despite its ostensible sovereignty, incapable of opting out of the AML-CTF regime.
That said, the issue of political alienation becomes even more compelling in light of existing
democratic processes in Pakistan. First, the question of holding an elected government
accountable for transgressing the defined limits of delegated power does not arise when global
regulations are foisted on the government and the Parliament as a fait accompli. That is, the
inability to opt-out and the lack of any alternatives precludes meaningful democratic
participation. Political alienation – or the growing estrangement between the people and political
power – is a natural corollary to a situation where citizens and their elected representatives lack
the power to affect the laws they are governed by. As such, the institution of AML-CTF
regulation is a direct attack on both democracy and parliamentary processes.
Second, the imposition of AML-CTF regulations further sharpens the civil-military divide by
empowering the Deep State at the cost of other power centres such as the political and the
judicial. It also enables the military establishment to tighten its hold over civil society by using
AML-CTF controls as a means of institutionalising political victimisation as well as an intrusive
surveillance of citizens and rights groups; some fear micromanagement including travel controls
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as well as controls on the legal transfer of money1087. The more authoritarian avatar of the Deep
State naturally further erodes any democratic pretensions.
There is a credible argument to be made regarding the general weakness of parliamentary
processes in Pakistan, including the lack of meaningful legislative debates. For example, an
interviewee spoke about having discussed an amnesty scheme with private-sector professionals
instead of parliamentarians1088; another voiced frustration at his inability to get the parliament to
agree to a law that would mandate parliamentary scrutiny of agreements with foreign
governments1089; yet another mentioned the strategic sidestepping of parliamentary processes by
even elected governments1090. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, these developments occurred
as a result of a skewed power dynamic in a particular historical context. The critical takeaway is
recognition of the fact that AML-CTF regulations exacerbate these power imbalances and
bludgeon a weak democracy.
5.4

Conclusion

While the critical literature documents some of the problems associated with the implementation
of AML-CTF regulations, these remain mostly confined to specifics such as derisking or
enhanced compliance costs. As such, there is a need to re-examine the other, incidental issues
that stem from the conceptual flaws of the regime; the structural exigencies of economies and
polities; as well as the political costs imposed by the interplay of global and local forces on the
terrain of AML-CTF regulation. As the foregoing shows, some jurisdictions clearly suffer more
than others and some benefit more than most.
The question implicit in this line of enquiry is simply this: given the severity of the consequences
associated with implementation, do AML-CTF regulations merit such an exhaustive
globalisation campaign? The final chapter offers some thoughts.
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion
This project began with a simple question: why is anti-money laundering and counter terrorism
financing regulation important despite its impotence? The quest for answers has involved several
detours (productive and non-productive!) through theories of power, global governance, the
weeds of Pakistan’s internal and external politics as well as its economy. As expected in a
project of this nature, there are few definitive answers and mostly a jumble of ideas for
subsequent projects.
6.1 Why AML-CTF?
Simply, AML-CTF regulation is important both for what it delivers and what it represents. Since
9/11, surveillance has emerged as possibly the most divisive political issue of our times. While
the frequency of ‘scandals’ such as the Snowden disclosures or Cambridge Analytica have
trained public attention on surveillance and privacy concerns, this focus remains locked within a
national security paradigm for the most part – the hacked emails, the phone taps. There is less
scrutiny of the other pillars of a rapidly expanding surveillance apparatus, the most glaring
omission perhaps being financial sector surveillance. As discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 5, the
global AML-CTF regime is part of this surveillance apparatus, delivering to regulators masses of
information and knowledge about the financial dealings of citizens everywhere.
Two features of the AML-CTF regime are particularly noteworthy. The first is the inexorable
nature of financial-sector surveillance; the second is that it guarantees a role for the security state
in perpetuity. Both are problematic. First, financial sector surveillance is the most dangerous
form of surveillance because it does not allow for even self-censorship. Where we shop, the
magazines we read, our duty-free purchases – they say things about us, our habits and our
political views. We leave digital trails to even our secret vices and personal struggles – gambling
receipts, tax claims and psychiatrists’ bills. Much of this information is, indeed, banal. But bit by
bit, a composite emerges: who we are, what we value and even what we aspire to.
Second, AML-CTF regulation enhances the ability of states to monitor and control the financial
dealings, and so the lives, of their citizens. Significantly, the regulation comes without even a
statute of limitations. At a basic level, for example, AML-CTF safeguards around the world
discourage citizens from financial transactions with Iran, even when these citizens are of Iranian
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origin . At an advanced level, however, AML-CTF regulations enable states to construct detailed
profiles – financial and otherwise – of their citizens, including corporations. These profiles are
based on disclosures by citizens, coupled with mandatory reporting by their banks, their
accountants, insurance companies, realtors, jewellers and even casinos. This data enables both
the commodification and the governability of citizens1091 by creating an informational
asymmetry that skews the balance of power between the consumer and the producer, the citizen
and the state. Critically, this ‘security state’ does not only operate within individual jurisdictions:
AML-CTF regulation also enhances the ability of global regulators as well as the intelligence
agencies in a few powerful jurisdictions to monitor and control less powerful states and, through
them, the lives of citizens who are not their own. For example, Pakistan is pushed to crack down
on the Jamaatud Dawa, despite the fact that the group does not engage in militant activities
within Pakistan and many Pakistani citizens benefit from its charity and relief work in the
country.
As such, the AML-CTF regime – as an example of a surveillance apparatus – represents
something infinitely more dangerous: the belief that constant surveillance is the right of the state/
global regulator and consent to surveillance is the obligation of a citizen/ weaker state1092. To
evoke Black again, the process of “giving account” in a relationship both constitutes the
relationship and is shaped by the relationship. AML-CTF regulation feeds into and amplifies this
fundamental power imbalance, both between the state and citizen as well as at an inter-state
level.
For many, the idea of the state/ global regulators knowing details about their wire transfers, for
example, is unremarkable. Most buy into the regulator’s argument that those who have nothing
to hide have nothing to fear1093. However, there is little attention paid to the fact that the ‘nothing
to hide’ argument is structured to facilitate ‘suspicion-in-the-making’ and inspire defensiveness
in those objecting to surveillance1094. More simply, surveillance normalises a culture of
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suspicion1095 and the nothing-to-hide argument justifies surveillance. The core issue is how
surveillance and restrictions – as well as the reflexive interplay between them – affects lives
lived outside the security sphere. The broader issue is of understanding the surveillanceindustrial complex – how global capital, state agencies and local political economies
collude to effect surveillance 1096 – and how it operates through mechanics and processes
such as AML-CTF regulation.
6.2 Revisiting power and the global AML-CTF architecture
The ubiquity of AML-CTF regulation can only be explained by an understanding of the power
that undergirds it. By teasing out similarities and differences in influential theories of power,
Chapter 2 attempted an outline of the conditions essential for exercising power as well as a
sketch of the modalities of its operation. Two key points bear repetition here: first, while the
exercise of power requires the complicity of the subjugated as well as the perception regarding
the legitimacy of power, the operationalization of power depends on a series of practices such as
the inculcation of group think; bureaucratic power; scienticisation; crisis discourse; divisive
power; and dressage. Simply this: AML-CTF regulation would not work unless, for example,
swathes of the global population were persuaded that money laundering and terrorism financing
is an imminent crisis that will destroy all they hold dear in life and that the world needs to thus
be divided into the AML-CTF-compliant and the non-compliant. Second, the interaction of
powers, whether at a global level or at a domestic level, generates a reflexive, internal
transformation within each source of power. Power struggles do not produce orderly, predictable
results since size doesn’t always matter: smaller powers – such as militant groups in Pakistan –
can also have outsized effects on regulatory outcomes, depending on their imbrication within a
society and a polity.
By deconstructing the AML-CTF regulatory architecture as well as the processes of its evolution,
Chapter 3 showed how regulation emerges from the dynamic interaction between multiple sets of
actors, institutions and networks, each with their individual interests and sources of power. Two
points are particularly significant here. First, given the multiplicity of interests and influences at

1095

See, generally, David Lyon.
See, for example, the collection of essays in Kirstie Ball & Laureen Snider (eds), The Surveillance-Industrial
Complex: a political economy of surveillance (New York, Routledge, 2013).
1096

237

play, no one actor/ institution/ network – not even a state – can be seen as unidimensional,
monolithic singularity with clearly defined and impregnable interests. This inherent fluidity, in
reflexive interaction with other, similarly fluid actors/ institutions/ networks, makes it impossible
to identify a singular author or driver for AML-CTF regulation. Second, the seeming anonymity
of ‘the global regulator’ is compounded by the invisibility of certain key actors/ institutions/
networks such as global capital. An account of AML-CTF regulation that characterizes the US as
the central ordering force, for example, neglects the fact that a) the US state is also subject to the
pressures of capital (among others), and b) the invisibility of global capital is no guarantee of its
being uninvolved in shaping AML-CTF regulation to its benefit through, for example, a focus on
corruption or criminal activities rather than trade malpractices.
6.3 Revisiting the AML-CTF rubric in Pakistan
Pakistan’s AML-CTF problems are intimately entwined with both its foreign policy and
domestic politics. The Pakistani state has become fairly dependent on militant groups as a tool of
foreign policy and an AML-CTF crackdown threatens this. Had the Pak-US relationship not
soured so or were the US less suspicious of China’s motives in the region, the issue of Pakistan’s
AML-CTF compliance would have probably been brushed under the carpet as it was for several
decades. But things being as they are, Pakistan is inexorably being pushed into a corner.
Simultaneously, global AML-CTF regulation helps the powerful military establishment effect a
selective, domestic crackdown on its political and judicial adversaries, thereby shoring itself up
as the pre-eminent power in Pakistan.
However, foreign and domestic political exigencies aside, Pakistan also faces grave challenges to
implementation that have little to do with its manifest sins. These problems have everything to
do with the conceptual flaws in the AML-CTF framework; the peculiar structure of Pakistan’s
economy and polity; as well as the political harms triggered by the operation of AML-CTF
regulation. While the state’s inability/ unwillingness to crack down on militant groups is
frequently criticized, for example, there is less discussion of the problems Pakistan faces in
transforming its economy to resemble those in developed countries or the longer-term problems
posed by the political alienation that AML-CTF regulation engenders.
6.4 Contributions
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This project advances three modest theses regarding the global AML-CTF regime.
The interaction of powers thesis
This thesis explains AML-CTF regulation as the outcome of the interaction of powers, both at
the global level and within polities. It does so by making three, interrelated arguments. First,
contrary to mainstream and critical interpretations available in the existing literature, this thesis
contends that the creation, implementation and enforcement of global AML-CTF regulation
depends on a coordinated hegemony effected by multiple powerful authors/ implementers/
enforcers (individual state actors such as the US, institutions such as FATF or the IMF and even
networks such as the G7) in derogation of the interests of other actors. The key point is that no
singular state or institution is solely responsible for the way the regulation is designed or how it
works. This strategic alliance between certain groups enables each actor/institution/network to
use their independent power and legitimacy to forge a common ideology or dominant discourse
regarding AML-CTF regulation. This discourse feeds into and amplifies the power and the
legitimacy of the larger AML-CTF project, which secures the complicity or even the (grudging)
consent of the subordinate groups (here, those actors whose interests are adversely affected).
More simply, the prevalent discourse co-opts the regulated or the subordinated groups as
participants in their own governance, either by convincing them of the salubriousness of the
regulation or through the prospect of ‘punishments’ for non-compliance – derisking, for
example. Both the multiplicity of regulators as well as the complicity of the governed are critical
to forestalling accountability for global AML-CTF regulation: not only do the governed sign up
for the regulations themselves, the fact that no singular actor or entity can be identified as the
primary mover of the regulation generally precludes accountability-related challenges.
However, this is not to suggest that the trajectory of global regulatory harmonization follows a
linear path. As Chapters 4 and 5 show, the imposition of this power is countered by considerable
resistance and pushback from smaller powers such as Pakistan that successfully resist
implementing AML-CTF regulation by deploying a series of ‘hidden’ or subterranean strategies.
This allows for greater plausible deniability: to resist or defy the regulations without seeming to
do either. As such, the outcome of power struggles is rarely predictable, even when the balance
of power is firmly in favour of one party.
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Second, the thesis contends that regulation the interests of actors/ institutions/ networks are
constantly evolving, both as a consequence of pressures mounted by the sources of power within
a polity (that is, military, judicial, economic, political and ideological power) or the various
constituencies of these actors etc. This ‘evolution’ challenges both the notion of static interests
on part of these actors/ institutions/ networks as well as the notion of their independent,
unfettered autonomy. States, for example, respond to the pressure of their military as well as
their economic actors just as FATF responds to the pressure of the US, its most powerful G7
members, as well as the pressure of India, a relatively less powerful G77 member. Critically,
these interests also evolve due to the engagement of these actors with other actors. The
interaction between FATF and the G7, for example, transforms both and results in regulation that
looks materially different to what it would have, had either FATF or G7 been operating on their
own. Further, these interests are also influenced by the non-elite constituencies of these actors
etc: for example, Pakistan’s resistance to AML-CTF regulation is conditioned by its religious
groups as well as its military. Similarly, the interests of the UK also evolve as a consequence of
the pressure from its islands as well as the US, a key ally.
Third, this thesis argues that even the military, judicial, economic, political and ideological
sources of power evolve as a consequence of their interaction with each other. This evolution
further conditions their interests and, as a corollary, the operationalization of the regulation both
at a global level and within a jurisdiction. For example, after 9/11, even though the US had both
a political and an economic interest in arresting money laundering and terrorism financing in
Pakistan, its military interests in Afghanistan precluded the strict enforcement of AML-CTF
regulation in Pakistan. That is, its political and economic power was tempered by the interaction
with military power. Similarly, while military power in Pakistan has an interest in protecting its
favoured militant groups from CTF regulation, it simultaneously has an interest in ratcheting up
implementation of AML regulation against political and judicial power.
Political economy versus criminological approach thesis
This thesis challenges the flawed identification of AML-CTF regulation as a criminological
exercise and advocates greater recognition of the global political economy of money laundering.
While Tsingou has made a similar claim previously, her approach is hobbled by the fact that she
reads states and networks such as the OECD as the fulcrum of the AML-CTF regime. While
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states and networks matter, they are significant primarily because they advance the material
interests of power sources within a polity. That is, the position assumed by a state on the global
stage is mostly conditioned and determined by domestic sources of power: military, economic,
political etc. Even where states respond to pressures mounted by other states, the response too is
conditioned by what its local constituencies want. The autonomy of decision-making Tsingou
attributes to states and networks does not exist. The failure to investigate the triggers operating
on states/ networks creates a blind spot of sorts: even as an ardent critic of the global AML-CTF
regime, Tsingou is unable to see beneficiaries of the regulation other than the state.
The thesis advances the proposition that the ‘other beneficiaries’ of money laundering include
capital: financial institutions that charge commissions on laundering transactions; service
industries (such as lawyers who set up shell companies) and property markets. Obviously, the
fortunes of the state are tied to these economic actors too: for example, the state benefits from
higher tax revenues as well as improved data regarding economic activities and employment
generation. However, the advantages to capital cannot be underestimated, particularly when
more than trade-related malpractices account for over two-thirds of illicit financial flows around
the world. To put it another way: the focus on criminal activities as the source of illicit flows or
the role of the state in effecting AML-CTF regulation detracts from the centrality of capital to
the laundering business. This sleight of hand, this misplaced attention ‘invisibilises’ capital by
directing regulatory attention towards the small fish (the drug dealers etc), thereby allowing
capital to operate with greater impunity.
This thesis argues that the current regulatory focus on the detritus of society – drugs dealers,
human traffickers, corrupt politicians etc – replicates deviancy theories of crime control by
labelling ‘bad’ individuals “launderers”, with a view to willfully obscuring the systemic aspects
of laundering. To rephrase: the attention paid to deviants allows systemic actors to escape
scrutiny. Accordingly, this thesis makes a case for – to borrow a cliché from corporate
criminology literature – rending that veil. If laundering is as terrible for the global economy as it
is purported to be, there’s every reason to nab the biggest money launderers, those that account
for the bulk of laundering.
Political fallout thesis
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The thesis examines the negative effects of the global AML-CTF regime on established power
hierarchies, both globally and locally. It argues that AML-CTF regulation feeds into skewed
power dynamics at both the global and local levels and re-entrenches the dominant powers at the
expense of weaker powers. The delicate balance of power in the both political ecosystems (the
global and the local) is thus upended with the FATF-mandated calls for greater financial sector
surveillance, accountability and mandatory ‘civilian policing’ and this re-entrenchment paves the
way for more exploitative relationships at every level.
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the global AML-CTF regime mobilises the power of the global
‘ruling elite’ (that is, the powerful actors) on the world stage to construct a regulatory enterprise
that delivers financial and surveillance gains to them while reinforcing their dominant position.
Chapter 4, meanwhile, showed that geopolitics is the primary driver behind AML-CTF
regulation (and not concerns about the health of the global financial system) and pressure to
comply with the regulations is mostly a reflection of a jurisdiction’s foreign politics. That is, a
country’s relationships with its key allies and adversaries as well as its appeasement or
frustration of their political and/ or geostrategic objectives determines how the country will be
treated at the FATF forum and the amount of pressure it will be subjected to.
This thesis also contends that the imperatives of domestic sources of power (military, economic,
political, ideological and judicial) as well as the interaction between these sources plays a critical
role in affecting the implementation of AML-CTF regulation in a jurisdiction. Further, in
countries with fragile political systems, global AML-CTF regulation feeds into domestic power
centres and, again, re-entrenches the ruling elite at the expense of smaller, more marginalized
players with severe consequences for domestic politics. Finally, global AML-CTF regulation
also produces several unintended but perverse consequences such as surveillance.
Critically, in the local context, the power imbalance is exacerbated, both between sources of
power in a polity as well as between states and their citizens. On the one hand, there is the
enhancement of powers available to the state – lower bars to conviction or surveillance, for
example – that derogate from the political rights of the citizen (for example, the right to be
presumed innocent in criminal proceedings or the right to privacy). On the other hand, there are
the longer-terms costs to societies and communities that accrue from the gradual distancing of
citizens from the affairs of the state. For example, the erosion of sovereignty at international law
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– as represented by the global AML-CTF regulation – renders political governments in Pakistan
unable to respond to the legitimate fears of their citizens regarding derisking or the FATFmandated structural overhaul of the economy. Meanwhile, the consolidation of power available
to the military establishment that occurs through AML-CTF regulation further reduces the ability
of political or judicial actors to serve as checks on the Deep State. With all other systems and
institutions thus compromised and crippled, is the future of global and local politics a series of
authoritarian regimes? How are citizens to feel relevant to their state or to hold it accountable for
its excesses? Why vote or even bother?
6.5 Conclusion
As mentioned above, there are no simple answers to questions regarding the global AML-CTF
regime – just a series of questions fit for further interrogation and research. However, the
demonstrable downsides – the enhanced ‘governability’ and commodification of citizens
everywhere – are significant enough to embark on an immediate reassessment of the drivers and
aims of the global regulatory regime. This project is one such attempt.
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